Return of the samurai
9/8/15 20:32![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
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talkpoliticsLast month the lower chamber of the Diet, the Japanese parliament, became a scene of big drama. Opposition politicians were holding protest signs and chanting, "No to war!" At the square outside, tens of thousands were screaming for Abe's resignation, and "Stop the fascists!" Seeing these sort of reactions, an outside observer could've thought that Shinzo Abe had decided to walk the steps of Gen. Tojo, the war-time leader of Japan, and was embarking on an imperialist invasion across East Asia. In fact the protest was against something not so dramatic: Abe and his ruling Liberal Democrats (which are actually the conservative party in Japan) were trying to pass a series of bills that'd remove part of the restrictions to the Japanese defense forces, and allow them to be deployed abroad in help of allied countries.
While that's considered a routine obligation almost anywhere else in the world, in Japan things look a bit differently. With the adoption of the current Constitution imposed by the US after the defeat of the Japanese Empire in WW2, Japan completely renounced the use of force as a way of achieving its international goals. But what's really worrying the Japanese public and the opposition is not just the fact that the country is about to say goodbye to pacifism, but mostly Abe's readiness to achieve his goals at any cost, even if he has to bypass the Constitution in the process.
The new security policy is being met with hostility not just within Japan. The Chinese Xinhua news agency has called the bill "a nightmare scenario" , and then published an article warning that the "historically bloodied samurai sword could again be wielded in every corner of the world". South Korea, which is still quarreling with Japan over a small archipelago, definitely still remembers the cruelty of the colonial Japanese rule from the early to mid 20th century, and it's got a lot of objections as well. Japan's initiative is coming at a time when tensions in the region are rising - China is building the Great Wall of Sand in territories contested by the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and the US still hasn't abandoned its Pivot to Asia agenda. In the complex knot of Asian politics, the Japanese decision could potentially be a game-changer.
Taken on their own, the amendments are not meant to introduce such big changes in the structure and prerogatives of the Japanese military. Japan already has one of the world's largest armies in the world anyway. But even after a 0.8% raise of the military budget, Japan is seriously lagging behind its main geopolitical rival, China. So it's normal to conclude that the slight raising of the military budget is not directly related to particular risks to the country's national security. Meanwhile, Abe is not hiding his ambition to make Japan a "normal" country, capable of defending itself if necessary, and supporting its allies where requested.
We certainly can't be speaking of a "re-militarization" of Japan - if for anything, because the country is not planning to increase the number of its troops even by one person. The plan is mostly about an overall improvement of the capacity of the air forces and the capabilities of countering submarine activity. The bulk of those efforts are about improving the capacity for conducting short-range amphibian operations, and mid-range expedition operations. All in all, the Japanese military is not trying to expand, but rather to become more balanced, and start using its resources more efficiently.
What the public is really concerned about is that the measures proposed by Abe are meant to bypass the national referendum that's obligatory in case of constitutional amendments. The analysts are also critical of the unusual haste (by Japanese standards) that the reform is being pushed through with. Most polls indicate that only about 1/4 of the Japanese public supports the new bill, and a large majority are opposed to it, especially to a possible hasty adoption of the new measures. It's not like the Japanese constitution cannot be changed, sure it can, like any other constitution. But Abe should follow the established procedures first, because he's clearly lacking the necessary public support right now. The actions of the ruling party and the cabinet could undermine the constitutional order in Japan, because they'd potentially leave opportunities for various interpretations of the main law, which could in turn affect the rights and liberties of the Japanese people. Abe is obviously hell-bent on setting such a precedent, so the question is why exactly now.
And the answer could be rooted back in 2012, when Abe won the election with promises of economic and structural reform that was hard to implement in Japan, due to the strong influence of the corporate interests. His inability to put his economic vision to action is the reason he's trying to distract public attention with these unpopular military reforms. The problem with that strategy is, since he is already running out of political capital, if he pushes the defense changes too hard, he might turn out to be without any credit of trust left for actually changing the economy.
This hurrying with the reform might be also partially explained with the internal situation in Japan. Abe is hoping to be re-elected chairman of his party in September, which would ensure his leadership position at least until 2018 when the next parliamentary elections are scheduled. But if he wants to rule until then, he'll have to deal with several serious domestic problems, and fast. The first one is the signing of the hugely unpopular TPP agreement before the end of this year; the other one is the VAT hike which should happen until late 2016; and finally, the election for the upper chamber of the Diet, which could cost the Liberals their majority, exactly because of their defense policy. So that's why Abe is pushing so urgently for these changes, otherwise he's risking the next general elections for his party. And those are just the domestic effects of a change that's bound to resonate across the entire region.
Of course, China is watching the situation with the greatest caution of them all. The relations between the two regional powers have been swinging from one extreme to another for the last decade - from partnership to suspicion to pure provocation. The disputes over a few small islands and the surrounding territorial waters are fueling the tensions. So, with or without the defense reform, the strategic confrontation between those two will be there to stay for a while. Right now, China's been maintaining a mostly composed tone - partly because they understand that these changes were expected and predictable since the very moment Abe supported the restructuring of the Japanese military a year ago. On the other hand though, China understands that if it adopts a rougher tone against Japan, it could only give more ammo to Abe, who'd now be able to explain his actions with China's behavior, and thus earn more support at home.
The case with South Korea is a bit more complicated. There's still a historical fear in the country from the memory of the Japanese militarism, and the South Korean politicians are extremely suspicious of what's happening across the sea. On the other hand, the Koreans are aware that there's only one other stable democracy in the region, which they could rely upon in case of a crisis with North Korea - and that's Japan.
Unlike China and South Korea, most South-East Asian countries seem prone to forgetting the past in the name of a more secure future. They are viewing the increase of the Japanese military capabilities as a way of enhancing their own defensive potential. Japan is one of the few regional powers that could provide a real counter-balance to the Chinese expansionism. The Philippines, Vietnam, even India and Australia, are viewing the increased Japanese activeness in the defense sphere as something that should be embraced rather than opposed. Because of China's increasing influence, the 10 countries of South-East Asia have pumped up their military budgets, and are feeling very nervous. The region is getting armed very fast - a SIPRI research found that the military expenditure of those countries has increased by 62% for the last decade. So, for the lesser players in this equation, the introduction of a big potential ally like Japan could be a balancing game-changer.
The US could also benefit from Japan's detour from pacifism. Because it'd gain an ally that could rush to the aid if the US military in Asia needs it. In the long term, the relations between these two trans-Pacific partners will be strengthening, and Japan's increased military capabilities could be helpful to the US, because they'd bring a more balanced distribution of responsibilities in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Right now, the situation is such that if North Korea launches a missile that could reach Japanese territory, the Japanese would be able to intercept it without a problem. But if that same missile could be directed to the US base in Guam, any Japanese intervention would be considered unconstitutional.
Taken by itself, the Japanese military reform is neither too dramatic, nor is it going to have a direct short-term effect. But still, it's yet another sign of the growing militarism in Asia, where the tensions between the dragon and the samurai is going to become ever more pronounced.
While that's considered a routine obligation almost anywhere else in the world, in Japan things look a bit differently. With the adoption of the current Constitution imposed by the US after the defeat of the Japanese Empire in WW2, Japan completely renounced the use of force as a way of achieving its international goals. But what's really worrying the Japanese public and the opposition is not just the fact that the country is about to say goodbye to pacifism, but mostly Abe's readiness to achieve his goals at any cost, even if he has to bypass the Constitution in the process.
The new security policy is being met with hostility not just within Japan. The Chinese Xinhua news agency has called the bill "a nightmare scenario" , and then published an article warning that the "historically bloodied samurai sword could again be wielded in every corner of the world". South Korea, which is still quarreling with Japan over a small archipelago, definitely still remembers the cruelty of the colonial Japanese rule from the early to mid 20th century, and it's got a lot of objections as well. Japan's initiative is coming at a time when tensions in the region are rising - China is building the Great Wall of Sand in territories contested by the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea, and the US still hasn't abandoned its Pivot to Asia agenda. In the complex knot of Asian politics, the Japanese decision could potentially be a game-changer.
Taken on their own, the amendments are not meant to introduce such big changes in the structure and prerogatives of the Japanese military. Japan already has one of the world's largest armies in the world anyway. But even after a 0.8% raise of the military budget, Japan is seriously lagging behind its main geopolitical rival, China. So it's normal to conclude that the slight raising of the military budget is not directly related to particular risks to the country's national security. Meanwhile, Abe is not hiding his ambition to make Japan a "normal" country, capable of defending itself if necessary, and supporting its allies where requested.
We certainly can't be speaking of a "re-militarization" of Japan - if for anything, because the country is not planning to increase the number of its troops even by one person. The plan is mostly about an overall improvement of the capacity of the air forces and the capabilities of countering submarine activity. The bulk of those efforts are about improving the capacity for conducting short-range amphibian operations, and mid-range expedition operations. All in all, the Japanese military is not trying to expand, but rather to become more balanced, and start using its resources more efficiently.
What the public is really concerned about is that the measures proposed by Abe are meant to bypass the national referendum that's obligatory in case of constitutional amendments. The analysts are also critical of the unusual haste (by Japanese standards) that the reform is being pushed through with. Most polls indicate that only about 1/4 of the Japanese public supports the new bill, and a large majority are opposed to it, especially to a possible hasty adoption of the new measures. It's not like the Japanese constitution cannot be changed, sure it can, like any other constitution. But Abe should follow the established procedures first, because he's clearly lacking the necessary public support right now. The actions of the ruling party and the cabinet could undermine the constitutional order in Japan, because they'd potentially leave opportunities for various interpretations of the main law, which could in turn affect the rights and liberties of the Japanese people. Abe is obviously hell-bent on setting such a precedent, so the question is why exactly now.
And the answer could be rooted back in 2012, when Abe won the election with promises of economic and structural reform that was hard to implement in Japan, due to the strong influence of the corporate interests. His inability to put his economic vision to action is the reason he's trying to distract public attention with these unpopular military reforms. The problem with that strategy is, since he is already running out of political capital, if he pushes the defense changes too hard, he might turn out to be without any credit of trust left for actually changing the economy.
This hurrying with the reform might be also partially explained with the internal situation in Japan. Abe is hoping to be re-elected chairman of his party in September, which would ensure his leadership position at least until 2018 when the next parliamentary elections are scheduled. But if he wants to rule until then, he'll have to deal with several serious domestic problems, and fast. The first one is the signing of the hugely unpopular TPP agreement before the end of this year; the other one is the VAT hike which should happen until late 2016; and finally, the election for the upper chamber of the Diet, which could cost the Liberals their majority, exactly because of their defense policy. So that's why Abe is pushing so urgently for these changes, otherwise he's risking the next general elections for his party. And those are just the domestic effects of a change that's bound to resonate across the entire region.
Of course, China is watching the situation with the greatest caution of them all. The relations between the two regional powers have been swinging from one extreme to another for the last decade - from partnership to suspicion to pure provocation. The disputes over a few small islands and the surrounding territorial waters are fueling the tensions. So, with or without the defense reform, the strategic confrontation between those two will be there to stay for a while. Right now, China's been maintaining a mostly composed tone - partly because they understand that these changes were expected and predictable since the very moment Abe supported the restructuring of the Japanese military a year ago. On the other hand though, China understands that if it adopts a rougher tone against Japan, it could only give more ammo to Abe, who'd now be able to explain his actions with China's behavior, and thus earn more support at home.
The case with South Korea is a bit more complicated. There's still a historical fear in the country from the memory of the Japanese militarism, and the South Korean politicians are extremely suspicious of what's happening across the sea. On the other hand, the Koreans are aware that there's only one other stable democracy in the region, which they could rely upon in case of a crisis with North Korea - and that's Japan.
Unlike China and South Korea, most South-East Asian countries seem prone to forgetting the past in the name of a more secure future. They are viewing the increase of the Japanese military capabilities as a way of enhancing their own defensive potential. Japan is one of the few regional powers that could provide a real counter-balance to the Chinese expansionism. The Philippines, Vietnam, even India and Australia, are viewing the increased Japanese activeness in the defense sphere as something that should be embraced rather than opposed. Because of China's increasing influence, the 10 countries of South-East Asia have pumped up their military budgets, and are feeling very nervous. The region is getting armed very fast - a SIPRI research found that the military expenditure of those countries has increased by 62% for the last decade. So, for the lesser players in this equation, the introduction of a big potential ally like Japan could be a balancing game-changer.
The US could also benefit from Japan's detour from pacifism. Because it'd gain an ally that could rush to the aid if the US military in Asia needs it. In the long term, the relations between these two trans-Pacific partners will be strengthening, and Japan's increased military capabilities could be helpful to the US, because they'd bring a more balanced distribution of responsibilities in the security of the Asia-Pacific region. Right now, the situation is such that if North Korea launches a missile that could reach Japanese territory, the Japanese would be able to intercept it without a problem. But if that same missile could be directed to the US base in Guam, any Japanese intervention would be considered unconstitutional.
Taken by itself, the Japanese military reform is neither too dramatic, nor is it going to have a direct short-term effect. But still, it's yet another sign of the growing militarism in Asia, where the tensions between the dragon and the samurai is going to become ever more pronounced.
(no subject)
Date: 9/8/15 19:25 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 10/8/15 01:58 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 10/8/15 06:17 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 10/8/15 13:36 (UTC):)
(no subject)
Date: 11/8/15 06:19 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 10/8/15 14:05 (UTC)Now, both Japan and the U.S. have agreed with the "One China" policy, and technically don't have "official" relations with the ROC in Taiwan. Yet no one (including the PRC) really bats an eyelash at the ongoing trade and interaction between Taiwan, the U.S., and Japan. Bush went so far as to say that the U.S. would intervene in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and the last several administrations have tried to walk this balance between maintaining relations with the PRC (meaning breaking off anything formal with the ROC) yet still interacting with the ROC in every possible way without calling it a formal relationship.
With that in mind, what if China decided they were tired of waiting, and invaded Taiwan? It's a huge assumption, of course, as is the assumption that the U.S. might intervene. But if that happened (and again, that's a big if,) the question I've taken forever to get around to is this: what does Japan do? Japan has been pretty clear that they have no part in such a conflict. Yet they're the big military ally of the U.S. in the Pacific. You can bet there'd be pressure by Washington for the Japanese to contribute something, and that potential situation has to be on the minds of regional leaders. Even if China isn't planning on any sort of military interaction with Taiwan (and I still tend to believe that they really aren't) this has to be on their minds, because every country with a military of any note has every possible future scenario mapped out and planned for, and if for nothing but this reason alone, any change in Japan's military readiness or make-up is going to affect Sino-Japanese relations.
And remember, the ROC also acknowledges the "One China" policy, just in reverse. They have to be watching this situation very closely as well.
(no subject)
Date: 12/8/15 22:15 (UTC)