What gives with Ukraine's weapons anaemia?

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

The Ukrainian political elite seems to be backing the request of president Petro Poroshenko for arms supplies from abroad. I'm not talking of tanks of course, but mostly modern communication and radar technology. However, Ukraine also needs armor-piercing weapons, as well as anti-air missiles. All in all, it seems Kiev can't do jack shit on the battlefield without the "deadly weapons" that we've heard being discussed lately.

The ongoing discussion in the US about the possible arms supplies has certainly increased the appetites in Kiev, although president Obama is still hesitating, and for a reason. In principle, German chancellor Angela Merkel is opposed to arms supplies to Ukraine, as that would further escalate the conflict - especially now that a fragile truce has been negotiated. After Germany's categorical rejection to supply arms, the focus has now been shifted on the Ukrainian arms producers. The question is, why are the large weapons factories in Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk so incapable of supplying the Ukrainian army with Ukraine-produced weapons? We're talking of arms factories that have been well known ever since Soviet times. The problem there is, most of them are facing bankruptcy, and Ukraine desperately needs investments in the arms industry, and a modernization of its management practices.

Of course, we shouldn't completely write off the Ukrainian arms industry just yet. There are still ample production facilities around the country. But then why are the arms factories in Ukraine not delivering weapons for the Ukrainian military, even if these are a bit out of date? That question has been put by lots of MPs at the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, and by representatives of the ministry of defense. A bit later next week the national security committee will be holding hearings of Stepan Poltorak, the fourth defense minister in a row for the last year. And there are increasing signals coming from Kiev that the ministry of defense has done some crucial management mistakes.

There's a suspicion among the observers that the ministry of defense itself is sabotaging the country's military industrial complex. It's not like Ukraine doesn't have a significant production potential, one that could probably provide the bulk of the needed weapons if managed properly. So far Ukraine has mostly been exporting arms, granted, but now that the country desperately needs them, the conclusion is that the ministry and high command has failed to respond to the new realities by adjusting their policy to the needs of the military. They're just failing to commission the producers with the production of the weapons they need. Which is absurd, when you think of it. It's either deliberate sabotage, or staggering incompetence, or mere corruption. Turns out, the top officers and the government representatives are pursuing their own interests and are so corrupt that they're undermining their own country's fighting capabilities, and they're not giving a damn about it.

One of Ukraine's biggest problems has long been the lack of loyalty. Ukraine is now in a delicate moment, in a transition period. For more than two decades the Russian secret services had been using every opportunity to infiltrate the Ukrainian institutions, which is why all military-related officials should probably go through a thorough vetting process, if the Ukrainians really want to clean up their house. And I'm not just talking about the chiefs of staff and the ministry of defense, but also all the parts of the cabinet which are even remotely related to the military industry, and are now blocking certain policies and decisions in one way or another. That's the only way to achieve clarity about who works for whom and which interests are being propped up, and why isn't the whole system working as it's supposed to.

Last week the Ukrainian secret services arrested a top officer from the chiefs of staff, who had been leaking the positions of the Ukrainian army to representatives of the rebel Donetsk and Lugansk "People's Republics". That's probably a good start. And if Ukraine manages to further tighten its internal security and adjust its otherwise big military industrial complex in a relatively adequate manner, the US wouldn't have to go through all that delicate stuff with the arms supplies, which could be interpreted as an act of aggression by the increasingly paranoid Russians.

Comments

[merig00.livejournal.com]

Yeap. That's why a lot of people in Ukraine against the supply of weapons from the West. No weapon will win the war if your command is incompetent, afraid to take responsibility or outright sabotaging and stealing.

The issue is for 23 years the army was in business of selling and stealing so most of the system is not set up to actually command and fight.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Russia has felt threatened and encircled, now that the West has changed the balance (http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20140915IPR62504/html/European-Parliament-ratifies-EU-Ukraine-Association-Agreement) in one of the more significant buffer zones between itself and Russia (at least that's the Russian narrative) - and Russia is responding accordingly by scrambling to build a new, more tightly controlled buffer zone around itself, even if they're doing it forcefully. That's the end game we're talking about here.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

It serves a protective purpose. It's a matter of spheres of influence. Russia is concerned whenever it's compelled to border to a country which it perceives to be of the "hostile" camp. The plans to put a missile shield under its nose hasn't been particularly helpful in disperse these concerns.

As weird as Putin is to comprehend, I'm guessing he's responding to what he perceives to be a direct NATO aggression against the balance of power that had been established with the end of the Cold War.

Crazy he might be, or misguided, or just very arrogant and believing he can serve some kind of messiah role - but one thing he certainly isn't: stupid, or incompetent. Yeltsin was incompetent. If Putin was too, Russia wouldn't be where it is now, and wouldn't be capable of twisting arms like it does now.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

What Russia fears is more countries being knocked out of its orbit of influence, and Russia finding itself encircled by hostile states at some point. It's all about geopolitics, with all the economic effects that come with that.

Putin believes the West started first to rewrite the status quo, when they essentially snatched Ukraine into EU and NATO orbit. There was a certain arrangement in the region that existed for decades, and an unwritten agreement that the West wouldn't touch the former Soviet republics and leave them in the Russian orbit - and now they're making inroads into that "forbidden territory", which the Russians are perceiving as a deliberate act of aggression, and a violation of those agreements.

Again, like I said, Putin's rationale is complicated to grasp, but from a Russian perspective, they have their reasons. The US has had a history of violently reacting to any incursions into their own sphere of influence, so I'm sure you'll agree that Russia's reaction is not entirely devoid of explanation.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

It's kind of surprising that the US history of having continuously worked to overthrow a number of governments in the Americas which didn't suit their interests even needs to be reminded of, in terms of "history".

I'm sorry if you're perceiving my attempt to put Russia's reactions to the US geopolitical stances in some context, as a "tu quoque".

What Russia is doing in Ukraine is showing to the West that it can't just make inroads into Russia's backyard, and what for a long time used to be Russia's sphere of influence, with impunity. Whether that's working or not is another story. The point is, they believe that's the only course of action that they have. The alternative is to just roll over and keep giving concessions.

I'm of the opinion that Russia's place is within the EU and NATO, but I might be a minority in this regard. I'm not seeing that happening any time soon - certainly not while Putin is in office. If for anything, because the US wouldn't want that to happen. Having a second powerful player within NATO would create tensions, and power struggles. Not to mention that NATO's role, from a Russian perspective, seems to have been mainly to counter and suffocate Russia for the most part, which means it could lose its primary function if it fully allied with Russia.

As for what Putin's main rationale is and how does his mind operate, I'm afraid you're asking your questions to the wrong person. Perhaps you could try to contact some of Putin's aides and think-tank associates, or better yet Putin himself, then report back. All I'm doing here is trying to put the latest developments into some geopolitical context, to the best of my knowledge, using the information that's readily available on the Internet and in the media, or from the contacts that I've had with people from the former Soviet republics. That's all.

I appreciate that there's a kind of conventional, easy-to-understand rationale here, one that Putin can sell his people and one that cable-news commentators can recite in order to make themselves seem informed. And that may, ultimately, be just what's driving Putin.

For the sake of constructive discourse, I really, really hope this wasn't actually very subtly directed at me.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Ok.

[htpcl.livejournal.com]

For starters, you could look for a rationale for getting involved in the overthrowing of Mossadeq (democratically elected) and his substitution with the Shah (a tyrant); then the rationale for getting involved in the overthrowing of Jacobo Arbens in Guatemala (democratically elected), and the installment of Carlos Castillo Armas (a military dictator), this starting a decades long civil war that claimed at least 200 thousand people; then the rationale for the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Project, Operation Northwoods and of course Operation Mongoose and the dozens other attempts to assassinate Castro (the leader of a foreign country); and the involvement in the overthrowing of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (not a very nice person, granted); and the rationale behind president Johnson authorizing the logistical support for the military coup in Brazil in 1964; and the rationale for the US intervention in Chile in the 70s which overthrew Salvador Allende (democratically elected) and installed none else but Augusto Pinochet, whose reign is associated with the darkest period in Chilean history. You could also look for the rationale behind the attempt to overthrow the government of Nicaragua in the 80s, and arming the Contras with money from secretly sold arms to Iran (despite the arms embargo at the time). More recently, you could look for the rationale behind the US special envoy Otto Reich's involvement in the attempt to overthrow Chavez in Venezuela in 2002. The list could go on and get very long really, but I think that'll suffice for a start.

If that's a mere tu quoque, so be it - at least it's a really huge one. At least as huge as to render the US disqualified from the position of pontificating to countries like Russia about their aggressive interventions in neighboring countries whose regimes they don't like.

[htpcl.livejournal.com]

You're welcome.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Yes, it's always about needling an American. It can't have anything to do with geopolitics, because, you know, that'd be the far more complex option. There's always someone aiming to stab/poke/jab at somebody else, and someone else to act offended, respectively.

Begging the question is not engaging in a discussion. It's answering one explanation with another question, and then another.

Let's just cut through the passive-aggressive crap and see what your point is. Make a statement about Putin's rationale, as opposed to continuously questioning others about it. Let's explore your theory.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Well, I do believe I've covered the topic to an extent that's as exhaustive as it could possibly be as far as my "competence" is concerned. Beyond that, the further you proceed with the questioning, the more I could go into a cyclical repetition of points that I've already laid out, I'm afraid.

Not to mention that this whole sub-thread has been one huge tangent that has been straying ever further away from the actual topic of this post, namely the Ukrainian arms industry, and the US plans of weapons supplies to Ukraine.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Well, that would have disastrous consequences for the West, now other countries in Ukraine's situation potentially figuring they can no longer rely on promised support. With all the consequences that come with that.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Maybe it doesn't have as much of a stake, maybe it does (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1832447.html). It's all too convenient of course, all of this is comfortably happening thousands of miles away from the US borders, so whatever the US tries over there, it won't affect them too much.

However I'm talking of the broader picture. If the West sets a precedent of betraying the reliance of a country for help that it had previously promised (http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine-abroad/euronews-european-parliament-promises-ukraine-help-338560.html), then that could potentially trigger a domino effect, now more countries thinking twice before embracing any extended hands coming from the West - and here I'm actually including the US. It's just that they wouldn't trust any further promises (http://www.wsj.com/articles/merkel-promises-support-for-baltic-states-alarmed-by-russia-1408383489) for help "if you could just get out of Russia's camp".

Same applies to other assertive wannabe-superpowers like China. If their lesser neighbors who still tend to gravitate toward the US/Westerncamp do notice they can't rely on support from the US and its allies, then they'd go looking for other options. Which, by extension, spells disaster for the entire Western geopolitical paradigm.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Except that Russia's invasion seems to be to me a bit of a clear-cut case of what's actually pretty damn predictable in the region: someone stirs up trouble and makes a mess for what they think is a foolproof means to limited territorial gains when the cards are loaded in their favor and then it turns out the battlefield has a logic all its own and that it's easier to start these wars than it is to end them or to pursue any kind of clear-cut strategic goals. By the same logic you want to apply to Putin, we could say, look at American involvement in Waziristan and Yemen and say the same illogic applies to American actions in these regions.

[mahnmut.livejournal.com]

Q: Whom does Russia border on?

A: With whoever it bloody wants to.

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

It's not a tu quoque, it's a "If others can do it, why shouldn't we" type of justification that Russia is using in cases like Ukraine and Georgia.

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

The OP is not using it here (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1954187.html?thread=149012363#t149012363), and it was the OP that you asked why it was being used.

Whether Russia itself might be able to refer to American behavior as the example it's following is, I think, a different kind of question

The question was what Russia uses as justification for its actions, not what Htpcl or anyone else in this forum believes is a justification. And it was answered as such. I'm at a loss why we should be talking-about-talking that much about it. Is it really that important for you to establish once and for all if it's been meant as a tu quoque or as a genuine attempt to analyse the rationale behind Russia's actions? Isn't that in fact quite an elaborate distraction from a topic that has already been derailed enough with tangential references?

Russia may, indeed, have legitimate cause to wonder why it shouldn't be permitted to do as it likes, given the American examples

Exactly the point I, and I believe the OP, are making.

The extent to which the above-listed actions had been objected to by the international community is irrelevant to the fact that these were quite unequivocally acts of open aggression against sovereign nations, perpetrated in pursuit of geopolitical interests. The extent of response from the international community is rather a consequence of the context of the particular epoch, the particular circumstances in terms of international diplomatic support for the perpetrator, and many other factors, which are tangential to the core principle - namely: is the direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country justified, and if yes, under what circumstances? That's the main question here.

I'm not sure if Russia is looking to American history as a model, rather than a justification. Ultimately, they're embarking on those adventures because they've figured they can, and they might imagine these would have little to no long-term consequences for them. It's all about the weighing of pros and cons, and the assessment of risks. The latest developments in terms of Europe's apparent inability to affect the situation in Ukraine in any meaningful way, may've additionally fueled this assertiveness on Russia's part.

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

There's nothing wrong with tangents - as long as they don't completely hijack the whole conversation.

Again. Whether I think they're correct is irrelevant. The question is how we can understand their rationale. Whether I agree with that rationale is yet another tangent.

you could note to this poster that nothing is really being served by jumping in to debate the point

I'm not sure what this is supposed to mean, and I'm not sure I'd like to know.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

It has quite a bit to do with it when we factor in how the Cuban Missile Crisis nearly started WWIII when the USA faced a Soviet maneuver identical to US backing of Georgia and Ukraine and threatened to unleash canned sunshine in response. Odds are that Putin intended something much smaller scale and is re-learning the oldest lesson in the book: starting the war is easy, ending it is hard, and doing so while avoiding mission creep mission seep is astronomically difficult.

[luzribeiro.livejournal.com]

Is there any way to avoid concluding that perhaps Putin is simply crazy, or grossly incompetent?

That would certainly be the conventional, easy-to-understand narrative, one that most mainstream commentators in the west, and by extension the bulk of the gullible Kool-Aid-consuming public can recite and conveniently re-re-regurgitate in order to make themselves seem informed, yep.

[luzribeiro.livejournal.com]

You will, when I have it.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Like Germany in 1914 Russia brought that encirclement on itself by refusing to consider any other element of power as relevant except the military measure. Like Germany in 1914 it also faces a global rival that speaks English and is far more amoral and pragmatically so than it would ever be and with an equal ability to win the PR war even if it can't win the actual shooting war. Encirclement is usually the last cry of the bitter losers of geopolitics who let things moulder for a while, back themselves in a corner, and then can't look at how they got into the fix, let alone try to solve it.

[cypukambl.livejournal.com]

To begin with, Ukraine had a very good start in 1991. There were sixteen military districts in USSR, three of which were located in Ukraine. And those were the most developed and well supplied districts. 1/5 of all Soviet weapons was left in independent Ukraine. Then the Capitalism has begun. Remember who is Victor Bout? I guess, not. But it was him who was portrayed by Nicolas Cage as Yuri Orlov in Lord of War. An enormous amount of Ukrainian Soviet arms was squandered. But even selling arms with FTL speed wasn`t enough to sell everything before it turned out that Ukraine needed those tanks and guns for it`s own purposes. Constructing new tanks? Yes. But there was an interesting episode, that explains a lot. Ukraine was to sell some four hundred BTR-4E Bucephalus to Iraq. It tried to, at least three times, but Iraq (!!!) wasn`t satisfied with quality. And the last lot has returned to Ukraine just in time to be partly destroyed, partly captured under Ilovaisk in August-September, 2014. You are also talking about Russian agents in Ukraine. What do you call an agent? A person, that acts in Russian interest? Yes. There are millions of them in Ukraine. Relatives, spouses, co-eds, friends... Some spare parts for Kharkiv and Dniepropetrivsk tank factories were made in Russia, some spare parts for Russian ICBMs were made in Dniepropetrivsk. Untill summer 2014 (We`re talkin` `bout Ukrainian Euro-integration, heh?). And Europeans will have to make a note to themselves: when Ukraine asks for something, it already conciders the thing it`s own and feels a bitter resentment if doesn`t get it (gas price discounts, visa-free regime with EU, you name it). You MUST give what Ukraine wants and Ukraine will concider later if it will pay for it.

[htpcl.livejournal.com]

Here's a heretical thought. If Ukraine hadn't quit its nuclear arsenal about 23 years ago, now Russia wouldn't be so bold. A Ukraine without nukes is like an open back-door. Iran may've taken the lesson quite a while ago, and Israel certainly did, too.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Ukraine is the classic state that looks big and intimidating on a map but collapses when the rotten structure is given that single solid kick. Its sole saving grace is that the people aiming to give it that kick, the Russians, are about on par with it for inability to get things right the first time or even the second.