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That's how European integration looks in the eyes of the ethnic minorities in Moldova, the tiny country that neighbors on Ukraine to the south-west. Many Russians and Ukrainians in Transnistria, and Bulgarians and Gagauz in Gagauzia are concerned that Chisinau's cordial relations with Brussels could endanger their civil rights. While everyone was preoccupied with Russia's geopolitical retaliation to Ukraine's decision to side with Brussels, last month Moldova quietly signed an association agreement with the EU, which only fuels these fears some more, and gives new momentum to all the separatist rhetoric.

Behind these moods there's a mixture of economic and cultural factors, plus a pinch of well-directed and quite successful propaganda. In February, 98% of the population in the autonomous Gagauzia region where many ethnic Bulgarians live among the dominant Gagauz, voted for joining the Russian-led customs union, and ultimately working for complete independence. The latter probably won't happen, but Gagauzia could still join Transnistria as the next region to generate instability in Europe's backyard.
The most obvious benefit to the minorities from their close relations with Russia is the relatively better economic condition of the autonomous regions in comparison to the other parts of Moldova, which as per UN's human development index is Europe's poorest country. The border village of Dorotcaia, close to both the Chisinau-controlled territories and the Transnistrian self-ruling region, is an example how the locals tend to think on these issues. Last month they had a local referendum, and voted for going under Transnistrian jurisdiction. And the motivation for that decision was almost entirely economic. In Transnistria, there are special funds which people simply call "Putin funds". These are bonuses for pensioners and other vulnerable groups, which are granted only in that region and nowhere else in Moldova. In Dorotcaia, this is particularly well visible. Just a road separates Dorotcaia from the neighboring village where pensioners tend to receive up to 3 times higher pensions. The Moldovan authorities have tried to convince people that they'll eventually improve their situation, but the truth is, everything is just much cheaper in Transnistria, and has been like that for quite a while.
The region which broke out after a brief civil war in the early 90s, remains closely related to Russia. It's where a large garrison of the Russian ground military forces is hosted, which is one of the very few sources of economic activity in the vicinity. During the latest visit of the Transnistrian leaders to Moscow, 7 memorandums for closer economic cooperation were signed, and that's bound to increase Tyraspol's dependence on Moscow.
Russia is showing that the more Moldova is striving for EU membership, the more they'll be trying to tear Transnistria away from Moldova - and now possibly Gagauzia, too. It's hard to predict what other lengths they'd further go to for the time being, but it's clear that the economic ties are getting actively intensified.
Moldova's poor condition inevitably causes parallels to what life used to be under Soviet rule. Back then, the tiny republic used to be one of the pearls of the vast communist federation. Moldovan wine was to be found at every table across the Eastern bloc. So it's normal that many people would feel nostalgic for the "good old days". Their life has taken a downward direction since the collapse of the USSR, and the economy is practically kaput now. Everyone suddenly ended up jobless, miserable and poor. Which is why many people in Moldova are comparing their life with that in Russia, believing that things could be turned around and be like they used to be in the past.
But it's not just nostalgy. Nearly 4/5 of the population still gets most of their information solely through TV, and only 1/3 have ever used the Internet. The most popular TV programs are Russian talk-shows like Let Them Speak and Wait For Me, which, albeit lacking explicitly political content, do create the impression of some kind of cultural belonging to a much larger community within the former Soviet space.

Traditionally, the minorities in the Soviet Union (and not only) tend to communicate with the metropoly of their respective patron, rather than with the central government of the country which they happen to be part of. There's a tradition of trusting Moscow rather than the respective republic, and that's a tactic that's been intended with the policy of dispersing of ethnic Russian population throughout the USSR. This is causing lots of problems in countries like Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and as we all remember well, Georgia.
In addition to the media and the cultural traditions, the political discourse among the ethnic minorities also flames up their hostility to Chisinau and Brussels. For example, the governor of Gagauzia, Mihail Formuzal claims that Romania wants to dismantle Moldova, and assimilate the Gagauz, respectively. When that's the only sort of information you're getting, you'd start believing it eventually. In regions like Transnistria and Gagauzia, it's very difficult to tell truth from lie.
Unlike Transnistria though, Gagauzia used to refrain from expressing separatist moods until very recently, and its governor used to traditionally participate in Chisinau's political life. But since last autumn, Formuzal has changed the tune abruptly. Suddenly people who were part of the Moldovan political process have started talking about the EU with animosity, visiting Moscow on a regular basis, etc. The visits to Kremlin have obviously affected Formuzal's rhetoric, which suddenly became radically anti-European and pro-Russian. Things went so much out of hand, that an investigation on charges of separatism was launched against him. His behavior could be explained by a combination of personal and geopolitical interests. He cannot be nominated for a third consecutive term, but he does want to remain in politics. He does have an interest to blackmail the Moldovan authorities and promote such ideas like the Eurasian Union. So the Russian interests perfectly coincide with his personal ambitions.
Of course, the Romanian neighbors "helped" quite a lot in this respect, as well. As mentioned earlier, in January the Romanian president Traian Basescu said that he'd like to see Romania and Moldova united one day. A passionate Formuzal speech followed immediately, lambasting the threat of cultural assimilation of Gagauzia by the Romanians. In fact, Basescu's statements were nothing more than the rambling of an outgoing politician who's about to leave the political scene, with no future and no influence left. For anyone who's been paying attention, Basescu has been talking like this for years, and nothing has really happened in that direction.
In the recent years, Romania's policy toward Moldova has actually been quite consistent. For example, there's a simplified procedure for issuing Romanian passports to Moldovan citizens, and over 250 thousand people have already taken advantage of it. Meanwhile, in Chisinau the idea of a union with Romania is far from popular and isn't even on the agenda, because it'd mean the loss of influence for the Moldovan political elites within a far more powerful neighbor, even if it's a cousin nation. So, Basescu's statements have been blown way out of proportion by the Gagauz politicians, and for a reason. This way they've garnered more support among their own base, by presenting themselves as some kind of protectors against aggressive cultural assimilation.

Still, the Russian factor is insurmountable for Moldova's stability and integrity. The frequent visits to Moscow by the minority leaders, and the presence of the Russian military in Transnistria, are making dialogue not just necessary but inevitable. In the meantime though, Russia has an interest to maintain the mood of uncertainty and instability in Moldova. Russia is concerned about NATO's advancement in the east, and will certainly do its best to prevent Moldova from joining the alliance. Putin will actively work to destabilize Moldova economically and politically as much as possible, although it's unlikely that it'd all end up with yet another annexation and military intervention like in Crimea (although bold maps like the above tend to raise suspicion that there could be more to this situation than meets the eye). Indeed, destabilization could be achieved in many different ways. For instance, Gagauzia could boycott the November parliamentary election in Moldova, and refuse to fulfil the association agreement with the EU.
As for Chisinau, their only option is to not stop the dialogue with Formuzal and the other players in Gagauzia. The EU can also influence the situation positively if they do grant the development funds that they've planned for the region. The Moldovan ministry of foreign affairs has already started an information campaign where they'll try to debunk the myths of the bad EU that the Russian media have been so successful at promoting. In practice, the closer relations between Chisinau and Brussels would mean even more decentralization, and more rights for the ethnic minorities, respectively. But that has to be clearly explained to them.
The change in the public opinion among the ethnic minorities in Moldova won't happen soon, that's for sure. It'll be a long process, and most likely it'll be a painful battle for hearts and minds. If for anything, because the Russian media and the pro-Russian politicians will be guarding the status quo fiercely, and try to use it as a starting point for making further geopolitical inroads in response to what they perceive as a direct threat to their security (by the West). Still, it's early enough to find a peaceful solution, before Moldova has followed Ukraine's fate. Because the alternative is not very nice at all. Without real integration for Transnistria and Gagauzia, these two regions will continue to be a source of increasing instability in East Europe.
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Date: 21/7/14 15:12 (UTC)Are you sure you're not talking about UKIP...or the Tories for that matter?
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Date: 21/7/14 17:33 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 21/7/14 21:03 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 22/7/14 07:54 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/7/14 08:23 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/7/14 09:14 (UTC)