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talkpoliticsGreetings, my bored slackers knowledgeable folks who are so curious to learn new things about distant lands! See, I'm seldom impressed with non-fiction books, especially ones that have the pretense of an "in-depth analysis of cultural and historic phenomena in the modern world" (as a recent review of this book described it). But I must admit I liked this work by a couple of German scientists, entitled Geschichte Südosteuropas. The authors are Clewing and Schmitt and a bunch of other folks from the Institute for East-European History. Now, admittedly, it has never been easy to present the controversial history of the Balkan peoples, so I approached this with indulgence. The difficulties are many, because it's probably the most complex chunk of Europe, and Europe is pretty complicated anyway. But I have to admit these guys have done a decent job. And what do I mean with that?
Well, have you noticed how the Greek crisis is practically never viewed in a Balkan context? It's either the Mediterranean context, or the "European periphery" context, or why not even the Ancient Greek context. We'd often hear parallels to the Greek poleis, etc. I've been hearing statements like: "The West couldn't have prevented the Greek crisis, but it could've at least anticipated it, if it had recalled the history of Ancient Greece". Well, I'm gonna say NO. I'd say that in order to understand what's going on in Greece today, one would have to shake off the traditional fascination with Hellenic history and look more closely to the more recent past of the region - the Ottoman period, and the late Byzantine period if you like. Why are people so focused on Ancient Greece when talking about modern Greece, and they fail to look at the more obvious factors (at least as far as history is concerned)? I guess it's because Ancient Greece has been so idealized, it was the cradle of democracy after all! That's fine, but any analysis that gets too obsessed with that, risks losing a big deal of relevancy. The truth is that the Greeks, like most other Balkan peoples, are better understood when looked at through the prism of their more recent/Oriental/Balkan past, the Greece of Kapodistrias, Ypsilantis and Georgios I, rather than the Greece of Sophocles and Plato. If anything, South-Eastern Europe (or the Balkans if you like to call it so) is the real source of the Greek crisis. Not the ancient polis.
So what *IS* South-Eastern Europe really? The question is extremely complicated. And not just because of the controversial and turbulent history of this region that continues to be such until this very moment, but also the difficulty in clearly encompassing its ethnic, cultural and social diversity in its entirety without going out of the traditional labels and its geographic boundaries. So this makes most attempts for analysis of the whole picture too incomplete, one-sided and often biased (depending on your standpoint and agenda, if any). It's also related to the relatively late moment of "discovering" and opening up the Balkans for the Western wold. It happened in the 19th century, and funnily, the authors of the above book are comparing this "discovery" with the scramble for Africa and Oceania. And we could add the seemingly non-historic approach to the issue, that's often full of ignorance about the specifics of the region, and we'll see why it's so difficult.
Take the linguistic diversity for example. Well, it's nothing like West Africa, but still. The Balkans are by far the most ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse corner of Europe. Four empires have changed the guard over here - Rome, Byzantium, Ottomans and the Habsburgs. It's also the only region where three major religions collide - Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In fact the term "South-Eastern Europe" only appeared in the early 19th century. It was coined by one Jernej Bartol Kopitar, a Slovene linguist, and it mostly had linguistic connotations, not cultural. But then the "Balkan" terminology was heaped in layers over that. And btw the very term "Balkans" is met with different responses in the various corners of the region. Where the Bulgarians don't shy away from naming everything "Balkan" (Balkan Air Lines, Balkan-Tourist Agency, Balkan this, Balkan that - maybe because the Turkish name for the Stara Planina mountain that runs through the entire Bulgaria is exactly "Balkan"), the Croatians and Slovenians are ashamed to use it. And no surprise that the term has obtained mostly pejorative nuances in Western Europe, because it has concentrated all the negative qualities that could be attributed to a backward periphery that's too fragmented and stagnated. The term "Balkanization" is a result of this attitude. In her famous book Imagining The Balkans, the Bulgarian-American historian Maria Todorova is going to the opposite extreme and rejecting the term "Balkans" altogether, because in it she sees the stigmatization of South-Eastern Europe. She believes "Balkanism" is the regional sister term to Edward Said's "Orientalism", another pejorative word with a heavy baggage behind it.
And of course a central place in all this is assigned to the nationalism / nation-state phenomenon. It's a fact that most of the modern S-E European countries define themselves as "nation states" in the attempt of the dominating ethnos to assert itself as the hegemon "state people". Having a state religion in addition is a bonus leading in the same direction. Maybe the only exception from this rule is Bosnia, where no ethnic group has a 50%+ majority. In the rest, self-identifying with the own nation is a phenomenon that's prevalent around the Balkans. But surely, that's not a monopoly of the Balkans only (or even Europe).
The birth of the nation in South-Eastern Europe was part of an all-European process. And interestingly, the Balkans were among the pioneers in this respect. Let me just point out that it was Paisius of Hilendar, a 18th century Bulgarian monk who wrote the Slavonic-Bulgarian History and thus kick-started the Bulgarian National Revival - he did that in 1762! Surprisingly early for the European context of the nationalistic revival. And looking at the 21st century, Kosovo's independence shows that the process of national self-identification that started in the 19th century is still pretty active today, and still has a lot of dynamics going on about it. A thing that could be exploited by the greater powers for whatever geopolitical plans they have (Russia, USA, EU). Seems like the process of national self-determination is still far from over. Or maybe its activation happens cyclically, I don't know which is more correct.
And of course this self-assertion has often happened in the most primitive way. With lots of bloodshed. Or at least with an explosion of chauvinistic hatred. Signs of this are visible even today, well hidden beneath the mask of apparent apathy and cynicism that's embraced these peoples. For instance, a couple of years ago two young historians (an Austrian gentleman and a Bulgarian lady) tried to look more closely into the historic significance of the Batak Massacre, which was part of the April Uprising that got brutally suppressed by the Ottomans, which in turn finally swayed the Western European public opinion in favor of a Russian "liberator" intervention in Bulgaria. Their study was exquisitely carried out, but they did a mistake: they dared to touch on some taboo topics and ask some inconvenient questions, and logically the public outrcy was swift and intense. We just don't want to hear things that we don't like, do we?
Meanwhile, the exalted attempts to praise the grandeur of the own nation are reflected in the political impotence and the self-marginalization of the Balkan peoples, that's fueled by the inherent disdain for thy neighbor and everything foreign, and the simultaneous ignorance of the "Big Powers" who have taken upon themselves the "moral" obligation to determine the destinies of this region (because they somehow know better what's best for it). Without really knowing much about it. A number of diplomatic and political gaffes in the West reeking of badly concealed nationalism and xenophobia (Austrian, German and French politicians are particularly prone to those) can be explained with the disparaging and belittling attitude of the West towards the East. And all of this is put in the context of *THE* Goal: accession to the EU, this manna from heaven. Despite all the flaws of democracy, the authors of this book are bold to conclude that "The ongoing European integration of the Balkan peoples shows that imposing democracy in South-Eastern Europe has been a successful project". Well, thank you, Europe. How would we survive without your help?
Except they might have a point. There's this sentiment around here that "We wouldn't be able to 'fix' ourselves without someone from outside 'forcing' us to do it through imposing strict rules that we could abide by, under threat of punishment". It's the constant striving for a "strong hand" to rule us all and show us the way. And that's a cultural trait that also has historic roots.
At least the authors are admitting that the recent developments in the last few decades are making the definition of "South-Eastern Europe" increasingly problematic. Because there are fewer things that connect all these countries under the same label. One of them is shared geography. But the more important one is the shared historic heritage, regardless of ethnic and linguistic differences. Not that those aren't important, mind you. Take the modern Macedonians, who, squeezed between the Albanians and Greeks, are desperately trying to find their identity, even if they have to "steal" some history from their neighbors. Now they claim to originate from the ancient Macedon people, a non-Slavic, indigenous, and very glorious people. The one of Alex the Awesome. While in fact their link to anything resembling Macedon is pretty weak, to say the least (I wouldn't want to use the term "non-existent"). Extensive DNA haplo-group surveys tend to do such funny things to poorly crafted pseudo-historic narratives, you'll have to give me that. ;-)
In fact the Byzantine heritage is much more tangible as a religious and cultural factor. And the Ottoman heritage, even more. Especially when we're talking of material culture, family structures, language, cuisine, music, architecture... This internal distancing of the individual from the state that's so inherent to the Balkans is also partially related to the Byzantine heritage and even more related to the Ottoman heritage. The total discrimination of the "giaour" population (i.e. all the non-Muslim conquered peoples) by the Ottomans, the lack of any opportunity for political participation and representation, the weak presence of the Ottoman state in the remote and inaccessible areas, the systematic abuse of power and corruption in that period, and the frequent violence by the authorities whenever taxes were being collected or janissaries were being "recruited" (read: abducted) for military service - all of this has left a deep scar in the political culture of the Balkan peoples. So, before we hurry to judge them as backward and inexperienced in the democratic tradition and the values of Enlightenment, perhaps we should poise for a second and think about the reasons why it is so.
The fact that, despite this alienation from the state in the Balkans, in most cases the people still turn to the state to solve their biggest problems, may sound paradoxical, but it really is not. In this sense the roots of the Balkan mentality are going much deeper than the recent Socialist past, contrary to what most Westerners are quick to assume.
All in all, this History of South-Eastern Europe From The Middle Ages To Today reads like a fairly competent and in-depth analysis of the situation and the factors that brought it about. Sometimes it's good to have a neutral, outside observer having a look into these matters, because we're loaded with too much baggage and it's hard to look at oneself without bias and emotion. I'd say these issues haven't been properly discussed until now, which may be the reason for continuing misunderstandings both within the region and between it and the West. And while we're at it, we may as well add some other related issues that also need more examination - like the history of the Roma people in the Balkans, the Macedonian "issue", and why not even the mundane everyday culture and pop-culture, and cultural traditions.
Or why not have a more thorough look at the moment of the saving of the Bulgarian Jews that was recently discussed around here, and the fact that they were all saved during WW2, but not without a price - it came at the cost of striking a deal with Hitler to assist him with rounding up the Jews in neighboring occupied territories and deporting them to the death camps. Sure, the circumstances might've pressed our leaders to do so, and they might've found themselves compelled to take the maximum they could out of that situation, but that still doesn't make an evil act any less evil, and besides I don't see a reason to sweep it under the rug and never talk about it. We should be honest with ourselves if we want to avoid further misunderstandings and to get over the old grudges with our neighbors. Things could've been very simple really.
Well, have you noticed how the Greek crisis is practically never viewed in a Balkan context? It's either the Mediterranean context, or the "European periphery" context, or why not even the Ancient Greek context. We'd often hear parallels to the Greek poleis, etc. I've been hearing statements like: "The West couldn't have prevented the Greek crisis, but it could've at least anticipated it, if it had recalled the history of Ancient Greece". Well, I'm gonna say NO. I'd say that in order to understand what's going on in Greece today, one would have to shake off the traditional fascination with Hellenic history and look more closely to the more recent past of the region - the Ottoman period, and the late Byzantine period if you like. Why are people so focused on Ancient Greece when talking about modern Greece, and they fail to look at the more obvious factors (at least as far as history is concerned)? I guess it's because Ancient Greece has been so idealized, it was the cradle of democracy after all! That's fine, but any analysis that gets too obsessed with that, risks losing a big deal of relevancy. The truth is that the Greeks, like most other Balkan peoples, are better understood when looked at through the prism of their more recent/Oriental/Balkan past, the Greece of Kapodistrias, Ypsilantis and Georgios I, rather than the Greece of Sophocles and Plato. If anything, South-Eastern Europe (or the Balkans if you like to call it so) is the real source of the Greek crisis. Not the ancient polis.
So what *IS* South-Eastern Europe really? The question is extremely complicated. And not just because of the controversial and turbulent history of this region that continues to be such until this very moment, but also the difficulty in clearly encompassing its ethnic, cultural and social diversity in its entirety without going out of the traditional labels and its geographic boundaries. So this makes most attempts for analysis of the whole picture too incomplete, one-sided and often biased (depending on your standpoint and agenda, if any). It's also related to the relatively late moment of "discovering" and opening up the Balkans for the Western wold. It happened in the 19th century, and funnily, the authors of the above book are comparing this "discovery" with the scramble for Africa and Oceania. And we could add the seemingly non-historic approach to the issue, that's often full of ignorance about the specifics of the region, and we'll see why it's so difficult.
Take the linguistic diversity for example. Well, it's nothing like West Africa, but still. The Balkans are by far the most ethnically, culturally and linguistically diverse corner of Europe. Four empires have changed the guard over here - Rome, Byzantium, Ottomans and the Habsburgs. It's also the only region where three major religions collide - Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In fact the term "South-Eastern Europe" only appeared in the early 19th century. It was coined by one Jernej Bartol Kopitar, a Slovene linguist, and it mostly had linguistic connotations, not cultural. But then the "Balkan" terminology was heaped in layers over that. And btw the very term "Balkans" is met with different responses in the various corners of the region. Where the Bulgarians don't shy away from naming everything "Balkan" (Balkan Air Lines, Balkan-Tourist Agency, Balkan this, Balkan that - maybe because the Turkish name for the Stara Planina mountain that runs through the entire Bulgaria is exactly "Balkan"), the Croatians and Slovenians are ashamed to use it. And no surprise that the term has obtained mostly pejorative nuances in Western Europe, because it has concentrated all the negative qualities that could be attributed to a backward periphery that's too fragmented and stagnated. The term "Balkanization" is a result of this attitude. In her famous book Imagining The Balkans, the Bulgarian-American historian Maria Todorova is going to the opposite extreme and rejecting the term "Balkans" altogether, because in it she sees the stigmatization of South-Eastern Europe. She believes "Balkanism" is the regional sister term to Edward Said's "Orientalism", another pejorative word with a heavy baggage behind it.
And of course a central place in all this is assigned to the nationalism / nation-state phenomenon. It's a fact that most of the modern S-E European countries define themselves as "nation states" in the attempt of the dominating ethnos to assert itself as the hegemon "state people". Having a state religion in addition is a bonus leading in the same direction. Maybe the only exception from this rule is Bosnia, where no ethnic group has a 50%+ majority. In the rest, self-identifying with the own nation is a phenomenon that's prevalent around the Balkans. But surely, that's not a monopoly of the Balkans only (or even Europe).
The birth of the nation in South-Eastern Europe was part of an all-European process. And interestingly, the Balkans were among the pioneers in this respect. Let me just point out that it was Paisius of Hilendar, a 18th century Bulgarian monk who wrote the Slavonic-Bulgarian History and thus kick-started the Bulgarian National Revival - he did that in 1762! Surprisingly early for the European context of the nationalistic revival. And looking at the 21st century, Kosovo's independence shows that the process of national self-identification that started in the 19th century is still pretty active today, and still has a lot of dynamics going on about it. A thing that could be exploited by the greater powers for whatever geopolitical plans they have (Russia, USA, EU). Seems like the process of national self-determination is still far from over. Or maybe its activation happens cyclically, I don't know which is more correct.
And of course this self-assertion has often happened in the most primitive way. With lots of bloodshed. Or at least with an explosion of chauvinistic hatred. Signs of this are visible even today, well hidden beneath the mask of apparent apathy and cynicism that's embraced these peoples. For instance, a couple of years ago two young historians (an Austrian gentleman and a Bulgarian lady) tried to look more closely into the historic significance of the Batak Massacre, which was part of the April Uprising that got brutally suppressed by the Ottomans, which in turn finally swayed the Western European public opinion in favor of a Russian "liberator" intervention in Bulgaria. Their study was exquisitely carried out, but they did a mistake: they dared to touch on some taboo topics and ask some inconvenient questions, and logically the public outrcy was swift and intense. We just don't want to hear things that we don't like, do we?
Meanwhile, the exalted attempts to praise the grandeur of the own nation are reflected in the political impotence and the self-marginalization of the Balkan peoples, that's fueled by the inherent disdain for thy neighbor and everything foreign, and the simultaneous ignorance of the "Big Powers" who have taken upon themselves the "moral" obligation to determine the destinies of this region (because they somehow know better what's best for it). Without really knowing much about it. A number of diplomatic and political gaffes in the West reeking of badly concealed nationalism and xenophobia (Austrian, German and French politicians are particularly prone to those) can be explained with the disparaging and belittling attitude of the West towards the East. And all of this is put in the context of *THE* Goal: accession to the EU, this manna from heaven. Despite all the flaws of democracy, the authors of this book are bold to conclude that "The ongoing European integration of the Balkan peoples shows that imposing democracy in South-Eastern Europe has been a successful project". Well, thank you, Europe. How would we survive without your help?
Except they might have a point. There's this sentiment around here that "We wouldn't be able to 'fix' ourselves without someone from outside 'forcing' us to do it through imposing strict rules that we could abide by, under threat of punishment". It's the constant striving for a "strong hand" to rule us all and show us the way. And that's a cultural trait that also has historic roots.
At least the authors are admitting that the recent developments in the last few decades are making the definition of "South-Eastern Europe" increasingly problematic. Because there are fewer things that connect all these countries under the same label. One of them is shared geography. But the more important one is the shared historic heritage, regardless of ethnic and linguistic differences. Not that those aren't important, mind you. Take the modern Macedonians, who, squeezed between the Albanians and Greeks, are desperately trying to find their identity, even if they have to "steal" some history from their neighbors. Now they claim to originate from the ancient Macedon people, a non-Slavic, indigenous, and very glorious people. The one of Alex the Awesome. While in fact their link to anything resembling Macedon is pretty weak, to say the least (I wouldn't want to use the term "non-existent"). Extensive DNA haplo-group surveys tend to do such funny things to poorly crafted pseudo-historic narratives, you'll have to give me that. ;-)
In fact the Byzantine heritage is much more tangible as a religious and cultural factor. And the Ottoman heritage, even more. Especially when we're talking of material culture, family structures, language, cuisine, music, architecture... This internal distancing of the individual from the state that's so inherent to the Balkans is also partially related to the Byzantine heritage and even more related to the Ottoman heritage. The total discrimination of the "giaour" population (i.e. all the non-Muslim conquered peoples) by the Ottomans, the lack of any opportunity for political participation and representation, the weak presence of the Ottoman state in the remote and inaccessible areas, the systematic abuse of power and corruption in that period, and the frequent violence by the authorities whenever taxes were being collected or janissaries were being "recruited" (read: abducted) for military service - all of this has left a deep scar in the political culture of the Balkan peoples. So, before we hurry to judge them as backward and inexperienced in the democratic tradition and the values of Enlightenment, perhaps we should poise for a second and think about the reasons why it is so.
The fact that, despite this alienation from the state in the Balkans, in most cases the people still turn to the state to solve their biggest problems, may sound paradoxical, but it really is not. In this sense the roots of the Balkan mentality are going much deeper than the recent Socialist past, contrary to what most Westerners are quick to assume.
All in all, this History of South-Eastern Europe From The Middle Ages To Today reads like a fairly competent and in-depth analysis of the situation and the factors that brought it about. Sometimes it's good to have a neutral, outside observer having a look into these matters, because we're loaded with too much baggage and it's hard to look at oneself without bias and emotion. I'd say these issues haven't been properly discussed until now, which may be the reason for continuing misunderstandings both within the region and between it and the West. And while we're at it, we may as well add some other related issues that also need more examination - like the history of the Roma people in the Balkans, the Macedonian "issue", and why not even the mundane everyday culture and pop-culture, and cultural traditions.
Or why not have a more thorough look at the moment of the saving of the Bulgarian Jews that was recently discussed around here, and the fact that they were all saved during WW2, but not without a price - it came at the cost of striking a deal with Hitler to assist him with rounding up the Jews in neighboring occupied territories and deporting them to the death camps. Sure, the circumstances might've pressed our leaders to do so, and they might've found themselves compelled to take the maximum they could out of that situation, but that still doesn't make an evil act any less evil, and besides I don't see a reason to sweep it under the rug and never talk about it. We should be honest with ourselves if we want to avoid further misunderstandings and to get over the old grudges with our neighbors. Things could've been very simple really.
(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:33 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:38 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:44 (UTC)Iraq is pretty important for you guys geopolitically. I can understand why some extra effort would be put into understanding it. And granted, you can't know everything about everybody. That's not the point, the point is if you guys are trying to do it or not.
(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:19 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/2/12 18:51 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 28/2/12 15:41 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 29/2/12 16:57 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:36 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:39 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 22:41 (UTC)Failing Greek student (me for example): "My problem is I have no problem with any language except Greek"
Classmate: Really? You know Russian?
FGS: Nope it's Greek to me.
(no subject)
Date: 27/2/12 07:06 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:41 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:48 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 17:53 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 18:42 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:05 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:10 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:17 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:34 (UTC)This sounds so familiar. Some things never change.
(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:44 (UTC)This is also what I thought recently after reading this text about the Greek debt (http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/article/1521511-greece-1858-plus-ca-change). It dates from 1858. When nothing has changed, the roots of problems must be sought in history.
(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:52 (UTC)Haha this reminds me of the national radio here. Every morning they have a short report about the change of the water levels in the Danube river (in cm). First they say it in Bulgarian, then Russian and then French. When there's no change they say in the French version "sans changement". This phrase has been ingrained in our pop culture so much that when they tried to change it for a more modern-sounding phrase, there was a huge public uproar and people demanded that "sans changement" be reinstated as the default "no change of water level" phrase. How dare they touch our fave phrase!?
:-D
(no subject)
Date: 26/2/12 19:49 (UTC)It's also what planted the seeds of the Ottoman downfall, so it's a double-edged thing. Like most things Balkan.
(no subject)
Date: 27/2/12 18:55 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/2/12 19:10 (UTC)