Why Yugoslavia fell apart

[asthfghl]

Was it worth it? A decade of wars? All those refugees and persecutions? No, most citizens of the seven former Yugoslav republics would say it wasn't worth it if you surveyed them - both among the older people who actually witnessed those events and the younger generations who know no reality other than the post-Yugoslav one, they'll all say the same. Probably. I dunno.

Because yeah, such a representative sample does not exist, just as Yugoslav society no longer exists. If you ask people from the various former Yugoslav republics today, you'd probably get radically different answers depending where you are. Only among the majority of Slovenian citizens the memory of the federal state is a little less loaded. The prevailing assessment there is that everything was okay at that time, very good even, some things were regretful, others are to be missed indeed, but in the end it was not possible for that project to sustain itself in the long run. But is that so - was it REALLY okay?

Quite expectedly, you won't find many "Yugoslavia nostalgics" among Kosovo Albanians. The memory of the last 10 years of Yugoslavia's existence is too traumatic for them. While there was no war in Kosovo until the very end of that fateful decade, there was real police terror. If you're really hell-bent on finding someone mourning the demise of Yugoslavia, you'd have to go to Serbia, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and even parts of Croatia, albeit pro-Yugo fans there mostly keep their thoughts to themselves or only share them after the third glass of Slivovitz (highly recommended).

In a major poll conducted more than 10 years after the end of the war and Croatia's declaration of independence, the vast majority of respondents said they considered Josip Broz Tito, the leader of the often-criticized Yugoslavia, to be the greatest Croat of all time. Attempts to attribute this role to the father of Croatian independence since 1991, Franjo Tudjman, have so far failed.

The first seeds of decline, however, had been sown long before the act. It was not the cultural differences of the peoples of the union state that were the problem - other multinational countries, such as India, Switzerland or classic immigrant countries such as the United States, have dealt and continue to deal with even greater cultural differences. The problem was elsewhere - in the attitude and approach to these differences.

In the "first Yugoslavia" between the two world wars (1918-1941), efforts were made to ignore these - differences on national, religious or cultural grounds. But the opposite happened: because the differences had to be blurred, a relative majority - the Serbian one - managed to prevail.

After the invasion by Hitler's Germany and the ensuing strongly ethnically colored Civil War in the 1940s, the Communists swore not to make the old mistakes again. And in the period of the "second Yugoslavia" (1943-1991) national identities were not only respected, but the imposition of new ones was encouraged - for example, Macedonian, Bosniak, and later Roma.

While national identity was understood in a purely Soviet model only as folklore, and politics was the sole responsibility of the Communist Party, this system did indeed function quite alright. But as communism began to decline and parliamentary democracy proved to be superior worldwide, and not least importantly as the myths and legends of the Partizan movement faded, national affiliation began to gain more and more political significance.

There was no room for shared decisions in Yugoslavia, as one nation was always stronger than the others. Although a balance was sought, it was always unstable. And when it was threatened, as in the early 1970s in Croatia, Tito would usually slam the table and the perpetrator would be restrained.

Tito's successor, who had proven to be a very skilled arbiter, must have been a successful cross between the ancestors of the various Yugoslav peoples. But no such figure was to be found anywhere. In the eight-member State Presidium, which took the lead, it was only formally possible to take decisions by majority. But when the majority imposed a decision to the detriment of one of the other peoples, it immediately created a risk to the integrity of the federal state. And after Slobodan Milosevic, who was initially considered a reformist president, ignored the others with his "Serbian bloc", this was essentially the end of Yugoslavia.

Yugo-nostalgists today again praise this model of a multiethnic state. According to them, it was destroyed by outside interference or malicious politicians. But in a society that distributes wealth and power on the basis of ethno-national quotas, quite logically sooner or later conflicts between ethnic groups would take over. In the end, the breakup was the only logical result. And there was no shortage of malicious people to drown this project in blood at its very end both in Yugoslavia as well as elsewhere around the world.

However, this doesn't mean that Yugoslavia had no chance of survival. When new democratic movements emerged in the world in the late 1960s, the youth in Yugoslavia were also excited about liberal values. And most of them put civil equality first, not national equality. But the old political guard, led by Tito, did not want to tolerate democracy anymore. Instead, they decided to focus even more on ethnic balance. In the end, everyone felt exploited by everyone else. And for a good reason.

Yugoslavia will never return. But other multiethnic states and state-like organizations face similar challenges, such as Yugoslavia in the past, and risk falling apart. That's sufficient reason not to allow more acts of arrogance similar to those of the past. If anyone would be willing to learn from its mistakes, that is.

Comments

[abomvubuso]

Very good insights. I'm guessing this was inspired by June 26th, the recent anniversary of the beginning of that war in 1991.