![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
fridi posting in ![[community profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/community.png){kind=small}
talkpoliticsAs it happens, Nagorno-Karabakh is again in flames. On September 27, the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan went full-fist along the borders of the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh. A week later, the clashes grew into all-out war with hundreds of casualties, including civilians.
The Azeris hit Stepanakert, the capital of the contested enclave. The Armenians responded by attacking Ganja, a town within Azerbaijani territory. This has been the biggest escalation of the conflict since the Russian-mediated truce from 1994. The size and scope of the war actions by far exceed those of the so called Four Day War in April 2016.
On October 4, Azeri president Ilham Aliyev said his forces had taken Jabrayil and surrounding villages, next to the border with Iran. That's the first town they've taken since the beginning of the three-decade old conflict. As the world watched in dismay, this was growing into a regional war, now that external powers such as Russia and Turkey also decided to get involved.
They both have got their geopolitical reasons. In 2016, Turkey seemed to support their cousins in Azerbaijan, but mostly on paper. Now, Erdogan seems to be determined to lay all the cards down. 1000 militia loyal to Turkey were transferred from North-West Syria to the front-line in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although both Turkey and Azerbaijan deny the Syrians' involvement, it has been established beyond any doubt at this point. Investigating journalists and experts have published data of dead Syrian militants.
Secondly, Azerbaijan has the upper hand in the air, partly due to the use of Turkish-made drones of the Bayraktar TB2 type, already noticed in both Libya and Syria. Armenia has even accused the Turkish air force of directly participating in the war, and downing an Armenian war plane on September 29. Turkey of course denies all of this.
Meanwhile, Erdogan has accused Armenia of having triggered the war, and being "the biggest threat to peace in the region". His position is shared by many in his country, where the slogan "one nation in two states" has become something of a dogma. Both the Turkish ruling elite and most of the opposition have strongly sided with Azerbaijan. Turkey's involvement, even if it's officially denied, enjoys tremendous support at home.
Turkey's participation in the conflict puts Russia in a delicate position. There's an alliance treaty between Russia and Armenia. Moscow maintains military bases in Armenia. Formally, the battles in Nagorno-Karabakh are not under the jurisdiction of the so called Collective Security Treaty Organization, as that territory is nominally part of Azerbaijan. But Armenia claims Turkey has downed its Su-25 in Armenian air space. In hoping to drag Russia into the conflict, president Nikol Pashinyan has even proposed the dispatch of Russian peace-keeping forces on the line of contact.
Russia, however, has chosen to remain cautious for the time being, and is not hurrying to run to the aid of its ally. The thing is, Putin is trying to maintain good relations with both sides. For years, Russia has been the main arms supplier for Azerbaijan, and only recently they've faced market rivals such as Turkey and Israel. Putin has positioned himself as the ultimate arbiter in the conflict, not explicitly a supporter and protector of the Armenians.
Russia played a similar role back in 2016. But now things have changed, and their diplomatic efforts have proven to have little effect. These include a joint call by Putin, Trump and Macron for a ceasefire, and a few phone calls between foreign minister Lavrov with his Turkish counterpart Cavusoglu, and then a meeting with the foreign ministers of the two sides. A fragile cease-fire was agreed indeed, only to start to be violated almost instantaneously by both sides.
So what's next after this temporary breath of fresh air? Well firstly, Russia's international prestige is clearly at stake here. Putin's goal to restore the post-Soviet bloc as a collection of vassal territories where the West cannot meddle, is again being challenged. Russia seems unable to exercise its leadership ambitions, although in this case it's enjoying the comfort of the French and American support (the other two participants in the so called Minsk Group on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh).
The big question now is, when will Russia decide to toughen its stance eventually. Would Putin threaten a military intervention to help draw the red lines between the two warring sides? In any case, he'll need to exercise pressure if he were to get them to sit on the negotiations table, and start talking to each other.
A more lasting truce would practically mean a win for Azerbaijan and Turkey because of the territorial gains. Russia would also score points for its mediator role in the South Caucasus. The big loser would be Armenian president Pashinyan, who came to power a couple years ago thanks to the color revolution that removed the so called Karabakh lobby in Yerevan. And not least importantly, a truce would underline the waning US and Western influence in that tumultuous region sitting at the very edge of Europe.
The Azeris hit Stepanakert, the capital of the contested enclave. The Armenians responded by attacking Ganja, a town within Azerbaijani territory. This has been the biggest escalation of the conflict since the Russian-mediated truce from 1994. The size and scope of the war actions by far exceed those of the so called Four Day War in April 2016.
On October 4, Azeri president Ilham Aliyev said his forces had taken Jabrayil and surrounding villages, next to the border with Iran. That's the first town they've taken since the beginning of the three-decade old conflict. As the world watched in dismay, this was growing into a regional war, now that external powers such as Russia and Turkey also decided to get involved.
They both have got their geopolitical reasons. In 2016, Turkey seemed to support their cousins in Azerbaijan, but mostly on paper. Now, Erdogan seems to be determined to lay all the cards down. 1000 militia loyal to Turkey were transferred from North-West Syria to the front-line in Nagorno-Karabakh. Although both Turkey and Azerbaijan deny the Syrians' involvement, it has been established beyond any doubt at this point. Investigating journalists and experts have published data of dead Syrian militants.
Secondly, Azerbaijan has the upper hand in the air, partly due to the use of Turkish-made drones of the Bayraktar TB2 type, already noticed in both Libya and Syria. Armenia has even accused the Turkish air force of directly participating in the war, and downing an Armenian war plane on September 29. Turkey of course denies all of this.
Meanwhile, Erdogan has accused Armenia of having triggered the war, and being "the biggest threat to peace in the region". His position is shared by many in his country, where the slogan "one nation in two states" has become something of a dogma. Both the Turkish ruling elite and most of the opposition have strongly sided with Azerbaijan. Turkey's involvement, even if it's officially denied, enjoys tremendous support at home.
Turkey's participation in the conflict puts Russia in a delicate position. There's an alliance treaty between Russia and Armenia. Moscow maintains military bases in Armenia. Formally, the battles in Nagorno-Karabakh are not under the jurisdiction of the so called Collective Security Treaty Organization, as that territory is nominally part of Azerbaijan. But Armenia claims Turkey has downed its Su-25 in Armenian air space. In hoping to drag Russia into the conflict, president Nikol Pashinyan has even proposed the dispatch of Russian peace-keeping forces on the line of contact.
Russia, however, has chosen to remain cautious for the time being, and is not hurrying to run to the aid of its ally. The thing is, Putin is trying to maintain good relations with both sides. For years, Russia has been the main arms supplier for Azerbaijan, and only recently they've faced market rivals such as Turkey and Israel. Putin has positioned himself as the ultimate arbiter in the conflict, not explicitly a supporter and protector of the Armenians.
Russia played a similar role back in 2016. But now things have changed, and their diplomatic efforts have proven to have little effect. These include a joint call by Putin, Trump and Macron for a ceasefire, and a few phone calls between foreign minister Lavrov with his Turkish counterpart Cavusoglu, and then a meeting with the foreign ministers of the two sides. A fragile cease-fire was agreed indeed, only to start to be violated almost instantaneously by both sides.
So what's next after this temporary breath of fresh air? Well firstly, Russia's international prestige is clearly at stake here. Putin's goal to restore the post-Soviet bloc as a collection of vassal territories where the West cannot meddle, is again being challenged. Russia seems unable to exercise its leadership ambitions, although in this case it's enjoying the comfort of the French and American support (the other two participants in the so called Minsk Group on the issues of Nagorno-Karabakh).
The big question now is, when will Russia decide to toughen its stance eventually. Would Putin threaten a military intervention to help draw the red lines between the two warring sides? In any case, he'll need to exercise pressure if he were to get them to sit on the negotiations table, and start talking to each other.
A more lasting truce would practically mean a win for Azerbaijan and Turkey because of the territorial gains. Russia would also score points for its mediator role in the South Caucasus. The big loser would be Armenian president Pashinyan, who came to power a couple years ago thanks to the color revolution that removed the so called Karabakh lobby in Yerevan. And not least importantly, a truce would underline the waning US and Western influence in that tumultuous region sitting at the very edge of Europe.
(no subject)
Date: 15/10/20 21:52 (UTC)That said, I suspect Russian passivity is as much that they can't afford a third war and Putin is somewhat smarter than the USA in being more willing to remember that (being smarter than the last few US Administrations since......a long time...is like being less smelly than a skunk but).
It's not like Russia has anywhere near the USA's budget nor the bodies to throw at that kind of clash.