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Some kind of choice
22/6/13 23:07![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
mahnmut.livejournal.comThe principle that if elections were to really change anything they'd already be abolished, is fully valid in Iran's case, it would seem. Although the economy is already suffering big time under the constant international sanctions, neither of the 7 candidates for the presidential post expressed any criticism or even gave a hint about a desire to change the controversial Iranian nuclear program or Iran's foreign policies, as set by ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In order to avoid any surprises, the ruling mullahs made sure that the election wouldn't divert Iran off its present course. For that purpose, hundreds of candidates were removed from the "approved list", and so it was eventually dominated by conservatives who are close to Khamenei. Meanwhile, the authorities continued to keep under house arrest the 2009 contender Mir Hossein Mousavi who headed the street protests of the Green Revolution that engulfed the country after evidence of mass election fraud surfaced, all of it favoring incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. All of this means that the regime hasn't learned anything useful from the Arab Spring, and it has no intention to reform itself, despite the severe external pressure and the mounting internal tensions.
Thus, the election didn't provide the Iranians with too much of a choice. In fact it was largely a contest between hardliners with little differences between them. And neither of them wanted to undertake big reform, because they were largely in agreement with the current politics, and, just like most Iranians, they believe in the legitimacy of their country's nuclear program. But let me also make it clear that in reality the power is far from being in the hands of the president, as Khamenei always has the last word in the Islamic Republic. He personally controls the nuclear program, and the policy toward Syria is hugely influenced by the Revolutionary Guard. So, even if the new president Rawhani really wanted to change his country's priorities, which is highly unlikely, he still wouldn't be able to do it on his own.
( Read more )
In order to avoid any surprises, the ruling mullahs made sure that the election wouldn't divert Iran off its present course. For that purpose, hundreds of candidates were removed from the "approved list", and so it was eventually dominated by conservatives who are close to Khamenei. Meanwhile, the authorities continued to keep under house arrest the 2009 contender Mir Hossein Mousavi who headed the street protests of the Green Revolution that engulfed the country after evidence of mass election fraud surfaced, all of it favoring incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. All of this means that the regime hasn't learned anything useful from the Arab Spring, and it has no intention to reform itself, despite the severe external pressure and the mounting internal tensions.
Thus, the election didn't provide the Iranians with too much of a choice. In fact it was largely a contest between hardliners with little differences between them. And neither of them wanted to undertake big reform, because they were largely in agreement with the current politics, and, just like most Iranians, they believe in the legitimacy of their country's nuclear program. But let me also make it clear that in reality the power is far from being in the hands of the president, as Khamenei always has the last word in the Islamic Republic. He personally controls the nuclear program, and the policy toward Syria is hugely influenced by the Revolutionary Guard. So, even if the new president Rawhani really wanted to change his country's priorities, which is highly unlikely, he still wouldn't be able to do it on his own.
( Read more )
