Some kind of choice
22/6/13 23:07![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
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talkpoliticsThe principle that if elections were to really change anything they'd already be abolished, is fully valid in Iran's case, it would seem. Although the economy is already suffering big time under the constant international sanctions, neither of the 7 candidates for the presidential post expressed any criticism or even gave a hint about a desire to change the controversial Iranian nuclear program or Iran's foreign policies, as set by ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
In order to avoid any surprises, the ruling mullahs made sure that the election wouldn't divert Iran off its present course. For that purpose, hundreds of candidates were removed from the "approved list", and so it was eventually dominated by conservatives who are close to Khamenei. Meanwhile, the authorities continued to keep under house arrest the 2009 contender Mir Hossein Mousavi who headed the street protests of the Green Revolution that engulfed the country after evidence of mass election fraud surfaced, all of it favoring incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. All of this means that the regime hasn't learned anything useful from the Arab Spring, and it has no intention to reform itself, despite the severe external pressure and the mounting internal tensions.
Thus, the election didn't provide the Iranians with too much of a choice. In fact it was largely a contest between hardliners with little differences between them. And neither of them wanted to undertake big reform, because they were largely in agreement with the current politics, and, just like most Iranians, they believe in the legitimacy of their country's nuclear program. But let me also make it clear that in reality the power is far from being in the hands of the president, as Khamenei always has the last word in the Islamic Republic. He personally controls the nuclear program, and the policy toward Syria is hugely influenced by the Revolutionary Guard. So, even if the new president Rawhani really wanted to change his country's priorities, which is highly unlikely, he still wouldn't be able to do it on his own.
The importance of this election has been limited to an extent as to turn it into mere parody. The proof for this is that a couple of weeks ago the Council of the protectors of the constitution striked out 678 out of all the 686 candidates (including all women) from the ballot. Half of the 12 members of the Council are of course personally appointed by Khamenei, and the rest are nominated by the chairman of the Supreme Court who's also appointed by the Supreme Leader himself. So in the Iranian theocracy the whole process is strictly controlled, and no glitches are ever allowed. But the fact itself that the regime has done its best to clear out the inconvenient candidates, is a sign for Tehran's nervousness.
Khamenei has already explicitly warned the candidates that the next head of state must not make any concessions in front of the West, because that wouldn't change the West's attitude to the country even one bit, anyway. In a TV address, he said that some erroneously believe that if they make a compromise with their foes, that would somehow diminish their wrath to Iran, which, he believed, would never be the case.
Granted, his favored candidate was hardliner Saeed Jalili, chief nuclear negotiator, and also Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, chief of the air force - both headliners. As far as some of the other candidates are concerned, some of them may've expressed some mild criticism of Ahmadinejad's foreign policies, but none of them have ever spoken against the nuclear ambitions of their country. One of the few alternative opinions came from moderate Akbar Rafsanjani who did play some part in the 2009 protests and insisted for decreased government control on the Iranian economy, but he was duly removed from the ballot by the Leadership Council. And that's what left former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani as the only "slightly reformist" candidate - the one most preferred by the establishment. So let's not fool ourselves that he'd do any bold moves and tackle the status quo, because he won't.
And whoever the Iranians had chosen, they'd still have to address the rising discontent from a failing economy, combined with incompetent governing and international sanctions because of the nuclear program. The Rial currency has lost 40% of its value for the last year alone, and the oil revenue has shrunken almost in half for the last few months. There's already shortage of some foods and medicines, which encourages a thriving black market, and has given birth to some ideas about introducing a coupon system and rationing for essential goods (albeit, in the form of electronic discount cards, at least for the time being).
The increasing international pressure for now hasn't changed Tehran's course, although some MPs have expressed criticism to Ahmadinejad's policies. But, given the painful effects of the sanctions, the question is how much longer Tehran will be able to resist this situation. Khamenei's recent actions regarding the election may be a signal about the risk of popular discontent because of his uncompromising policies. He's trying to surround himself with loyal people because Iran's nuclear ambitions are becoming too hard to sell, even to his own most devout supporters. The economy is becoming factor number one, and fast, and its poor state will only be adding more threats for the ruling elite. Another wave of protests like those in 2009 may not be too far behind the corner, and this time the mess will be much, much greater than last time, when the regime could at least cite economic prosperity as an argument in its favor - whereas now it cannot. So the shit is bound to hit the fan sooner than most people at the top floors of power in Tehran might be willing to acknowledge. And this time the violence will make the 2009 events look like children's play.
In order to prevent such a scenario, the authorities are already busy, arresting hundreds of political activists. More than a thousand have been executed in recent years on charges of espionage, rape, murder and adultery, according to human rights reports. But that doesn't always bring the intended results. For instance, Haaretz reports that a couple of weeks ago, tens of thousands of Iranians had participated in a protest against Khamenei in the city of Isfahan, chanting "death to the dictator". And that's been the largest anti-government protest in Iran for years.
That said, given all the factors (external pressure, internal tensions, economic headaches, the looming threat of an Israeli unilateral military strike, and the overall instability in the Middle East), the regime will be tightening its grip on power in preparation for the coming shitstorm - despite the election of a seemingly "moderate" president. And this way it'll be shooting itself in the foot some more, because, by trying to preserve its political power, it'll be letting the main lever, the economy, slip off its hands. And then... nothing will be able to save it any more.
In order to avoid any surprises, the ruling mullahs made sure that the election wouldn't divert Iran off its present course. For that purpose, hundreds of candidates were removed from the "approved list", and so it was eventually dominated by conservatives who are close to Khamenei. Meanwhile, the authorities continued to keep under house arrest the 2009 contender Mir Hossein Mousavi who headed the street protests of the Green Revolution that engulfed the country after evidence of mass election fraud surfaced, all of it favoring incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. All of this means that the regime hasn't learned anything useful from the Arab Spring, and it has no intention to reform itself, despite the severe external pressure and the mounting internal tensions.
Thus, the election didn't provide the Iranians with too much of a choice. In fact it was largely a contest between hardliners with little differences between them. And neither of them wanted to undertake big reform, because they were largely in agreement with the current politics, and, just like most Iranians, they believe in the legitimacy of their country's nuclear program. But let me also make it clear that in reality the power is far from being in the hands of the president, as Khamenei always has the last word in the Islamic Republic. He personally controls the nuclear program, and the policy toward Syria is hugely influenced by the Revolutionary Guard. So, even if the new president Rawhani really wanted to change his country's priorities, which is highly unlikely, he still wouldn't be able to do it on his own.
The importance of this election has been limited to an extent as to turn it into mere parody. The proof for this is that a couple of weeks ago the Council of the protectors of the constitution striked out 678 out of all the 686 candidates (including all women) from the ballot. Half of the 12 members of the Council are of course personally appointed by Khamenei, and the rest are nominated by the chairman of the Supreme Court who's also appointed by the Supreme Leader himself. So in the Iranian theocracy the whole process is strictly controlled, and no glitches are ever allowed. But the fact itself that the regime has done its best to clear out the inconvenient candidates, is a sign for Tehran's nervousness.
Khamenei has already explicitly warned the candidates that the next head of state must not make any concessions in front of the West, because that wouldn't change the West's attitude to the country even one bit, anyway. In a TV address, he said that some erroneously believe that if they make a compromise with their foes, that would somehow diminish their wrath to Iran, which, he believed, would never be the case.
Granted, his favored candidate was hardliner Saeed Jalili, chief nuclear negotiator, and also Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, chief of the air force - both headliners. As far as some of the other candidates are concerned, some of them may've expressed some mild criticism of Ahmadinejad's foreign policies, but none of them have ever spoken against the nuclear ambitions of their country. One of the few alternative opinions came from moderate Akbar Rafsanjani who did play some part in the 2009 protests and insisted for decreased government control on the Iranian economy, but he was duly removed from the ballot by the Leadership Council. And that's what left former nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani as the only "slightly reformist" candidate - the one most preferred by the establishment. So let's not fool ourselves that he'd do any bold moves and tackle the status quo, because he won't.
And whoever the Iranians had chosen, they'd still have to address the rising discontent from a failing economy, combined with incompetent governing and international sanctions because of the nuclear program. The Rial currency has lost 40% of its value for the last year alone, and the oil revenue has shrunken almost in half for the last few months. There's already shortage of some foods and medicines, which encourages a thriving black market, and has given birth to some ideas about introducing a coupon system and rationing for essential goods (albeit, in the form of electronic discount cards, at least for the time being).
The increasing international pressure for now hasn't changed Tehran's course, although some MPs have expressed criticism to Ahmadinejad's policies. But, given the painful effects of the sanctions, the question is how much longer Tehran will be able to resist this situation. Khamenei's recent actions regarding the election may be a signal about the risk of popular discontent because of his uncompromising policies. He's trying to surround himself with loyal people because Iran's nuclear ambitions are becoming too hard to sell, even to his own most devout supporters. The economy is becoming factor number one, and fast, and its poor state will only be adding more threats for the ruling elite. Another wave of protests like those in 2009 may not be too far behind the corner, and this time the mess will be much, much greater than last time, when the regime could at least cite economic prosperity as an argument in its favor - whereas now it cannot. So the shit is bound to hit the fan sooner than most people at the top floors of power in Tehran might be willing to acknowledge. And this time the violence will make the 2009 events look like children's play.
In order to prevent such a scenario, the authorities are already busy, arresting hundreds of political activists. More than a thousand have been executed in recent years on charges of espionage, rape, murder and adultery, according to human rights reports. But that doesn't always bring the intended results. For instance, Haaretz reports that a couple of weeks ago, tens of thousands of Iranians had participated in a protest against Khamenei in the city of Isfahan, chanting "death to the dictator". And that's been the largest anti-government protest in Iran for years.
That said, given all the factors (external pressure, internal tensions, economic headaches, the looming threat of an Israeli unilateral military strike, and the overall instability in the Middle East), the regime will be tightening its grip on power in preparation for the coming shitstorm - despite the election of a seemingly "moderate" president. And this way it'll be shooting itself in the foot some more, because, by trying to preserve its political power, it'll be letting the main lever, the economy, slip off its hands. And then... nothing will be able to save it any more.
(no subject)
Date: 22/6/13 19:53 (UTC)I don't remember if it was liberals, libertarians, conservatives, democrats, republicans, or what, but I remember reading now and again that "Sanctions don't work". I always thought that was silly. Not only can sanctions have a significant effect, the threat of sanctions can bring leverage.
(no subject)
Date: 23/6/13 06:29 (UTC)On the other hand, I suspect we'll be watching an increasingly amusing circus of internal fights for power in the Iranian regime in the next few years.
(no subject)
Date: 23/6/13 16:11 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/6/13 01:09 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/6/13 01:18 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/6/13 19:56 (UTC)But it turned out the Iranian people had other plans, and Rowhani, of all candidates, won the election. And from the first try. And with a 72% turnout. If that's not a sign (if more subtle than those protests from 4 years ago) that the majority of Iranians are rejecting the hardline policies, and a blow on Khamenei's authority, I don't know what is (short of an actual "counter?"-revolution).
The post is good indeed.