NATO's logistical war
31/5/16 14:36![[identity profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/openid.png){kind=small}
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talkpoliticsIf tomorrow Russia suddenly (and hypothetically) invades a NATO member country in East Europe, the NATO forces would hardly have the capacity to react to the invasion. And not because they're weak, or ill-equipped and poorly trained, but because they just won't be able to deploy their forces in time. Or at least the sufficient amount of forces.
That's what an ever growing number of top politicians and military commanders in the alliance are acknowledging, and many security think-tanks too. Paradoxically, NATO's biggest enemy in a situation of escalating conflict would not be Russia or any other foreign foe, but bureaucracy and logistics. Acknowledging that they'd need a new approach if they were to parry any potential Russian operations of the Crimean type, on their meeting in Wales from two years ago, NATO decided to create a special emergency task-force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This unit has personnel of about 4-5 thousand and is supposed to quickly deploy that force within the first 48 hours. Except, that's only in theory.
In reality, two days would only suffice for the transportation of a single battalion of 900 ground troops plus 400 units of military equipment - provided that there are no additional complications. Realistically, the complete deployment of 5-7 thousand troops and 3000 equipment units would take 14-16 days. The annexation of Crimea showed that the time between Putin's order and the actual landing of the Pskov parachute brigade was about 48 hrs. That's theoretically the time that the new VJTF unit would need to be there as well. But only after the NATO council (with all its 28 member states) has taken the decision. It's starting to sound a bit complicated, no?
In result, some are now calling for something like a "military Schengen". Because right now, NATO would need at least a week to get the official green light for moving troops from Germany to neighbouring Poland. And two weeks to move troops across the Czech Republic. Granted, we should keep in mind that the VJTF is meant to act upon activation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The regional HQ in Szczecin is supposed to direct the NATO forces in that part of the world in case of a conflict, which means the VJTF could be activated as early as the first indications of an impending escalation have started to pour in - i.e., long before a full-out war has broken out (which in turn would mean the activation of Article 5). Still, in case of an armed conflict, the transportation logistics would be a very complex and protracted process. In the meantime, according to think-tanks like RAND Corporation, right now the Russian forces are capable of conquering Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours.
That's why in about a couple of months the political leaders of the NATO member states will likely make up their mind about permanently deploying troops in the peripheral countries. There's a top-level meeting in Warsaw on July 8-9. The official statement of the Polish hosts says that "Poland is a country that takes its security obligations seriously. We should seriously consider the challenges to the regional security. Ukraine was a peaceful country until recently, but now there is war in that country. And that shows how fragile our security is". Poland, one of NATO's staunchest supporters and most devoted contributors, has already given indications about the priorities that it will be insisting on. One is the permanent deployment of NATO troops which would have a deterring effect against possible Russian expansionist ambitions.
The argument is that NATO wouldn't need to use its military might for fighting, as much as to contain its rivals and prevent a real war. The idea is not to wage direct war but to send a permanent warning to Russia that there are lines that cannot be crossed. Problem is, while the anti-missile shield is viewed as a deterrent by the West, Russia views it as a direct threat and a hostile act, and possibly as justification for a renewed arms race. The Kaliningrad district (a Russian enclave embedded between Poland and Lithuania) already hosts a new generation of quasi-ballistic missiles of the Iskander type, which could easily hit any target in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland, and even as far as Germany. That's a very aggressive weapon, and NATO feels the need to respond to the threat.
Right now NATO has two different security statuses. One applies to West Europe, the other for the so called Eastern flank. For the time being, the symbolic presence of military aircraft and troops participating in various training exercises in the east does not constitute a sufficient presence of alliance forces. The initial idea was to deploy just four permanent battalions (about 1000 troops each), one in each of the three Baltic states, plus Poland. But the latter was not content with that proposal, and they clearly showed that Poland considers that sort of presence the absolute minimum. The Polish elites are trying to ensure that at least one US tank brigade and one multinational NATO brigade are permanently present on their territory, plus a major upgrade of the surveillance and intelligence systems has taken place. The RAND Corporation analysis states that any efficient regional defense would require at least 7 brigades, including 3 armed brigades, with all the relevant maintenance equipment and support both by air and sea (with all the special personnel involved). Maintaining such a force would cost the staggering $2.7bn annually.
The Polish defense minister has suggested that as of now, there's a fundamental debate as to how the Eastern flank should be defended. He believes the Wales meeting was initially dominated by the argument that there's no need of placing permanent troops, because those could always be deployed if something goes wrong. But then it became clear that Russia has the capability to thwart such security measures, or what the NATO jargon calls Anti-Area Access Denial (A2/AD), which is essentially blocking the rival's access to a certain territory. And that's the reason that makes the permanent NATO presence necessary. In the case with Poland and the Baltics, the Kaliningrad district is that A2/AD, because Russia has placed anti-air, anti-ship and quasi-ballistic missiles with a range of a few hundred km there, as well as a few groups of fighter jets. And in the case of the south-eastern (Balkan) flank, the same A2/AD role is now being played by Crimea (which is one of the many reasons that it was such a key acquisition for Russia).
The problem with moving NATO troops in an eastern direction is that this inevitably brings the proportional response from Russia, and thus a new arms race would commence between the two sides. That's what Putin argued last week, just a day after the US activated their first ground station that's part of the new anti-missile shield (in Romania), and construction simultaneously began at the equivalent station in Poland. Although the project has been well-known for years and the US claims it's meant to intercept only a limited number of "stray" ballistic missiles from "rogue" states in the Middle East, Russia makes no mistake about its true purpose, and interprets its as an attempt to disturb the nuclear balance of the superpowers that has existed for decades. Now, when the first elements of this anti-missile defense are being put in place, the Russians will have to come up with ways to counter that move. And from there, the downward spiral will suddenly start looking dangerously close. And the upcoming NATO meeting in Warsaw will likely duly oblige and do that final step beyond the tipping point of no return.
That's what an ever growing number of top politicians and military commanders in the alliance are acknowledging, and many security think-tanks too. Paradoxically, NATO's biggest enemy in a situation of escalating conflict would not be Russia or any other foreign foe, but bureaucracy and logistics. Acknowledging that they'd need a new approach if they were to parry any potential Russian operations of the Crimean type, on their meeting in Wales from two years ago, NATO decided to create a special emergency task-force, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). This unit has personnel of about 4-5 thousand and is supposed to quickly deploy that force within the first 48 hours. Except, that's only in theory.
In reality, two days would only suffice for the transportation of a single battalion of 900 ground troops plus 400 units of military equipment - provided that there are no additional complications. Realistically, the complete deployment of 5-7 thousand troops and 3000 equipment units would take 14-16 days. The annexation of Crimea showed that the time between Putin's order and the actual landing of the Pskov parachute brigade was about 48 hrs. That's theoretically the time that the new VJTF unit would need to be there as well. But only after the NATO council (with all its 28 member states) has taken the decision. It's starting to sound a bit complicated, no?
In result, some are now calling for something like a "military Schengen". Because right now, NATO would need at least a week to get the official green light for moving troops from Germany to neighbouring Poland. And two weeks to move troops across the Czech Republic. Granted, we should keep in mind that the VJTF is meant to act upon activation of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The regional HQ in Szczecin is supposed to direct the NATO forces in that part of the world in case of a conflict, which means the VJTF could be activated as early as the first indications of an impending escalation have started to pour in - i.e., long before a full-out war has broken out (which in turn would mean the activation of Article 5). Still, in case of an armed conflict, the transportation logistics would be a very complex and protracted process. In the meantime, according to think-tanks like RAND Corporation, right now the Russian forces are capable of conquering Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours.
That's why in about a couple of months the political leaders of the NATO member states will likely make up their mind about permanently deploying troops in the peripheral countries. There's a top-level meeting in Warsaw on July 8-9. The official statement of the Polish hosts says that "Poland is a country that takes its security obligations seriously. We should seriously consider the challenges to the regional security. Ukraine was a peaceful country until recently, but now there is war in that country. And that shows how fragile our security is". Poland, one of NATO's staunchest supporters and most devoted contributors, has already given indications about the priorities that it will be insisting on. One is the permanent deployment of NATO troops which would have a deterring effect against possible Russian expansionist ambitions.
The argument is that NATO wouldn't need to use its military might for fighting, as much as to contain its rivals and prevent a real war. The idea is not to wage direct war but to send a permanent warning to Russia that there are lines that cannot be crossed. Problem is, while the anti-missile shield is viewed as a deterrent by the West, Russia views it as a direct threat and a hostile act, and possibly as justification for a renewed arms race. The Kaliningrad district (a Russian enclave embedded between Poland and Lithuania) already hosts a new generation of quasi-ballistic missiles of the Iskander type, which could easily hit any target in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland, and even as far as Germany. That's a very aggressive weapon, and NATO feels the need to respond to the threat.
Right now NATO has two different security statuses. One applies to West Europe, the other for the so called Eastern flank. For the time being, the symbolic presence of military aircraft and troops participating in various training exercises in the east does not constitute a sufficient presence of alliance forces. The initial idea was to deploy just four permanent battalions (about 1000 troops each), one in each of the three Baltic states, plus Poland. But the latter was not content with that proposal, and they clearly showed that Poland considers that sort of presence the absolute minimum. The Polish elites are trying to ensure that at least one US tank brigade and one multinational NATO brigade are permanently present on their territory, plus a major upgrade of the surveillance and intelligence systems has taken place. The RAND Corporation analysis states that any efficient regional defense would require at least 7 brigades, including 3 armed brigades, with all the relevant maintenance equipment and support both by air and sea (with all the special personnel involved). Maintaining such a force would cost the staggering $2.7bn annually.
The Polish defense minister has suggested that as of now, there's a fundamental debate as to how the Eastern flank should be defended. He believes the Wales meeting was initially dominated by the argument that there's no need of placing permanent troops, because those could always be deployed if something goes wrong. But then it became clear that Russia has the capability to thwart such security measures, or what the NATO jargon calls Anti-Area Access Denial (A2/AD), which is essentially blocking the rival's access to a certain territory. And that's the reason that makes the permanent NATO presence necessary. In the case with Poland and the Baltics, the Kaliningrad district is that A2/AD, because Russia has placed anti-air, anti-ship and quasi-ballistic missiles with a range of a few hundred km there, as well as a few groups of fighter jets. And in the case of the south-eastern (Balkan) flank, the same A2/AD role is now being played by Crimea (which is one of the many reasons that it was such a key acquisition for Russia).
The problem with moving NATO troops in an eastern direction is that this inevitably brings the proportional response from Russia, and thus a new arms race would commence between the two sides. That's what Putin argued last week, just a day after the US activated their first ground station that's part of the new anti-missile shield (in Romania), and construction simultaneously began at the equivalent station in Poland. Although the project has been well-known for years and the US claims it's meant to intercept only a limited number of "stray" ballistic missiles from "rogue" states in the Middle East, Russia makes no mistake about its true purpose, and interprets its as an attempt to disturb the nuclear balance of the superpowers that has existed for decades. Now, when the first elements of this anti-missile defense are being put in place, the Russians will have to come up with ways to counter that move. And from there, the downward spiral will suddenly start looking dangerously close. And the upcoming NATO meeting in Warsaw will likely duly oblige and do that final step beyond the tipping point of no return.
(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 21:03 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 21:22 (UTC)1. Big amount of troops already presented in Crimea as protection of military base. As result it was not even necessary to move some forces except to use army units more suitable and prepared for task (like special forces instead marines).
2. Ukrainian government was paralyzed because revolution and army was demoralized.
3. Locals was mostly friendly and loyal to Putin's troops.
As result it was rather political trick than military operation and reproduction of something like this is too unlikely.
(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 21:30 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 21:47 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 22:02 (UTC)Putin avoids shocking statements, he usually says reasonable thinks but often do almost nothing to achieve them (like fight with corruption, import substitution, development of nanotechnology etc)
(no subject)
Date: 1/6/16 05:43 (UTC)A funny thing Trump said: he'll sit with Putin, look him in the eye, and everything will be koomba-ya in the world. Or something to that effect.
(no subject)
Date: 1/6/16 06:13 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 1/6/16 06:34 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/16 21:49 (UTC)Sounds like one of those fancy cartoon Acme gadgets.
(no subject)
Date: 1/6/16 08:52 (UTC)However it makes it a great way for those running NATO to ask for more money. After all, repelling the initial attack by the Russian army would be a big job, big in the Russian sense, and they know how to do big. Of course, Russia's chances of holding onto bits of a NATO member, after some kind of response and build up, would be about zero. While I'm certainly all for keeping this deterrence up, both by keeping ethnic Russians in the Baltics happy and by keeping NATO functional, I'm thinking they can increase readiness in ways that wouldn't give the Russians an excuse or motivation to escalate as well. Even a Russian-paid troll would blush if they had to say that a plan to move troops across NATO countries faster is an unprovoked act of war.
That said, there's no reason not to deploy some extra troops in the Baltics and maybe Romania or Bulgaria, but mostly because it's a good way to show displeasure at the Russians while showing we're all serious about NATO, not because they could repulse a Russian attack.
(no subject)
Date: 1/6/16 19:48 (UTC)