talkpolitics | Missiya vypolnena*

The end of the Russian military operation in Syria has surprised most experts and politicians both in Russia itself and beyond. Most analysts believe Putin has achieved his military and political goals for the most part, and with minimum losses and expenses. But the question is, why didn't the Russians continue to capitalize on the acquired strategic advantage?

At a first sight, the Syrian operation cannot be defined as a clear "victory". Technically, it was conducted spot on and it didn't cost too much. Putin says it cost about 33 billion rubles, the Russian military says 38 billion; but even if we take the largest estimates (made by Western experts of course), it still cost less than 1% of the Russian defense budget. If we compare this to the US operations in Syria, we'd realize the Russian flights were somewhere around 5 times cheaper than the US ones. And yet, none of the initial military objectives was brought to its very end. Confusing, right?

Russia claims it sent its airforce to combat Daesh, and indeed it did severely disrupt their oil business. But in the meantime, the Russians withdrew from Syria before the complete defeat of Daesh. Putin said one of his objectives was to eliminate the Russian-born Daesh militants (about 5-7 thousand fighters from the post-Soviet era). At the end of the operation, the Russian minister of defense reported about 2 thousand dead militants. Also, Putin made it clear that the operation was limited in time and Russia would be removing its airforce before Assad's ground forces could start their offensive. In reality though, this happened just as the Assad forces (aided by Iranian guard) started advancing on Palmyra.

That said, some analysts are asking the question if the Russian air operation could really be considered successful. The answer may still be yes, at least because the real military objectives of the Russians actually differed from the officially stated ones quite a bit. In fact, Putin's main goal was to fortify Assad's regime, consolidate the pro-government elite, repel the jihadists from Central Syria (i.e. from their heartland), and expand the Assad-controlled territories. All of this was achieved, and this allowed for the start of Russia-backed negotiations between Assad and some of the opposition. Indeed, the unexpected efficiency of the truce negotiations in Geneva raises quite a few questions. The truth is, Putin and Assad are relying not so much on the negotiations, as much as on the unilateral dialog with the armed opposition in the various regions of Syria.

The biggest gain for Russia in Syria is the establishment of its image as a state that, unlike the US, is able to cooperate with legitimate political players and fight terror rather than generate it. By the way, the biggest loser in Syria is Turkey, because, while everyone involved (including the US and Russia) is trying to adjust their respective Syrian policy according to the situation, Turkey is stubbornly pursuing a firm line that has remained inflexible, and therefore disadvantageous.

Once more, Putin has proven himself to be the proactive side in international politics, defying expectations, taking the initiative (unilaterally), bringing the troops in and then pulling them out at will, without any outside factor dictating his actions. Whether the Syrian operation was costly or not, it did put him in a position where he will be the one actively defining the future of Syria, at the expense of his geopolitical rivals.

Like I said, in result of the Russian operation, Daesh has been on the run on all fronts for the last few months. At the time Putin announced the partial withdrawal of his airforce, the Kurds were already knocking at the gates of Raqqah, the Daesh capital, and the Assad army plus the Iranian volunteers were already setting up the siege of Palmyra. Granted, it's hard to tell if Daesh will keep retreating, now that the Russians are gone. Would the Kurds keep the momentum, or the Turks would use the situation and stab them in the back? Or maybe Assad would manage to hold the newly acquired territories on his own? And let's not forget that Putin said the Russian military could get back in at any time, within the matter of a few hours, if need be.

Whatever happens from now on, Russia is getting out of the isolation that the US and its European allies had tried to put it in after the annexation of Crimea and the Donbass war. By placing himself as a key factor for the outcome in Syria, Putin is also putting pressure on the sanctions - a question that the EU will again be discussing later this year. Besides, he has shown the so called "developing countries" that Russia is a partner who does not leave its buddies in the dirt, like the US often does (the case with the Arab Spring where the US turned its back on Mubarak and other "friendly" proteges as soon as it deemed them expendable, is the most recent example). Putin has demonstrated quite some patience as the regimes along Russia's buffer periphery were being troppled with help from outside, one after another. As well as during the arbitrary build-up and conduction of the Western intervention in Libya, which left EU's southern flank dangerously exposed to a migrant and extremist pressure from North Africa. With his actions in Syria, Putin has demonstrated a change of approach, basically saying he'll no longer tolerate further meddling into his country's geopolitical interests by his rivals.

Besides, the Syrian operation has allowed the Russians to conduct some field tests and demonstrate their latest military equipment, including their new missiles, which the Russian ships launched from the Caspian Sea and hit targets in Syria with great precision. But above all, Putin wanted to show the world that there are only two global superpowers capable of ending regional conflicts (if they somehow manage to restore the dialog between themselves), and those are Russia and the US and none else. So yes indeed, the Cold War is back in more than just one way.

There's a reason that in his WSJ article, the Pulitzer laureate Bret Stephens calls the Russian operation in Syria "Putin's splendid little war", arguing that the US strategists could learn from the way the Russians have entered the Syrian conflict, and then exited it. He also emphasizes on the fact that the Russian leader needed just half a year to show the world that despite the limited use of military might, he could stil tilt the power balance in his favor, and even more importantly, that not every intervention in the Middle East is necessarily doomed to become a quagmire.

A couple of conclusions stick out from the whole case. Firstly, the necessity to define each side's position in a conflict very clearly, and firmly support the chosen side. Or, as Machiavelli would've put it, it's always better to clearly state if you're friend or foe, rather than just sit on the sidelines. In Syria, the Russians have firmly taken the side of the incumbent regime, and in Ukraine and Georgia they defended the Russian or pro-Russian interests with equal zeal.

Secondly, putting realistic objectives in front of yourself. For instance, while the Obama administration hoped that the Russian intervention in Syria would repeat the Soviet scenario in Afghanistan, Putin knew full well that a more limited and dynamic use of the Russian airforce could marginalize the relatively weak opposition, and turn the Syrian civil war into a sort of referendum. Both domestic and international. A choice between two evils: Assad - or Daesh.

Third, the Russians knew well that any military intervention should be coupled with solid diplomatic results. They've achieved that too - in Geneva.

And lastly, they wanted to achieve sufficient freedom to maneuver both diplomatically and militarily in the short- and long-term. Which they achieved as well. Russia has only partially withdrawn from Syria. It remains involved there. It will keep its hi-tech naval base at Tartus, and its air base at Latakia. Putin has made it clear that he could bring his troops back to Syria at any given time if he wants to. And the success of his recent operation means any subsequent operation in the future would be overwhelmingly supported by the public at home.

At the end of the day, the purpose of a military intervention is not to solve all problems at once, like with a magic wand. Putin himself has said something to that effect many times. Any attempt to solve everything at once would inevitably render you incapable of solving anything, ever.

* (Russian) "Mission accomplished.