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talkpoliticsRussia seen building up two more military facilities in Syria
Russia sends artillery and tanks to Syria as part of continued military buildup
Nope, the refugee crisis in Europe ain't the reason that Russia is sending military equipment, including planes, helicopters and the related staff to Syria - and neither are the warm brown eyes of the Syrian refugees behind Putin's decision to build a second military base on the Mediterreanean coast. After all, the Kremlin has already officially declared the refugee situation an internal European problem that Russia doesn't care about. What's more, ethical principles don't seem to be driving Russian foreign policy at all, so it's not that.
Let's face it. Just as their trans-Atlantic counterparts (or anyone else, to that matter), the Russkies are solely being led by their own geopolitical interests. Ignoring the ethical side of the question and the fact that Russia itself bears part of the responsibility for the bloodbath in Syria (along with the West and a number of Gulf states, granted), their foreign policy has never shied away from supporting the Assad regime both diplomatically and militarily. After all, he's Russia's last remaining partner in the Middle East, so he needs some hard propping-up. That's the one thing that drives the Russian actions in the region. Or indeed, anyone's.
Putin has been given plenty of reason to worry lately though, because Assad is starting to lose positions: the nuclear deal with Iran has seriously diminished the levels of confrontation between the US and Iran (the latter actually being Assad's main partner, Putin's cosy relations with him notwithstanding). And the intensified US military interventions in the region (like Yemen), and Turkey's more active involvement (mostly directed against the Kurds) are ultimately meant to undermine the last remnants of Assad's regime - if not directly, at least indirectly.
That's why Putin has obviously decided to take matters in his own hands now. Almost unnoticed by the West (which is too preoccupied with the ISIL mess), he has managed to set up a new massive Russian military base on the Syrian shores. In his eagerly anticipated speech before the UN assembly (which is to happen at the end of the month), he'll surely be boasting about the "Russian contribution" to the fight with the Jihadists, which of course won't prevent him from continuing his support for the Assad regime in the meantime.
If the US and the other Western powers are eventually compelled to put up with the new Russian approach, it could turn out Putin had actually fulfilled his most optimistic plans for Syria: he would've managed to break his country's international isolation, which Russia fell into after the Crimea annexation and the war in East Ukraine. Besides, Russia would get international re-validation as a "great power" that is again capable of competing with the US. All the while, the Assad regime being temporarily preserved, which would also be taken as testament to Russia's geopolitical might.
On the other hand, if the US rejects the proposal for a joint anti-terrorist coalition against ISIL at the cost of temporarily freezing the question about Assad's political future, Russia would still come out with strengthened positions from the current situation. One way or the other, Russia has already managed to get its new military base on the strategically important East Mediterranean coast (remember all that newly found oil sitting in the sea just outside Cyprus?)
Even if Syria continues to disintegrate territorially in the course of the civil war, the Latakia region where the base is located, has been selected quite smartly. Apart from being smack in the middle of the area where Assad's clan originates from, more importantly, it's the traditional homeland of the ruling Alawite Shia minority in Syria, which could naturally form the core of a possible future Alawite state, even without Assad. Indeed, such a state had briefly existed there, shortly after the end of WW1 - it was a French protectorate.
In exchange for their right to have a base in Latakia, the Russians could play the role of defender of such an Alawite state, and thus remain relevant in the Middle East. Even if only that minimum goal is achieved, from Putin's standpoint, his policy in Syria could already be considered a success.
Russia sends artillery and tanks to Syria as part of continued military buildup
Nope, the refugee crisis in Europe ain't the reason that Russia is sending military equipment, including planes, helicopters and the related staff to Syria - and neither are the warm brown eyes of the Syrian refugees behind Putin's decision to build a second military base on the Mediterreanean coast. After all, the Kremlin has already officially declared the refugee situation an internal European problem that Russia doesn't care about. What's more, ethical principles don't seem to be driving Russian foreign policy at all, so it's not that.
Let's face it. Just as their trans-Atlantic counterparts (or anyone else, to that matter), the Russkies are solely being led by their own geopolitical interests. Ignoring the ethical side of the question and the fact that Russia itself bears part of the responsibility for the bloodbath in Syria (along with the West and a number of Gulf states, granted), their foreign policy has never shied away from supporting the Assad regime both diplomatically and militarily. After all, he's Russia's last remaining partner in the Middle East, so he needs some hard propping-up. That's the one thing that drives the Russian actions in the region. Or indeed, anyone's.
Putin has been given plenty of reason to worry lately though, because Assad is starting to lose positions: the nuclear deal with Iran has seriously diminished the levels of confrontation between the US and Iran (the latter actually being Assad's main partner, Putin's cosy relations with him notwithstanding). And the intensified US military interventions in the region (like Yemen), and Turkey's more active involvement (mostly directed against the Kurds) are ultimately meant to undermine the last remnants of Assad's regime - if not directly, at least indirectly.
That's why Putin has obviously decided to take matters in his own hands now. Almost unnoticed by the West (which is too preoccupied with the ISIL mess), he has managed to set up a new massive Russian military base on the Syrian shores. In his eagerly anticipated speech before the UN assembly (which is to happen at the end of the month), he'll surely be boasting about the "Russian contribution" to the fight with the Jihadists, which of course won't prevent him from continuing his support for the Assad regime in the meantime.
If the US and the other Western powers are eventually compelled to put up with the new Russian approach, it could turn out Putin had actually fulfilled his most optimistic plans for Syria: he would've managed to break his country's international isolation, which Russia fell into after the Crimea annexation and the war in East Ukraine. Besides, Russia would get international re-validation as a "great power" that is again capable of competing with the US. All the while, the Assad regime being temporarily preserved, which would also be taken as testament to Russia's geopolitical might.
On the other hand, if the US rejects the proposal for a joint anti-terrorist coalition against ISIL at the cost of temporarily freezing the question about Assad's political future, Russia would still come out with strengthened positions from the current situation. One way or the other, Russia has already managed to get its new military base on the strategically important East Mediterranean coast (remember all that newly found oil sitting in the sea just outside Cyprus?)
Even if Syria continues to disintegrate territorially in the course of the civil war, the Latakia region where the base is located, has been selected quite smartly. Apart from being smack in the middle of the area where Assad's clan originates from, more importantly, it's the traditional homeland of the ruling Alawite Shia minority in Syria, which could naturally form the core of a possible future Alawite state, even without Assad. Indeed, such a state had briefly existed there, shortly after the end of WW1 - it was a French protectorate.
In exchange for their right to have a base in Latakia, the Russians could play the role of defender of such an Alawite state, and thus remain relevant in the Middle East. Even if only that minimum goal is achieved, from Putin's standpoint, his policy in Syria could already be considered a success.
(no subject)
Date: 24/9/15 14:42 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 24/9/15 18:32 (UTC)And lastly, it wasn't Russia that started all the turmoil of the Arab Spring, which brought today's bloodbath in Syria. The might not be the ones to end it, either. All they'll do is use the opportunity to gain something out of the whole mess. As would anyone else, especially the so self-proclaimed paragon of freedom and democracy in the Universe.
(no subject)
Date: 25/9/15 13:55 (UTC)