[identity profile] mahnmut.livejournal.com posting in [community profile] talkpolitics
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Riyadh's nightmare is Tehran laying its dirty paws upon the Bab el Mandeb, the narrow pirate-infested strait where the oil tankers from the Gulf to the West are passing. Simply said, Saudi Arabia has been in a cold(ish) war with Iran for a while. And now, Yemen has become the next hot battlefield in that war. The bloody standoff between Sunni and Shia that we've been seeing in places like Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, has opened a new front.

The Saudis and their Arab coalition are bombing positions of the Shia Houthi rebels as we speak. The Houthis had taken Yemen's main towns, and forced president Hadi to flee for his life. They're supported by Iran. For quite a while, actually. And that's no secret to anyone.

This conflict is at least a decade old. In 2004, the northern provinces of the country were the arena of a guerrilla war, waged by the Houthis against the government army of long-time president Saleh. The Houthis had the upper hand for a time, they were familiar with the terrain, and they successfully used the guerrilla tactics. Still, the government managed to hold them off to some extent.

That was then. A decade ago, the Houthis were only fighting for autonomy of the northern Saada province. But the Arab Spring and the ousting of Saleh has made their ambitions greater now. They started targeting the capital, Sana'a. And there was a reason for that. In fact, the Houthis were the main force behind Saleh's ousting. And secondly, they used to be viewed as Al Qaeda's main opponent, and a rival to the Salafi militants who had found refuge in various corners of Yemen, sponsored by various Saudi and Gulf foundations. Armed and sponsored by Iran, and patted on the back by some Western diplomats, the Houthis began to take themselves rather seriously, and they violated their initial agreements with president Hadi. In fewer words: they decided they wanted everything. The whole country. Their aspirations for a restored theocratic monarchy (which used to exist until 1962) however were only possible to fulfill with help from outside.

Leaving the entire Yemen to the Houthis, i.e. to Iran, was Saudi Arabia's biggest mistake in this case. For many reasons: political, economic, strategic. Moreover, after the Saudi defeat to the hands of Iran (albeit indirect) at the Syrian and Iraqi front, they just couldn't afford to lose Yemen as well. The whole initial concept of the Saudis about Syria and the plan to kick Assad out, has failed. Then, Iran took all the strong cards by assuming the role of an official key player in the struggle against the Islamic State in Iraq. The Saudi cards in Lebanon were also squandered. And on top of all that, just as the US and Iran were warming up their relations, the Houthis have taken Sana'a. Things were getting from bad to worse for Saudi Arabia.


A Yemen under Iranian control would not be just control over some obscure, wild country, constantly torn apart by tribal quarrels. It means controlling the Bab el Mandeb straits, the only naval connection between the Red Sea and the Arab Sea. Before heading to the Suez canal and then to Europe and America, all the oil and trade traffic passes through Bab el Mandeb. That's where most Saudi oil export goes through. And that's the reason for the fast formation of an anti-Houthi coalition, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and four Gulf monarchies (Kuwait, Qatar, UAE and Bahrain). The biggest surprise entry in this coalition is Pakistan. Not only that, but Pakistan is prepared to participate with ground troops in Yemen. Pakistan's inclusion (the only nuclear force in the group) not only adds exra legitimacy to the operation - it's supposed to be taken as a serious warning to Iran, which at the same time is negotiating the parameters of its own nuclear program in Geneva.

Each member of this coalition has its own reasons to be there. For some of them, Saudi Arabia is a major sponsor, and they wouldn't dare to refuse. Some of the Gulf monarchies are in the coalition because of their own problems with their Shia minorities. Especially Bahrain, where the Shia are even the domninant part of the population, and the Saudis were "invited" a while ago to suppress a Shia uprising (also allegedly sponsored by Iran).

So what will be Iran's response now? Most likely, Tehran will officially restrict itself to only using diplomatic means. A watered-down denunciation of the operation as "aggression" against a sovereign state, followed by propositions for negotiations and the seeking of a peaceful solution - that'd help Iran save face in this situation. The Sultan of Oman, who's considered a moderate and a balancing factor in the region, could be used as a mediator in this respect.

In the meantime though, I don't think Iran would stop covertly giving support to the Houthis with all means possible, just as it's been doing with all its proxies. Even if some temporary solution is found in Yemen, the unstopping confrontation between Sunni and Shia will continue to be a fruitful soil for all sorts of conflicts, and a source of instability for a long time. The biggest problem will be if (or rather, when) Iran and Saudi Arabia start a real, direct, hot war with each other. Then things will get really messy.

(no subject)

Date: 11/5/15 18:25 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] abomvubuso.livejournal.com
I'm liking Qaboos and the way he's been running his country. Oman is shaping up to be the moderating factor in the region, and I love it. Of course I'm biased in this case due to my personal links there, but still. It's refreshing to see at least one such factor in a region as turbulent as the Gulf.

(no subject)

Date: 12/5/15 06:51 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] luzribeiro.livejournal.com
Great. Yet another place to send the drones too.

Oh wait. They've already been sent.

(no subject)

Date: 12/5/15 19:15 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
You know, this “smart diplomacy” stuff may not be working out very well, but at least it is entertaining in it's own tragicomic way.

(no subject)

Date: 13/5/15 13:57 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] 404.livejournal.com
You can feign righteous indignation all you want, but unless you have some concrete way to change this, we are all bystanders to the events at hand.

(no subject)

Date: 13/5/15 14:53 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] 404.livejournal.com
You can say this is "talking about talking," but your original reply appeared more than just disagreement regarding his opinion.

(no subject)

Date: 13/5/15 14:58 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] 404.livejournal.com
I'm sure.

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 16:48 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
It's called Schadenfreude.

"thousands of people fleeing their homes, a whole region becoming battlefield, and destruction worth billions" that's the tragic part. Seeing my supposed moral and intellectual betters get "mugged by reality". That's pure comedy,

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 18:51 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
That doesn't surprise me.

Like i said, the bloody mess is the tragic part, the comedy comes from having seen it, and the consternation of those who claimed to know better and the ability to honestly say "I told you so".

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 20:33 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
We lack Baraka, and thus we find ourselves in a "Pre-War" world... (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1911404.html)

Don't say "we don't need a world cop" and then complain about a lack of policing. (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1906179.html)

...this is what happens when the powerful abdicate their responsibilities. (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1894691.html?nc=47)

Jeff on foreign intervention and the "you break it you buy it" theory of warfare (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1680120.html?thread=134094584)

Cheezyfish covering similar ground (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1877166.html?)

...along with endless cyclical threads about the death of "Pax Americana" and the morality of propping up third world dictators or opposing militants.

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 22:27 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
Not quite.

I opened the middle east tag. Found posts where myself and others pointed out the unreliable nature of our proxies/allies, and the danger of a power vacuum, and selected a few where those concerns were subsequently dismissed as being overly cynical, paranoid, or bigoted.

Turns out they were largely on the money.

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 20:51 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] abomvubuso.livejournal.com
This has very little to do with the "smart diplomacy" that you're trying to involve here, and a lot to do with the clash of geopolitical interests - mainly those of two regional players like KSA and Iran. The US had long taken one side, but now they're finding themselves in the tricky situation to have to cooperate with the other side as well, which doesn't seem to please the "allied" side too much. It's a good example of unforeseen consequences coming to bite you bitterly on the ass, due to short-sightedness in prior choices and actions.

That's not a deligitimisation of the argument for diplomacy. It's an example of cold wars gone hot via proxy - an exercise that the US has excelled in throughout the years, by the way. So I don't think you're the ones who should be saying "told you so", especially as long as you guys are active players in it all.
Edited Date: 14/5/15 20:53 (UTC)

(no subject)

Date: 14/5/15 23:49 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
I disagree that this has little to do with the "smart diplomacy", but concede the rest as fair points.

The thing is that there were many of us who pointed out that our allies and proxies were unreliable, that the power vacuum left by the US pullout was dangerous, and that certain factions within Iran were liable to further destabilize the region with an eye towards achieving their own ends.

These concerns were roundly dismissed as paranoid and "warmongering" yet that's pretty much what happened.

(no subject)

Date: 15/5/15 06:03 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] abomvubuso.livejournal.com
Everyone anywhere around the world knows that your allies and proxies are unreliable. They're unreliable by definition - because, before becoming your allies and proxies, they weren't your allies and proxies. And the way they easily became your allies and proxies, they could cease being your allies and proxies just as easily, if presented with the incentive.

Their reliability is not the point. Everybody's knowledge of their unreliability is not the point either. The point is that even after taking their unreliability into account, there's a variety of options that you have to conduct foreign policy - and working with allies and proxies (as temporary as they may be) tends to wield much better results than directly engaging into conflicts. Because you can't police everything - it's immensely expensive, and it tends to create more enemies than friends.

So you've got no other viable option but to pick your allies and proxies carefully, and tread cautiously when using them.

The way I'm reading your links and the threads under them, it's not the concern about your proxies' and allies' unreliability that was dismissed. What was dismissed is the notion that once you've been directly involved in a conflict, you can just suddenly disengage, and leave the locals to their means, and pretend that you've done of job and the whole mess is none of your business any more. What's also rejected is the notion that all problems and conflicts can only be solved with violence - which seems to be the general approach of a number of administrations that you've had over the years.

I hope I've provided the nuance that was quite necessary, as you seemed to have again chosen to misrepresent other debaters' arguments for the sake of defeating them more easily - which I'm sure you know is the very definition of strawman.
Edited Date: 15/5/15 06:06 (UTC)

(no subject)

Date: 15/5/15 07:16 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com
Disengagement the "smart" option that we are currently dealing with the aftermath of.

Point being that if you are going advocate disengagement, you need to accept the consequences there of. Likewise if you are going to get directly involved you need to be willing to see it through, rather than leaving the locals to fend for themselves at the first sign of adversity.

Apparently that dichotomy is simply too black and white for some people to accept. They want to have their cake and eat it too. If we have a problem with Iranian expansionism why has the "smart" money been giving so much support to Iran and it's proxies?

Like I said, "Don't say "we don't need a world cop" and then complain about a lack of policing."
Edited Date: 15/5/15 07:37 (UTC)

(no subject)

Date: 15/5/15 08:36 (UTC)
From: [identity profile] abomvubuso.livejournal.com
No one has advocated for disengagement, at least not in the links that you provided. What's been advocated is either multi-layered engagement (with emphasis on diplomacy conducted by international alliances that are formed voluntarily along shared interests and principles - as opposed to forcefully, through coercion) -or- refraining from disengagement, once you've been engaged, until you've helped the situation normalise (basically: the "You created the mess, now sort it out" argument). Again, you're resorting to a misrepresentation of your opponents' arguments. Thus, I'm afraid your entire premise is constructed around a fallacy. When you look closer, there's actually no argument here. If you are going to get directly involved you need to be willing to see it through, rather than leaving the locals to fend for themselves at the first sign of adversity - is exactly what has been argued.

As to why is the smart money giving so much support to Iran and its proxies, I'd venture with a guess: short-sightedness among the ranks of those geopolitical think-tanks of yours that usually craft your foreign policies. Unintended consequences from short- to mid-term strategies, whose long-term results no one is bothered to contemplate. We've been seeing this all throughout US foreign policy, and it has become a habit of a number of US administrations: from funding the Mujahideen in order to root out the Russian influence from Central Asia (but never thinking of the consequences of a strong militant movement ruling in a volatile region); to supporting Saddam in order to counter the Iranian theocracy (but creating a monster who oppresses and murders his own people, and becomes too assertive in their aspirations in the region to the point of becoming a nuisance); to funding an oppressive theocratic regime in Saudi Arabia for the sake of getting cheap oil, while simultaneously trying to sell the "we are the flag-bearer of freedom and democracy" parable to the rest of the world. And the list could go on.

It's not that we don't need a world cop. The problem is that we don't need an incompetent and selfish world cop who uses his position of power and the trust that others have in him, to essentially become the world bully. Because incompetence and arrogance leads to downfall, and in case of a US downfall as the world's cop, there'll be other, much worse factors who'll be sure to sneak into the vacuum that'll be opened. And all of us lose - both the world that has delegated the role of a world cop to you, and yourself as well. Because your own mistakes will come to bite you in the ass eventually, whichever way you'd like to argue on the matter.
Edited Date: 15/5/15 08:36 (UTC)

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