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talkpolitics"I submit this motion to the Federal Assembly and request that you review a constitutional bill for accepting two new subjects into the Russian Federation, the Republic of Crimea, and the City of Sevastopol. I am also asking you to ratify the bill for accepting the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol into the Russian Federation. I do not doubt your support". These words of Putin's were met with standing ovations in the two chambers of the Duma, the Russian parliament, and they effectively put an end to all hopes for a diplomatic solution of the Crimean crisis, and marked another modern-day re-drawing of Europe's map.
The annexation of Crimea (because that's what it is), which for the rest of the world remains de jure part of Ukraine, comes a few days after the Crimean secession referendum that's recognized only by Moscow. And also a day after the EU and US imposed some minor sanctions against Russia. Brussels and Washington had warned many times that including the Black Sea peninsula into the RF would be a breach of international law, and would undermine the principle of national sovereignty that has been at the core of the European legal framework post-WW2. Putin's response was that he doesn't want to break up Ukraine and he has always respected its territorial integrity, but "in the hearts and minds of the people of Crimea, it has always been and remains an inseparable part of Russia". Those pesky Crimean Tatars be damned.
Putin also made a warning to NATO: "We are not against a partniership with NATO, but we are against a military organization placing itself beside our fence and next to our historical territories. I cannot imagine us going to Sevastopol to visit NATO soldiers - I'm sure they are nice chaps, but they better be coming for a visit to our Sevastopol".
As usual, he has thrown all the blame for the crisis on the "extremists" in Kiev and the West, which is "irresponsibly" supporting them. But then he assured the public that he doesn't want to split Ukraine, and after Crimea he wouldn't be reaching out for other regions. But despite these assurances, Ukraine is naturally suspicious and keeps mobilizing its troops in the eastern regions because it fears that Russia could step in beyond just Crimea. In an angry reaction to Putin's statements, the Ukrainian ministry of foreign affairs stated that signing the agreement for incorporating Crimea "has nothing to do with democracy and common sense", and "shows how real the Russian threat isto the civilized world and international security".
Putin's blitzkrieg, from the well-planned occupation of Crimea to its annexation (in less than 3 weeks) is a test for Europe, above all. In the best-case scenario, this crisis could unite the EU and compel it to finally show some strategic thinking and a unified foreign policy. In the worst case, it could highlight and deepen its internal weaknesses, just when it's standing against an uncompromising opponent.
As for NATO, until just a few days ago the alliance looked like an organization that was ready to sink into semi-oblivion in the wake of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the Crimean crisis may've breathed new life into it. Some analysts believe NATO is now back in the game, but meanwhile it'd be very irresponsible if this crisis is taken as a reason for reviewing and changing NATO's role and strategy in Europe.
After what has happened in Ukraine the alliance that had been wandering in the wild in search of a meaning for its existence, suddenly realized that its old mission of taking care of Europe's security is still valid. No doubt the Crimean crisis will mobilize NATO. Some European countries may have to update their national security concepts, that's for sure. Particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, whose governments now have strong arguments to expect a boost of their military budgets from the public. And it won't be just the big European NATO members, but the US as well, who'll have to rethink their notion of Russia's predictability. NATO has to clearly re-confirm that they stand firmly by Art.5 of the alliance agreement, the one guaranteeing mutual defense in practice, not just on paper.
In the long run, we could expect more investment in defense in the NATO members, more meaningful actions for developing their defensive capabilities, and probably working out possible scenarios that would include more aggressive actions of the kind that Russia is employing at the moment, in case one or more NATO member states are threatened (I'm specifically talking of the Baltic states). That would mean increased pressure for bigger defense budgets, and renewed armament. And the problem is that some of these countries are still too dependent on Russia for technology, training and know-how, not to mention resources. It's a little discussed fact that in some of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the bulk of the military equipment is still predominantly Russian. And that will have to change. Which means Bonanza for the military industrial complex. And the big wheel will start turning at a great speed again.
I'm not saying the change will be complete, but it'll definitely have to happen in the most sensitive spheres, such as air defense, the radar systems, etc. The domains where Russian technology continues to dominate, this re-armament will be happening more urgently. That's something these states should've probably done a long time ago, instead of turning a blind eye to the new geopolitical realities and burying their heads in the sand. But now, maintaining the current situation could turn out unacceptable, even dangerous to their security.
If there's one thing positive from the whole Crimean chess game, it is that it could give a new impulse not only to NATO but to that mythical creature caled "EU foreign policy". It's as geopolitical a crisis as much as it's military, and the EU should have a strategy for addressing it. It might have to develop a new type of identity, a real geopolitical identity replacing the current clique of technocrats reigning in Brussels who don't bother to think on the issues that really matter. There's a chance that the confrontation with Putin would lead to a new type of leadership agenda in Europe. But it's still too hard to say which side will take over, the ones that say things should be taken more seriously now, because next time they could get worse - or the ones who just want this crisis to pass, to be forgotten, and pretend that nothing had ever happened, and carry on the same way like before.
Still, there are some encouraging signs: for more than three weeks the EU has managed to radiate a sense of surprising unity, and the new plan for three-stage sanctions on Russia looks reasonable enough. The only dissent seems to be on the question under what circumstances the last stage should be reached, the trade and economic sanctions, which would be the thing that would really hurt Russia. What matters at this point is the level of unity. Furthermore, more and more voices are being heard, arguing that EU's unified response should trump the petty national considerations.
There may be some chance that the Ukrainian crisis could turn out to be the catalyst for creating a real, strategically orientated EU foreign policy. Despite the many reasons to be skeptical due to the mistakes of the past, there are signs that the EU member states are trying to think together, and in the long-term. This cohesion was achieved due to the critical nature of the situation, which compelled many of these countries to adjust their risks-and-benefits analysis, and consider adopting new approaches.
As always, the key is in Germany. And Germany has given some signals that it's prepared to make some economic sacrifices for the sake of Europe's strategic interests. The shift in the German attitude to Russia looks promising. Berlin has been more critical of Moscow for some time, and the Ukrainian debacle has taught the Germans that they really cannot expect to have any special relations with the Russians, nor can they seriously hope to exert any influence on Putin. This is forcing Germany to build deeper partnerships with other EU countries, and that's something that for a long time used to be absent from Berlin's approach to Russia. Other European countries might have to take a lesson or two from the latest developments, as well. They'll have to start thinking long-term, and take strategic decisions with EU's interest in mind.
The annexation of Crimea (because that's what it is), which for the rest of the world remains de jure part of Ukraine, comes a few days after the Crimean secession referendum that's recognized only by Moscow. And also a day after the EU and US imposed some minor sanctions against Russia. Brussels and Washington had warned many times that including the Black Sea peninsula into the RF would be a breach of international law, and would undermine the principle of national sovereignty that has been at the core of the European legal framework post-WW2. Putin's response was that he doesn't want to break up Ukraine and he has always respected its territorial integrity, but "in the hearts and minds of the people of Crimea, it has always been and remains an inseparable part of Russia". Those pesky Crimean Tatars be damned.
Putin also made a warning to NATO: "We are not against a partniership with NATO, but we are against a military organization placing itself beside our fence and next to our historical territories. I cannot imagine us going to Sevastopol to visit NATO soldiers - I'm sure they are nice chaps, but they better be coming for a visit to our Sevastopol".
As usual, he has thrown all the blame for the crisis on the "extremists" in Kiev and the West, which is "irresponsibly" supporting them. But then he assured the public that he doesn't want to split Ukraine, and after Crimea he wouldn't be reaching out for other regions. But despite these assurances, Ukraine is naturally suspicious and keeps mobilizing its troops in the eastern regions because it fears that Russia could step in beyond just Crimea. In an angry reaction to Putin's statements, the Ukrainian ministry of foreign affairs stated that signing the agreement for incorporating Crimea "has nothing to do with democracy and common sense", and "shows how real the Russian threat isto the civilized world and international security".
Putin's blitzkrieg, from the well-planned occupation of Crimea to its annexation (in less than 3 weeks) is a test for Europe, above all. In the best-case scenario, this crisis could unite the EU and compel it to finally show some strategic thinking and a unified foreign policy. In the worst case, it could highlight and deepen its internal weaknesses, just when it's standing against an uncompromising opponent.
As for NATO, until just a few days ago the alliance looked like an organization that was ready to sink into semi-oblivion in the wake of its withdrawal from Afghanistan. But the Crimean crisis may've breathed new life into it. Some analysts believe NATO is now back in the game, but meanwhile it'd be very irresponsible if this crisis is taken as a reason for reviewing and changing NATO's role and strategy in Europe.
After what has happened in Ukraine the alliance that had been wandering in the wild in search of a meaning for its existence, suddenly realized that its old mission of taking care of Europe's security is still valid. No doubt the Crimean crisis will mobilize NATO. Some European countries may have to update their national security concepts, that's for sure. Particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, whose governments now have strong arguments to expect a boost of their military budgets from the public. And it won't be just the big European NATO members, but the US as well, who'll have to rethink their notion of Russia's predictability. NATO has to clearly re-confirm that they stand firmly by Art.5 of the alliance agreement, the one guaranteeing mutual defense in practice, not just on paper.
In the long run, we could expect more investment in defense in the NATO members, more meaningful actions for developing their defensive capabilities, and probably working out possible scenarios that would include more aggressive actions of the kind that Russia is employing at the moment, in case one or more NATO member states are threatened (I'm specifically talking of the Baltic states). That would mean increased pressure for bigger defense budgets, and renewed armament. And the problem is that some of these countries are still too dependent on Russia for technology, training and know-how, not to mention resources. It's a little discussed fact that in some of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the bulk of the military equipment is still predominantly Russian. And that will have to change. Which means Bonanza for the military industrial complex. And the big wheel will start turning at a great speed again.
I'm not saying the change will be complete, but it'll definitely have to happen in the most sensitive spheres, such as air defense, the radar systems, etc. The domains where Russian technology continues to dominate, this re-armament will be happening more urgently. That's something these states should've probably done a long time ago, instead of turning a blind eye to the new geopolitical realities and burying their heads in the sand. But now, maintaining the current situation could turn out unacceptable, even dangerous to their security.
If there's one thing positive from the whole Crimean chess game, it is that it could give a new impulse not only to NATO but to that mythical creature caled "EU foreign policy". It's as geopolitical a crisis as much as it's military, and the EU should have a strategy for addressing it. It might have to develop a new type of identity, a real geopolitical identity replacing the current clique of technocrats reigning in Brussels who don't bother to think on the issues that really matter. There's a chance that the confrontation with Putin would lead to a new type of leadership agenda in Europe. But it's still too hard to say which side will take over, the ones that say things should be taken more seriously now, because next time they could get worse - or the ones who just want this crisis to pass, to be forgotten, and pretend that nothing had ever happened, and carry on the same way like before.
Still, there are some encouraging signs: for more than three weeks the EU has managed to radiate a sense of surprising unity, and the new plan for three-stage sanctions on Russia looks reasonable enough. The only dissent seems to be on the question under what circumstances the last stage should be reached, the trade and economic sanctions, which would be the thing that would really hurt Russia. What matters at this point is the level of unity. Furthermore, more and more voices are being heard, arguing that EU's unified response should trump the petty national considerations.
There may be some chance that the Ukrainian crisis could turn out to be the catalyst for creating a real, strategically orientated EU foreign policy. Despite the many reasons to be skeptical due to the mistakes of the past, there are signs that the EU member states are trying to think together, and in the long-term. This cohesion was achieved due to the critical nature of the situation, which compelled many of these countries to adjust their risks-and-benefits analysis, and consider adopting new approaches.
As always, the key is in Germany. And Germany has given some signals that it's prepared to make some economic sacrifices for the sake of Europe's strategic interests. The shift in the German attitude to Russia looks promising. Berlin has been more critical of Moscow for some time, and the Ukrainian debacle has taught the Germans that they really cannot expect to have any special relations with the Russians, nor can they seriously hope to exert any influence on Putin. This is forcing Germany to build deeper partnerships with other EU countries, and that's something that for a long time used to be absent from Berlin's approach to Russia. Other European countries might have to take a lesson or two from the latest developments, as well. They'll have to start thinking long-term, and take strategic decisions with EU's interest in mind.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 16:46 (UTC)Although it does contradict international law and undermines the principle of national sovereignty that the European framework rests upon, what Russia has done in Crimea is understandable from a certain standpoint. Especially after the whole circus that the EU and the US played in the last few years in Ukraine. In other words, with their own stones, on their own heads.
Being the world powers pretending to be the paragons of modern legal principles, the Western powers have fallen in the trap of their own hypocrisy and lack of principle. In that respect, Russia's actions, albeit primitive and vulgar, are somewhat more predictable and straightforward, and they emerge from certain motivations that anyone could understand, even if they don't necessarily have to agree with them. Which makes the Western reaction all the more pathetic.
So far I'm not seeing any constructive proposals for a solution of the crisis from the West. The sanctions are a mere comparing of dick sizes, not a solution. A solution means compromise, not insistence on reverting to the situation that existed before the crisis, because that's simply not realistic. It's naive and stupid. It's clear that no matter how much they insist, there's no way that things could happen exactly the way they want. So, talks of the sort which side could humiliate the other one more quickly and efficiently, definitely are not a prerequisite for a peaceful cohabitation, let alone finding solutions to the situation.
Of course it takes two to tango, but when neither side is showing even the remotest hints of wanting to make the first steps in that dance, no one would make these steps for them.
As for NATO, let's not forget why it was created. Its purpose was to counter the Eastern bloc. It's a military organization. Since the Eastern bloc disintegrated, NATO found itself hanging in the air, seeking for a new identity and a new purpose. All attempts to reanimate it as some kind of world policeman and insert it in various conflicts outside its natural zone of operation, have failed to one extent or another. Yugoslavia was the beginning, Afghanistan was the culmination, and Iraq was the total fallout. Nowadays NATO is not what it used to be. A cursory glimpse at all the "coalitions of the willing", "Old Europe/New Europe" and suchlike bullshit is enough to see that.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 18:54 (UTC)Go earlier. The USSR collapse was not natural phenomenon or desire of population, it was result of Cold War defeat. Reassemble processes may be like return to balanced or healthy state from devastation. Looks like Europe is creating new Union like USSR too.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 20:42 (UTC)Except, no one is forced to stay in the EU.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 21:07 (UTC)Why? USSR covers approximately the same region as older Russian Empire.
> Except, no one is forced to stay in the EU.
And is this good or bad?
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 21:31 (UTC)Irrelevant to the point of it not being forceful; i.e. you're attempting a distraction from the original point. Try to stay focused.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 21:56 (UTC)Not all but many of them, somewhere majority, somewhere minority, dependending of time and region.
> Doesn't the very definition of "empire" imply something forceful?
I think the very definition of "state", "government" or "law" imply something forceful :)
And I think the USA, Germany, UK and any other large country is empire in the same meaning as USSR: their history contains some periods of expansion with various ways. Even Sweden :)
> Irrelevant to the point of it not being forceful
It's your idea to be focused on forceful or not forceful.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 21:59 (UTC)States do not conquer people. Empires do. There's a difference, and the fact you prefer to ignore it, is not my problem.
Yes, except Sweden is not annexing anyone right now.
I'm not interested in endless distractions. Either stay on topic or do not talk to me at all.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:17 (UTC)All of them?
> States do not conquer people. Empires do
What your definition of "conquer people"? Any war? Any war with territory annexation? Any war with resource capture?
> Yes, except Sweden is not annexing anyone right now.
And? USSR also is not annexing anyone right now :) Also annexion of Crimea was already finished several days ago and right now Russia is not annexing anyone :))
> Either stay on topic
I staying in my topic. You may stay in yours. My topic is the "motivation of Russians in current Crimean crisis".
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:32 (UTC)You either are not reading what I'm saying, or your language capabilities just prevent you from doing that. Either way, I'm not going to entertain your meandering thought process.
Taking over their ships and expelling them from their naval bases at gunpoint is a good start as to where "annexation" begins.
Keep telling yourself that. I'm sure comrade Putin would be very proud of you.
Then have a nice day.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:48 (UTC)Have a nice day.
(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 07:03 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:36 (UTC)The topic is NATO and the EU. You're invited to make your separate post about USSR if you like.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:43 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 07:04 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 08:31 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 08:36 (UTC)I thought you had left the, ehm, "topic".
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:17 (UTC)You can't compromise with criminal - Russia, that took Crimea from Ukraine at gunpoint, breaking the law - Budapest Memorandum.
You can destroy the criminal, when circumstances are right, and take back his loot, like West did with USSR, but you can't compromise with criminal.
(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 16:51 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 17:13 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 17:20 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 18:07 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 21:42 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 26/3/14 22:16 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 13:00 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 27/3/14 14:13 (UTC)