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talkpoliticsThe Arab streets haven't met a foreign leader with such enthusiasm since the time of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the famous revolutionary icon. But now thousands of people flocked on the squares to meet and greet the Turkish prime-minister Erdogan during his tour of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. He's one of the charismatic leaders, and immensely popular - something everyone acknowledges in the region. Mostly because the so-called "Turkish model" is now being viewed as a viable option for the awakening Middle East.
In his interviews, Erdogan keeps claiming that "Turkey doesn't want to export models - we are not interested in that". But he also added, "if they ask for our help, we'll give it to them". Obviously, Turkey doesn't want to get into the US situation - being hated for their support of dictators, or because of the "export of democracy" in Iraq. Egypt and Tunisia may be considered a triumph of Turkish foreign policy, but meanwhile the war in Libya and the riots in Syria are putting it in front of a difficult choice.
The dictators that Turkey, just like everybody else, was used to coping with and working with, are suddenly expendable now, even unwanted and harmful. Bashar Assad who made several visits to Erdogan, now looks like a heavy burden to him. A burden that the Turkish leader is trying desperately to shake off. His explanations in a CNN interview are rather telling: "Yes, he was my guest, but we never went out on vacation together". He's trying to distance himself from Assad as much as possible. Erdogan also said something remarkable. You can't remain in power through brutality for too long. This could continue for a while, but sooner or later if the people in Syria decide, they'll get either the outcome of Egypt or Tunisia or even Libya. (The Libyan scenario is now looking more probable as the time passes, although the Syrian opposition is still too fragmented). One of the reasons why Turkey is so angry at Syria (apart from the thousands of refugees crossing the border every day), is that Assad's reaction to the protests destroyed all illusions about the "Turkish soft power" and its ability to dictate the events in a neighbouring country. That's a major blow on Turkey's image as a regional mediator.
Erdogan's tour in the Arab countries is a sign that Turkey is trying to get on the "right side of history". For instance in Libya, Turkey first tried to be a mediator between Gaddafi's regime and the rebels in Benghazi. But then they quickly turned into the main financial supporter of the transitional council when they saw where the wind was blowing.
And here's the discrepancy in Turkey's position in this complicated situation. There are some obvious self-contradictions in the Turkish model itself. The liberally inclined activists at the Tahrir Square in Egypt are attracted by Turkey's apparently secular arrangement. Erdogan, who's a cunning politician, didn't miss the chance to give them an important signal - out of the blue, he urged the Egyptian state to be equally distant from all religions. He even met with the Coptic patriarch. Of course, this gesture angered the Muslim Brotherhood, who accused him of interfering in the internal matters of Egypt.
The Islamists are watching the rise of Erdogan's party very closely. It presents a specific model of blending Muslim values with headlong economic development. Turkey's present example is also much more acceptable for the West than the theocratic regime in Iran, not to mention the Salafi radicals or the Taliban. The prevalent premise is that Erdogan's party is just following the example of the Christian-Democratic parties in Western Europe. I'm not sure how valid this parallel is, but apparently it's well met by a large number of Western analysts, and it raises some hopes about the future of other Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Nahda party in Tunisia (which became a major player after the Arab spring). But in fact there's no such thing as a universal Turkish "model". It could mean many different things in different places, where different kinds of political players are playing.
There's another shift happening in Turkey's position. Because Turkey doesn't only gain from the Arab spring, but it also loses in some respects. Its most obvious problem is the end of the famed "zero problems with the neighbours" policy. And the relations with Syria are not the only area where this policy has failed. That's more valid in the case with Israel. One of the reasons for Erdogan's huge popularity among the Arabs is his firm position on the Palestinian issue. A large part of the Palestinians believe that Turkey is their greatest ally, and Egypt is somewhere far behind. Erdogan's words about Turkey's former great ally, Israel, are reeking of more and more frost with every next sentence. "While Israel persists in not apologising for the flotilla raid, and not paying compensations, and while the embargo on Gaza remains, there can be no normalisation of our relations", he said. The expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Turkey was followed by canceling the military cooperation, and even hints that the Turkish navy could start patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean (although the main reason is the interest in its gas resources). Some critical voices in Turkey are saying that Erdogan is going too far with all this muscle flexing, and he might be even fueling Antisemitism. It seems there's a rift opening between Erdogan and his pragmatic foreign minister Davutoglu, because Erdogan is a populist and he's steering Turkey further towards the Middle East, maybe more than necessary.
By wading deeper into the muddy waters of the Middle Eastern conflicts (from which it had remained largely distanced and neutral for a long time), Turkey cannot continue to play the role of an impartial mediator any more. For a time it used to fill the vacuum that remained from the political frailty of sclerotic regimes like Mubarak's. But now the environment is much more competitive - the "new Egypt" is trying to assert a more active position, Iran is also trying to draw dividends from the Arab spring... And Turkey cannot afford to remain passive. Erdogan may have to play along with Egypt for the time being, in order to block the increasing Iranian influence. The decision to build NATO radars on Turkish territory was a clear sign that the Turks want to draw some clear lines between themselves and Iran.
On the downside, on some of the most important bilateral conflicts (Cyprus, Armenia, etc), the situation is getting worse. An example is the tension between Turkey and the Cyprus-Greece-Israel bloc, in their scramble for natural gas on the Mediterranean sea shelf.
Erdogan will soon realise that the more the Turkish model is being promoted, the more visible the discrepancies between his words and actions will become. Turkey is far from perfect. The Kurdish problem is escalating since the beginning of the summer, and the renewed military action in the Turkish south-east and the air strikes on PKK targets deep into Northern Iraq is causing still more tension in the otherwise good relations with the autonomous Kurdish territory in Iraq. The Israeli foreign minister Lieberman warned that Israel could restart its support for PKK. A possibility that Syria is also sponsoring PKK shouldn't ruled out either, just like they did in the 90s.
And Turkey itself is not very clear about what exactly it wants to "promote". For instance, on the issue of religions, despite Erdogan's statements that he remains faithful to the secular regime established by Atatürk, in reality he has put the Suni Islam as an appendix to political power, merging religion with state, while discriminating against all other faiths in the country (like the heterodox Alevi Islam).
The Turkish example of a separation between civilian and military command is also not perfect. A few months ago the Supreme Military Coincil that's ruling Egypt called for loaning some models from the Turkish Constitution, particularly ones that give a leading role to the military as a guarantee for stability. The irony is that Erdogan's party has been fighting for more than a decade against the regime of military-bureaucratic guardianship that Turkey got during the 1980 coup. Erdogan and his people want to promote the Turkey of 2011 as a "source of inspiration" (they're staying away from the term "model"). It's the Turkey where top military generals can be and are being arrested and tried for conspiracy against the state. Not the Turkey of the 80s and 90s, where the generals had the power to bring down governments, blackmail politicians with threats of coups, etc. And it's easy to imagine that the Egyptian generals don't like this very much.
A triumphant tour of the Arab streets may've won the hearts of some of the Arabs, but in the battle for the future of the Middle East, Turkey is still just one of the many players scrambling for dominance, each using their own means.
In his interviews, Erdogan keeps claiming that "Turkey doesn't want to export models - we are not interested in that". But he also added, "if they ask for our help, we'll give it to them". Obviously, Turkey doesn't want to get into the US situation - being hated for their support of dictators, or because of the "export of democracy" in Iraq. Egypt and Tunisia may be considered a triumph of Turkish foreign policy, but meanwhile the war in Libya and the riots in Syria are putting it in front of a difficult choice.
The dictators that Turkey, just like everybody else, was used to coping with and working with, are suddenly expendable now, even unwanted and harmful. Bashar Assad who made several visits to Erdogan, now looks like a heavy burden to him. A burden that the Turkish leader is trying desperately to shake off. His explanations in a CNN interview are rather telling: "Yes, he was my guest, but we never went out on vacation together". He's trying to distance himself from Assad as much as possible. Erdogan also said something remarkable. You can't remain in power through brutality for too long. This could continue for a while, but sooner or later if the people in Syria decide, they'll get either the outcome of Egypt or Tunisia or even Libya. (The Libyan scenario is now looking more probable as the time passes, although the Syrian opposition is still too fragmented). One of the reasons why Turkey is so angry at Syria (apart from the thousands of refugees crossing the border every day), is that Assad's reaction to the protests destroyed all illusions about the "Turkish soft power" and its ability to dictate the events in a neighbouring country. That's a major blow on Turkey's image as a regional mediator.
Erdogan's tour in the Arab countries is a sign that Turkey is trying to get on the "right side of history". For instance in Libya, Turkey first tried to be a mediator between Gaddafi's regime and the rebels in Benghazi. But then they quickly turned into the main financial supporter of the transitional council when they saw where the wind was blowing.
And here's the discrepancy in Turkey's position in this complicated situation. There are some obvious self-contradictions in the Turkish model itself. The liberally inclined activists at the Tahrir Square in Egypt are attracted by Turkey's apparently secular arrangement. Erdogan, who's a cunning politician, didn't miss the chance to give them an important signal - out of the blue, he urged the Egyptian state to be equally distant from all religions. He even met with the Coptic patriarch. Of course, this gesture angered the Muslim Brotherhood, who accused him of interfering in the internal matters of Egypt.
The Islamists are watching the rise of Erdogan's party very closely. It presents a specific model of blending Muslim values with headlong economic development. Turkey's present example is also much more acceptable for the West than the theocratic regime in Iran, not to mention the Salafi radicals or the Taliban. The prevalent premise is that Erdogan's party is just following the example of the Christian-Democratic parties in Western Europe. I'm not sure how valid this parallel is, but apparently it's well met by a large number of Western analysts, and it raises some hopes about the future of other Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Nahda party in Tunisia (which became a major player after the Arab spring). But in fact there's no such thing as a universal Turkish "model". It could mean many different things in different places, where different kinds of political players are playing.
There's another shift happening in Turkey's position. Because Turkey doesn't only gain from the Arab spring, but it also loses in some respects. Its most obvious problem is the end of the famed "zero problems with the neighbours" policy. And the relations with Syria are not the only area where this policy has failed. That's more valid in the case with Israel. One of the reasons for Erdogan's huge popularity among the Arabs is his firm position on the Palestinian issue. A large part of the Palestinians believe that Turkey is their greatest ally, and Egypt is somewhere far behind. Erdogan's words about Turkey's former great ally, Israel, are reeking of more and more frost with every next sentence. "While Israel persists in not apologising for the flotilla raid, and not paying compensations, and while the embargo on Gaza remains, there can be no normalisation of our relations", he said. The expulsion of the Israeli ambassador from Turkey was followed by canceling the military cooperation, and even hints that the Turkish navy could start patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean (although the main reason is the interest in its gas resources). Some critical voices in Turkey are saying that Erdogan is going too far with all this muscle flexing, and he might be even fueling Antisemitism. It seems there's a rift opening between Erdogan and his pragmatic foreign minister Davutoglu, because Erdogan is a populist and he's steering Turkey further towards the Middle East, maybe more than necessary.
By wading deeper into the muddy waters of the Middle Eastern conflicts (from which it had remained largely distanced and neutral for a long time), Turkey cannot continue to play the role of an impartial mediator any more. For a time it used to fill the vacuum that remained from the political frailty of sclerotic regimes like Mubarak's. But now the environment is much more competitive - the "new Egypt" is trying to assert a more active position, Iran is also trying to draw dividends from the Arab spring... And Turkey cannot afford to remain passive. Erdogan may have to play along with Egypt for the time being, in order to block the increasing Iranian influence. The decision to build NATO radars on Turkish territory was a clear sign that the Turks want to draw some clear lines between themselves and Iran.
On the downside, on some of the most important bilateral conflicts (Cyprus, Armenia, etc), the situation is getting worse. An example is the tension between Turkey and the Cyprus-Greece-Israel bloc, in their scramble for natural gas on the Mediterranean sea shelf.
Erdogan will soon realise that the more the Turkish model is being promoted, the more visible the discrepancies between his words and actions will become. Turkey is far from perfect. The Kurdish problem is escalating since the beginning of the summer, and the renewed military action in the Turkish south-east and the air strikes on PKK targets deep into Northern Iraq is causing still more tension in the otherwise good relations with the autonomous Kurdish territory in Iraq. The Israeli foreign minister Lieberman warned that Israel could restart its support for PKK. A possibility that Syria is also sponsoring PKK shouldn't ruled out either, just like they did in the 90s.
And Turkey itself is not very clear about what exactly it wants to "promote". For instance, on the issue of religions, despite Erdogan's statements that he remains faithful to the secular regime established by Atatürk, in reality he has put the Suni Islam as an appendix to political power, merging religion with state, while discriminating against all other faiths in the country (like the heterodox Alevi Islam).
The Turkish example of a separation between civilian and military command is also not perfect. A few months ago the Supreme Military Coincil that's ruling Egypt called for loaning some models from the Turkish Constitution, particularly ones that give a leading role to the military as a guarantee for stability. The irony is that Erdogan's party has been fighting for more than a decade against the regime of military-bureaucratic guardianship that Turkey got during the 1980 coup. Erdogan and his people want to promote the Turkey of 2011 as a "source of inspiration" (they're staying away from the term "model"). It's the Turkey where top military generals can be and are being arrested and tried for conspiracy against the state. Not the Turkey of the 80s and 90s, where the generals had the power to bring down governments, blackmail politicians with threats of coups, etc. And it's easy to imagine that the Egyptian generals don't like this very much.
A triumphant tour of the Arab streets may've won the hearts of some of the Arabs, but in the battle for the future of the Middle East, Turkey is still just one of the many players scrambling for dominance, each using their own means.
(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 16:07 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 17:58 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 18:24 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 19:01 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 19:03 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 18:29 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 19:03 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 4/10/11 19:15 (UTC)There were speculations that Iran played a significant role in ousting Mubarak and propping up the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Those were based on some cables (http://mnprager.wordpress.com/2011/02/27/wikileaks-reveal-muslim-brotherhood-ties-to-iran/) that leaked through Wikileaks. The White House didn't seem very surprised by this.
The latest indication about Iran probing the terrain for further inroads into the region is the events in Bahrain. The Shia minority there, supported by Iran, rebelled against the royal dynasty which is a satellite to the Saudis. The response was a crackdown, mostly carried out by regular Saudi troops who crossed the Abo Haddryah land connection and entered Bahrain, a presumably sovereign neighbouring country, and drowned the rebellion in blood. The international community remained completely silent (no surprise). And Iran drew their conclusions for the time being.
All about natural gas.
Date: 15/10/11 08:05 (UTC)MY PRECIOUS!
And when you think about all the so called humanitarian support Turkey is providing to Gaza & its reaction to the flotilla incident indicates how interested is Turkey in the big pie.
now when Greece is bankrupt and is asking the world for a little more funds, it won't mind some gas to sell and boost its fucked up economy, Grecian Cyprus stands with Greece, Israel issued a warning against any Lebanese trial to "steal" its natural gas resources and Lebanon announced its right to "explore" its water...
Middle East governments fought for land, water, politics and now they are fighting for gas.
nothing special about democracy, freakin' religion whether Sunni Islam or even Wahhabi Islam... it's just good business.