Curveball

[ddstory.livejournal.com]

You know who/what's Curveball? That's the coded pseudonym of the Iraqi chemistry engineer who leaked information to the German intelligence and practically brought down Saddam. Except his info was pure bullshit.

Nowadays, Curveball is convinced that he had been treated unfairly by the German intelligence BND. The former Iraqi chemistry engineer (real name: Rafid al Janabi) gave a large amount of secret intel from Iraq to the Germans, just before the beginning of the Iraq War v.2.0 in 2003. In response, the intelligence started paying him via a fictitious company, the monthly "salary" being 3000 euros. But in 2008 the German intelligence decided to stop the payments. Meanwhile, Al Janabi who was already living in Karlsruhe and had obtained German citizenship, had to return the Mercedes he had been lended.

Al Janabi never gave up though, so he turned to court, using the fact that the fictitious company for which he had been working, was issuing written invoices for the payments. In order to cover it up, he was officially hired at the marketing department as an "assistent in innovative advertisement" (LOL). What's more, the firm gave him a permit for a 15 year working contract that he could use at the Karlsruhe bank. And it's exactly this permit that he's now using at the Munich court that's supposed to settle labor cases. Because this is being viewed as a mere argument between employer and employee. Yeah, Germany is weird like that...

So basically a former informer is suing the intelligence services. No wonder that the judges are seeing so much potential danger in this situation that the whole court case is being held behind closed doors, no journalists allowed. Eventually the sides reached an agreement, and Al Janabi got a one-time compensation of 5000 euros. Wow, that was pretty cheap. So that should have settled it, you'd think? Um, actually no.

The thing is, the whole story is breaking out just now, and some curious details are coming up to the public. Details with much deeper implications about the Iraq War (although they might not be telling us anything that we don't already know or suspect, but now it's being officially confirmed).

The whole episode is a wacky epilogue to one of the biggest spying scandals in modern history. Al Janabi's "intel" about Saddam's regime turned out to be pure fiction. But that didn't stop the Americans from using that "data" to explain their invasion of Iraq. Since no WMDs ever turned up in the process, the US tried several times to make it look as if the whole blame was on Al Janabi's faked info and the Germans' naive belief in it. Like anyone is buying that.

Now for the first time the German intelligence has expressed some opinion on the matter. The former BND chief August Hanning himself said, "Washington misused our intel to justify the Iraq war". His words, verbatim. At the Welt am Sonntag, he said the US government had presented Curveball's intel as hard truth, despite the fact BND had warned them multiple times about their doubts in the veracity of his fantasies.

Hanning also added that Bush had planned the war right after 9-11. Just two weeks after the terrorist attacks the German intelligence received a letter from CIA, asking for all the information they got on Iraq. CIA was particularly interested in Curveball's testimony. He had been living in Germany since 1999 under political asylum and he instantly drew the attention with his statements that he had worked in Saddam's chemical labs. Only later he admitted that he had lied about this.

Several top-ranking members of the German intelligence are confirming that CIA had been warned several times and through several separate channels that Curveball's intel was untested and untrustable. The BND chief Hanning had even written to then CIA chief George Tenet. But despite everything, Bush's administration decided to use the fake informer's made up info as a keystone in their attempt to sell the war on Iraq. They simply created a narrative to justify their adventure in the Gulf, and they found the perfect story-teller to do it for them.

A few days ago Al Janabi gave his first interview for a German media. He told Welt am Sonntag that he had lied many times. He did it in order to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein. He also told the newspaper how, for years after the Iraq war the German intelligence still wanted to send him under cover and keep a low profile for him, because in 2007 the NYT had uncovered his true identity.

BND recommended that Al Janabi should change his looks through plastic surgery. That could happen in Italy or Greece. But he refused. He's convinced that BND shares some of the guilt too for compromising his identity. He thinks the Germans had given that info to CIA, from where it probably became accessible to the public via the press. We all know how leaky CIA is these days. For Al Janabi this was the latest reason to start asking himself whether he shouldn't sue the intelligence once more. And for that part of the public who are interested in something more beyond the spicy superficial sensationalism, the whole story puts some uncomfortable questions about the war in Iraq, as well as the credibility of the intelligence community.

Comments

[badlydrawnjeff.livejournal.com]

What significant support did the US have going into Iraq?

Here's a list (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm).

Would you consider international political support (i.e. from governments) more or less important than international public support?

More. Doing the right thing isn't always the same as doing the popular.

[mrsilence.livejournal.com]

Interesting how many of the nations involved in the coalition, who did not have direct access to intelligence and the number of nations that did have access to direct intelligence, who did not join the coalition.

Of course "significant" support is a subjective term, but suffice to say, in my opinion, excepting the UK and South Korea, none of those nations count as significant, politically.

What is more glaring is the number of major powers that weren't involved and were in fact opposed to the action.

[badlydrawnjeff.livejournal.com]

Interesting how many of the nations involved in the coalition, who did not have direct access to intelligence and the number of nations that did have access to direct intelligence, who did not join the coalition.

All of those nations were members of the UN.

What is more glaring is the number of major powers that weren't involved and were in fact opposed to the action.

As is their right and choice.

[mrsilence.livejournal.com]

What I'm talking about is examples such as Germany, who for instance had interviewed Curveball, supposedly taken at the time as some of the firmest and strongest evidence of an Iraqi WMD program, yet Germany didn't support military action.

You'd think that would ring alarm bells in certain quarters, but apparently they were more interested in perceiving this as a demonstration that Germans were cowards.

[badlydrawnjeff.livejournal.com]

What I'm talking about is examples such as Germany, who for instance had interviewed Curveball, supposedly taken at the time as some of the firmest and strongest evidence of an Iraqi WMD program, yet Germany didn't support military action.

And yet the UK was on board. We could go back and forth with various nations all night - some chose to help, others did not.

You'd think that would ring alarm bells in certain quarters, but apparently they were more interested in perceiving this as a demonstration that Germans were cowards.

What rang alarms for me was that Germany was willing to buck the wealth of information in favor of the limited stuff they had direct access to. It's a gamble that some could say worked in their favor, but was still a sizable risk.

[mrsilence.livejournal.com]

Yet "Curveball" was considered one of the most significant intelligence sources regarding Iraq's WMD programs. His statements composed a very significant component of the "wealth of information" you refer to.

So significant were his statements that they were quoted directly at the highest level by Bush and Powell, in speeches to the U.N., in the State of the Union address and to the media, to press the case for war.

Yet the Germans at the same time were telling the U.S. that they did not believe him.

As for that being a gamble, it didn't arguably pay off in their favour. Very simply, they were right.

They had the same information that every other U.N. member was given and they also had in their possession one of the most significant sources that the U.S. was relying on - Curveball. Yet they told the U.S. that Curveball was full of shit and they did not want or see a need to go to war.

I agree their behaviour should definitely have rang alarm bells. On Capitol hill. In the White House.

[badlydrawnjeff.livejournal.com]

Yet "Curveball" was considered one of the most significant intelligence sources regarding Iraq's WMD programs. His statements composed a very significant component of the "wealth of information" you refer to.

Not really. He was a key part, but not the only piece.

As for that being a gamble, it didn't arguably pay off in their favour. Very simply, they were right.

When I say "arguably in their favor," I'm saying that many could believe they made the right move in staying out. I disagree.

They had the same information that every other U.N. member was given and they also had in their possession one of the most significant sources that the U.S. was relying on - Curveball. Yet they told the U.S. that Curveball was full of shit and they did not want or see a need to go to war.

You still seem to think that Curveball was the only source here.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Indeed. If Iraq was indeed an enemy of the USA then what Rummy was doing in the 1980s falls under the constitutional definition of treason.