Stimulus? Still a failure.

[badlydrawnjeff.livejournal.com]

The failure of the stimulus isn't exactly news, and hasn't been for some time. Thankfully, more and more people are getting on board.

For instance, it looks like we might not have needed it to begin with. Granted, since stimulus of this nature doesn't work, we never need it, but the justification for it isn't so strong anymore:

"We had to hit the ground running and do everything we could to prevent a second Great Depression," Obama told supporters last week.

...

IBD reviewed records of economic forecasts made just before Obama signed the stimulus bill into law, as well as economic data and monthly stimulus spending data from around that time, and reviews of the stimulus bill itself.

The conclusion is that in claiming to have staved off a Depression, the White House and its supporters seem to be engaging in a bit of historical revisionism.

...

The argument is often made that the recession turned out to be far worse than anyone knew at the time. But various indicators show that the economy had pretty much hit bottom at the end of 2008 — a month before President Obama took office.

Stanford's John Taylor showed us that tax credits and directed spending was fairly worthless:

Individuals and families largely saved the transfers and tax rebates. The federal government increased purchases, but by only an immaterial amount. State and local governments used the stimulus grants to reduce their net borrowing (largely by acquiring more financial assets) rather than to increase expenditures, and they shifted expenditures away from purchases toward transfers.

Some argue that the economy would have been worse off without these stimulus packages, but the results do not support that view.

Even Harvard's Robert Barro is on board to an extent. While he has yet to come around on the fact that stimulus has not ever been shown to work, he's at least noting that the merits of spending need to be more important than the stimulating impact:

"In the long run you have got to pay for it. The medium and long-run effect is definitely negative. You can't just keep borrowing forever. Eventually taxes are going to be higher, and that has a negative effect," he said.

"The lesson is you want government spending only if the programmes are really worth it in terms of the usual rate of return calculations. The usual kind of calculation, not some Keynesian thing. The fact that it really is worth it to have highways and education. Classic public finance, that's not macroeconomics."

With murmurings that we may need a second stimulus, the question remains as to why we'd pursue such a thing given the track record of the first. At this point, if you're still a proponent of Keynesian-style stimulus, why? What will it take to convince you that it will not succeed?

Comments

[johnny9fingers.livejournal.com]

That could be because the papers linked to are quite long and needed thorough reading. Even so, nevermind has nailed it. Jeff has misrepresented small parts of these papers or, more generously, been selective about the bits he's quoted in the OP, probably due to confirmation bias.

Nevertheless, Taylor's analysis is interesting.

He does seem to come out against tax rebates. His conclusion that tax rebates were largely saved by individuals and families, and that federal government increased purchases by "an immaterial amount" and "State and local governments used the stimulus grants to reduce their net borrowing (largely by acquiring more financial assets) rather than to increase expenditures, and they shifted expenditures away from purchases toward transfers" rather re-inforces my view that this spending should have been on infrastructure and capital projects, rather than acquiring more financial assets, or giving tax cuts/rebates/credits which were then saved or used to reduce levels of debt.

I quote his penultimate paragraph:

Others argue that the stimulus was too small, but the results do not lend support to that view either. Using the estimated equations, a counterfactual simulation of a larger stimulus package—with the proportions going to state and local grants, federal purchases, and transfers to individual the same as in ARRA—would show little change in government purchases or consumption, as the temporary funds would be largely saved. Of course, the story would be different for a stimulus program designed more effectively to increase purchases, but it is not clear that such a program would be politically or operationally feasible.

When I have time I shall read around this particular area rather more: as I am of the opinion that this debate ain't over yet by a long way. I'm sure Joe the Stig has an opinion. :)