Atheism as Faith

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

Back in the day, a guy named Plutarch wrote an essay comparing atheism with superstition. In his estimation, superstition is worse than atheism because it puts divinity in a negative light. Of course, the school of thought to which Plutarch belonged did not view jealousy as a divine attribute. The jealous gods were not part of the higher pantheon. This perception of divinity is shared with Buddhism which depicts the jealous gods at a level below the higher gods.

One of my favorite ways to challenge the ignorant is to ask them where they got the idea that there is only one deity. They often point to a biblical passage that fails to support their assertion. That passage does not assert the non-existence of other gods, but instead affirms their existence. The jealous deity seeks to enslave people into his cult at the expense of a higher order understanding.

Which individual has greater faith: the one who is suckered into a cult of jealousy or the one who refuses to pledge allegiance to any of the gods? From where Plutarch sits, the atheist seems the more judicious of the two and hence the one closer to a sublime life path. Those who fail to become seduced into the luxury of ignorance are more likely to follow the path less traveled. The atheist is freer to bond with the eternal than is the religious bigot who has become immersed in a quagmire of primitive precepts.

What does this have to do with public policy? It promotes secularism as a spiritual enabler rather than as a negation of faith. It contradicts the crippling dogma of those who seek to put superstitious supplications back into public schools.

Comments

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

The OP asks "Which individual has greater faith[?]" I suppose the implication is that one of them does, yes.

So you can't actually discern which one has more trust based on that hypothetical?

I'm not sure how the OP would prefer to have this formulated. I suspect they would be a better person to ask than me.

So you can't answer the question by referring to the OP's own words?

Now, if we use the second definition of faith, both of these questions are easily answered. That definition is also the most common one, especially in this situation as deities and atheism are being discussed.

The atheist is described here as one who does not believe in gods. The superstitious is described as one who does. It's clear that the superstitious, when we say they have faith, that they have [belief with lack of evidence], not that they [trust] that the gods exist. It's a misnomer to say that, because trust does not convey the idea that you believe in something with no evidence to support that belief.

Superstition, by definition, borrows heavily from the second definition of faith. They're synonyms. When Plutarch talks about faith, he's talking about believing in things without evidence. He's not talking about issues of trust or confidence.

If the OP believes otherwise, then the OP is wholly misinterpreting Plutarch's words. However, since the OP's conclusions are the same as Plutarch's, I would assume they're using the same definitions.

It makes no sense otherwise.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"So you can't actually discern which one has more trust based on that hypothetical?"

I suppose the implication is that the reader would in fact make a discernment about this.

"So you can't answer the question by referring to the OP's own words?"

I don't particularly care in any case.

"Now, if we use the second definition of faith, both of these questions are easily answered."

Unfortunately, however easily you think the answer is provided by this method, it remains an invalid answer, since it's a fallacy of equivocation, as has been noted.

"That definition is also the most common one, especially in this situation as deities and atheism are being discussed."

If it's the most common one, then this simply illustrates how commonly people are mistaken, since it's the incorrect definition. And since it's not the definition the OP has in mind in any case, using definition two remains a fallacy of equivocation.

"It's clear that the superstitious, when we say they have faith, that they have [belief with lack of evidence], not that they [trust] that the gods exist."

No, this isn't clear. Moreover, it's incorrect for the reasons noted, namely that it's a fallacy of equivocation.

"When Plutarch talks about faith, he's talking about believing in things without evidence."

Incorrect. The term only appears once in the text, specifically at 170e, where it has the first meaning.

"If the OP believes otherwise, then the OP is wholly misinterpreting Plutarch's words."

Incorrect. The OP's meaning coincides with that used by Plutarch, as just noted, and it also coincides with the relevant meaning of the term in this context, as has been noted.

"I would assume they're using the same definitions."

They are indeed. You and the_rukh are the ones using the wrong definition.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

I suppose the implication is that the reader would in fact make a discernment about this.

I don't particularly care in any case.

This is a big point of contention for me. If you can't understand what the OP means, then either the OP means something other than what you think, or it's deliberately vague so as to promote incorrect responses. The former seems more reasonable to me. If you can't tell me your opinion on the matter in the same breath as telling me that I'm getting it all wrong, then I'm going with my first assumption.

Unfortunately, however easily you think the answer is provided by this method, it remains an invalid answer, since it's a fallacy of equivocation, as has been noted.

If it's the most common one, then this simply illustrates how commonly people are mistaken, since it's the incorrect definition. And since it's not the definition the OP has in mind in any case, using definition two remains a fallacy of equivocation.

No, this isn't clear. Moreover, it's incorrect for the reasons noted, namely that it's a fallacy of equivocation.

This assumes that the original meaning was clear, and then was changed. I contend that the original meaning was the different the entire time in every instance, so this has nothing do with do with a fallacy of equivocation. To do that, I would have to claim first that the first definition was used and then switched to the second. I never made this claim.

Incorrect. The term only appears once in the text, specifically at 170e, where it has the first meaning.

So, you're contending what someone who is superstitious is NOT believing in things that lack evidence? I'm curious: Where in the definition of trust does it apply to superstition?

Incorrect. The OP's meaning coincides with that used by Plutarch, as just noted, and it also coincides with the relevant meaning of the term in this context, as has been noted.

They are indeed. You and the_rukh are the ones using the wrong definition.

The first definition of faith is trust. If you believe that this is the relevant definition, then tell me how. Explain to me how superstitious people exhibit trust in their superstitions and not the second definition of faith.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"If you can't understand what the OP means..."

I understand what the OP means just fine.

"...then either the OP means something other than what you think..."

Since the OP has already told us what she thinks of the_rukh's/your definition, we're in the fortuitous position of not having to speculate on the matter.

"This assumes that the original meaning was clear, and then was changed. I contend that the original meaning was the different the entire time in every instance, so this has nothing do with do with a fallacy of equivocation. To do that, I would have to claim first that the first definition was used and then switched to the second. I never made this claim."

You're mistaken. The fallacy of equivocation arises from your misattribution of meaning to the OP's word. You don't have had to have changed your mind about this, indeed you evidently have been engaged in the exact same fallacy of equivocation all along, treating the word as if it meant definition two when in fact it meant definition one.

"So, you're contending what someone who is superstitious is NOT believing in things that lack evidence?"

I'm contending that the term only appears one in the text, specifically at 170e, where it has the first meaning.

Incidentally: no, in the text "superstitious" does not mean "believing in things that lack evidence" or anything like this.

"I'm curious: Where in the definition of trust does it apply to superstition?"

What?

"The first definition of faith is trust."

Right.

"If you believe that this is the relevant definition, then tell me how."

Tell you how what?

"Explain to me how superstitious people exhibit trust in their superstitions and not the second definition of faith."

What are you talking about?

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

Incidentally: no, in the text "superstitious" does not mean "believing in things that lack evidence" or anything like this.

su·per·sti·tion
   /ˌsupərˈstɪʃən/ Show Spelled[soo-per-stish-uhn] Show IPA
–noun
1.
a belief or notion, not based on reason or knowledge, in or of the ominous significance of a particular thing, circumstance, occurrence, proceeding, or the like.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

Were you under the impression the cherry picking a definition from dictionary.com informs you about the contents of Plutarch's argument?

If not, I can't imagine why you think your response is relevant.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

Cherry picking.

Like what you're doing with the first definition when for all intents and purposes the relevant definition of faith is the second in this discussion.

The fact that the OP thinks otherwise is bastardizing Plutarch. I wouldn't be surprised if the OP just c+p'd everything in there verbatim from somewhere and added that last line.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"Like what you're doing with the first definition...?"

No, not at all like that. I have pointed out that the first definition of faith is the appropriate one to use because it is the one intended by the OP, appropriate to the context of the OPs remarks, and thus that to use another would be a fallacy of equivocation.

"...when for all intents and purposes the relevant definition of faith is the second in this discussion."

You're mistaken. Since the OP did not intend the second definition, nor does the text on which the OP is commenting, nor does the general context of the comments support the second definition, evidently it is not the relevant one. To the contrary, it is a fallacious one, as has been indicated.

"The fact that the OP thinks otherwise..."

The fact that, as you are evidently now admitting, you equivocate on the term used by the OP in your response to it makes you guilty of the fallacy of equivocation, as has been indicated.

"The fact that the OP thinks otherwise is bastardizing Plutarch."

To the contrary, the OP's definition matches that found in Plutarch, as has been indicated.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

You are the one making the fallacy of equivocation.

Faith in a deity uses the second definition, because there is no evidence of a deity. An atheist, thus, has no faith by the second definition. It is not that the atheist has no faith from the first definition, because that makes no sense. An atheist having trust or confidence in a deity would imply that they believe in it in the first place, which is not the case.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"You are the one making the fallacy of equivocation."

I don't seem to be. Perhaps you could state your criticism on this account.

"Faith in a deity uses the second definition..."

Evidently it doesn't in the two cases relevant here, namely the OP and Plutarch, as has been noted. Then evidently it doesn't mean this in principle either.

"...because there is no evidence of a deity."

Presumably you mean that you believe there is no evidence for a deity. But of course the human language wasn't built around your personal beliefs. Neither do your beliefs somehow trump the meaning of the words used by the OP and Plutarch. Such an implication is transparently ridiculous.

"An atheist, thus, has no faith by the second definition."

Since the faith of the atheist is discussed both by the OP and by Plutarch, this would be a good indication to you that the second definition is not the on being used here. You can add that to the immense pile of good indications we have previously discussed.

"It is not that the atheist has no faith from the first definition, because that makes no sense."

You're confused: the charge in Plutarch and the OP is that the atheist has faith and the superstitious doesn't. All along you've been imagining the very opposite to be the case. This is presumably one of the major sources of your profound confusions.

Incidentally, you may find that if you actually read a text before you lecture people about it, that your lectures will have a higher chance of accuracy and reasonableness than if you just make them up as you go along, as has been the case here.

Moreover, there's nothing the least bit nonsensical in attributing to the atheist either faith or the lack thereof, according to the first definition, i.e. that being used here.

"An atheist having trust or confidence in a deity would imply that they believe in it in the first place, which is not the case."

If this is true, it certainly doesn't follow that an atheist cannot have trust or confidence at all, which is the issue at hand.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

the charge in Plutarch and the OP is that the atheist has faith and the superstitious doesn't.

Well this is just silly. Whether or not the OP or Plutarch are saying these things, it's just not true. I don't believe Plutarch is talking about this (maybe the OP is, who knows), but if you believe that to be the case, then I simply disagree with that claim.

Moreover, there's nothing the least bit nonsensical in attributing to the atheist either faith or the lack thereof, according to the first definition, i.e. that being used here.

Too bad I never addressed this issue at all. Your entire argument seems to be twisting my words to say what you want them to say. An atheist is perfectly capable of being able to trust and have confidence, for example, in people, I just don't see the correlation between religion at all, how it's even remotely a religious issue over whether or not a person is insecure.

If this is true, it certainly doesn't follow that an atheist cannot have trust or confidence at all, which is the issue at hand.

Of course it doesn't follow. I never said that it did. If that's the issue at hand, it's just logical fallacy and we shouldn't waste another reply on it.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"Whether or not the OP or Plutarch are saying [that the atheist has faith and the superstitious doesn't], it's just not true."

Given that you, evidently by your own admission, don't understand the meanings of the words as they are being used in this context, surely you're not in a position to assess whether or not the claims that use these meanings are true or false. That is: in order to assess whether Plutarch or the OP are correct in their attribution of faith to the atheist and not the superstitious, you would surely first have to understand what they mean by faith, atheism, and superstition. But you don't.

In any case, your personal belief that their thesis is false (regardless of whether that belief is well or poorly founded, and regardless of whether their thesis is in fact false) isn't relevant. The problem here is that you and the_rukh have engaged in a fallacy of equivocation. A critic's fallacy of equivocation is no less fallacious if the thesis they are critiquing happens to be false.

"I don't believe Plutarch is talking about this..."

But you haven't read the piece, right? Why should anyone--including, above all, yourself--be interested in beliefs you've arbitrarily imagined about the contents of something about whose contents you are ignorant? If you're interested in what Plutarch is saying, surely the next step would be to read what he is saying.

"I simply disagree with that claim."

Again, you would have to have understood the claim in order to have a reasonable disagreement with it.

"Your entire argument seems to be twisting my words to say what you want them to say."

My argument is that the comments by you and the_rukh are insubstantial since they are based on a fallacy of equivocation.

"However, suppose the second definition is used."

No, that's exactly what we shouldn't do, since it would be a fallacy of equivocation.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

Well, we can agree to disagree. You're not actually addressing anything I'm saying, just repeating yourself, so when you actually feel like substantiating your claims with some evidence call me back. If you're just gonna repeat your ignorance again, I'm done right here.

[anosognosia.livejournal.com]

"Well, we can agree to disagree."

To the contrary, the only relevant question is whether we agree to assent to what reason and evidence shows us is true. And reason and evidence has shown us that your claims are fallacious.

"You're not actually addressing anything I'm saying..."

It seems I have addressed every relevant remark of yours. If I have not, I encourage you to indicate the pending claim and I will give it my utmost attention.

"so when you actually feel like substantiating your claims with some evidence call me back."

My claims, evidently substantial, I repeat: the OP intends the word to mean what we have been calling definition one, you and the_ruhk respond as if the word meant definition two. Then you are guilty of a fallacy of equivocation, and your claims are fallacious. No objection seems to be pending to this argument, indeed you seem to have assented to all of its premises.

Moreover, the source of the OP's commentary, Plutarch's On Superstition, also uses the term with the meaning used by the OP. Thus the OP's use is well-founded, and the fallaciousness of your and the_rukh's use further substantiated. No objection seems to be pending to this further argument, indeed you don't seem to want to read this text which you have been instructing on.

Moreover, in the general topic treated by the OP and Plutarch, the term is used with the meaning used by the OP. Thus...etc.

"If you're just gonna repeat your ignorance again..."

One ought perhaps resist throwing around the allegation after spending so long instructing people about a text they've never read. It's a bit silly.

[kylinrouge.livejournal.com]

However, suppose the second definition is used.

the charge in Plutarch and the OP is that the atheist has faith and the superstitious doesn't.

It seems to me that in the context of this statement, it implies that the atheist has more faith (belief that lacks evidence) than the superstitious, because maybe Plutarch thinks that it takes more power of will to denounce the 'evidence' that superstitious people use to justify their beliefs, and when the superstitious buy into a belief system, they unquestioningly follow it.

In the context of trust, then the superstitious would have more trust and confidence in their belief system, since they have allowed their reason to be overridden by faith [belief in something that lacks evidence], setting a precedent. The atheist would reject it out of logic, not faith.