Who'll blink first
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talkpoliticsThe exchange of deadly fire between the Turkish forces and Russia-backed Assad military in the Idlib province in Syria has drastically increased the tension in the region for the last fortnight or so. The situation looks set for an escalation into a uncontrolled spiral of violence, now that the urgent talks in Moscow have failed to deliver a significant result. The Turkish military, sent to secure the agreed safety zone in North Syria, has been met with an assault by the Assad forces for the last half a month, suffering at least a dozen casualties. And of course Erdogan is not going to let this slide, lest he appears weak and incompetent.
"The operation in Idlib is imminent", he directly said last week during a meeting with his party MPs. He also said the Turkish military was getting prepared, and the countdown was on. Last warnings were being issued; if Assad's military and the paramilitary groups that he supports do not back down and leave the Turkish positions by the end of the month, Erdogan will order a massive attack.
The Astana accords in 2018, signed by Turkey and Russia, stipulated that a deescalation zone should be established along the Turkish-Syrian border, with a certain depth inside Syria. The two sides agreed to put observation outposts along the line to control the observation of the ceasefire.
Except, the situation has taken a dramatic turn in the last weeks. Assad's forces have been trying to neutralize the last remnants of the Turkey-backed rebels in the Aleppo and Idlib regions, and in result of their offensive, several Turkish outposts found themselves encircled by the Syrian army. A series of provocations followed, with casualties on both sides. As Assad advanced, his forces took control of the key M5 highway, connecting Damascus with Aleppo.
Naturally, Erdogan didn't leave the provocation unchallenged. The response to his retaliation came just a few hours after the start of Turkey's operation, and in of course it didn't come from Assad, but from Moscow. First the Kremlin speaker Dmitry Peskov vaguely threatened that "An operation against the legitimate Syrian authorities is the worst possible scenario", and then Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was even more direct, saying the Syrian forces were honoring the 2018 accords, but would not refrain from responding to provocations.
Translated into simpler language, this means that potential Erdogan actions could ultimately lead to a direct clash between Russian and Turkish forces. Right now, the Syrian army is advancing successfully, and getting the edge in the civil war only thanks to the total air supremacy provided by the Russian planes stationed at the two air bases in Khmeimim and Tartus. However, if the Turkish forces go into full-out assault mode, the Russian airforce will be faced with a tough choice: bomb the hell out of them, risking a direct conflict with Turkey, or abandoning the obviously weaker Assad ground forces, which would undermine all strategic achievements done so far by Russia in the region.
As of now, the situation very much resembles a high-risk geopolitical poker game between these two regional powers. Especially knowing that if Turkey is somehow directly hit by Russia, they'd probably invoke Article 5 of the NATO pact, and request allied support from the other countries in the alliance, and that could have unforeseen consequences for global security.
How things will unfold from here on, is a volatile and highly unpredictable equation with lots of variables. In the above mentioneed speech at home, Erdogan said he's determined to enforce the safety zone in the contested region "at any cost". In the meantime, Assad's regime and his Russian mentors also demonstrate determination, and they don't seem likely to back down and withdraw behind the demarcation line established in 2018. The Russian proposal for redrawing the safety zone was also soundly rejected by the speaker of the Turkish president as "unacceptable" and "out of question".
Another complicating factor is the fact that for nearly three months, the Assad offensive in Idlib has driven another 900 thousand people away from their homes, and they'll certainly be looking for refuge in neighboring Turkey, which is already having serious trouble dealing with the 3.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory.
Turkey is preparing very hard to launch their operation plans any time now. Their operation in Idlib looks like just a matter of time. The official Turkish data indicates that their military has dumped about 30 thousand troops along the border with Syria, plus huge amounts of military equipment. Reuters also reports that Turkey has already placed about 15 thousand troops and officers within Syria itself, all of them prepared to attack. The scale of these preparations is truly humongous; for instance, the border town of Reyhanli is now overrun with special forces, waiting for the signal to pour into Syria.
So where do we go from here? Well, there are a few possible scenarios, a good, bad, and worst one. The worst-case scenario is further escalation. Erdogan could try to up the ante for Russia and Assad. In a sense, he's already doing it by sending heavy equipment to the frontline, including tanks, armed vehicles and artillery, in support of the rebels in Idlib. This scenario would seriously threaten Turkey's relations with Russia.
Another course of action is of course diplomacy. But in this case, Erdogan is risking looking weak if he tries to re-negotiate the conditions of the Astana accords. In that case, Turkey could agree to shrink the safety zone along the border, and try to squeeze the refugees more tightly there, which would exasperate the humanitarian crisis. In that case, he'd need to request financial aid from the EU (another one), to cover the expenses for maintaining the refugee buffer. But that creates a risk of turning that area into no-man's-land, or another Gaza strip, since Assad mostly seems interested in controlling the strategic keypoints around Idlib, and would gladly let Turkey deal with the humanitarian problem. Yep, that's how much he cares for his own people.
A third scenario is if Erdogan requests support from the West. If Turkey decides to at least partially sacrifice the improved relations with Russia, they could ask their (former?) allies for help, especially the US. They're already doing that to some extent; Mike Pompeo, at least in words, has indicated (via Tweeter, no less) that there are hints of the US possibly supporting the Turkish position. He has also sent the regional US envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey to the region, to coordinate possible measures in case of a major clash with the Syrian-Russian forces.
How much of this means real actions from the US, remains to be seen. But if that were to happen at all, Erdogan would have to make some tough decisions, like reviewing his policy on the Syrian Kurds (an important US ally against ISIS), and rethink his deal with Russia for the C-400 missiles that caused his country to be cut off the F-35 deal. And since he still seems remarkably adamant on both points, the US support is likely to remain just on paper.
Right now, it seems that the likeliest scenario is the first one, a dangerous and deadly poker play, where proxy war could easily grow into a full-out conventional one. With all the relevant consequences for all sides involved, and all neighboring regions.
"The operation in Idlib is imminent", he directly said last week during a meeting with his party MPs. He also said the Turkish military was getting prepared, and the countdown was on. Last warnings were being issued; if Assad's military and the paramilitary groups that he supports do not back down and leave the Turkish positions by the end of the month, Erdogan will order a massive attack.
The Astana accords in 2018, signed by Turkey and Russia, stipulated that a deescalation zone should be established along the Turkish-Syrian border, with a certain depth inside Syria. The two sides agreed to put observation outposts along the line to control the observation of the ceasefire.
Except, the situation has taken a dramatic turn in the last weeks. Assad's forces have been trying to neutralize the last remnants of the Turkey-backed rebels in the Aleppo and Idlib regions, and in result of their offensive, several Turkish outposts found themselves encircled by the Syrian army. A series of provocations followed, with casualties on both sides. As Assad advanced, his forces took control of the key M5 highway, connecting Damascus with Aleppo.
Naturally, Erdogan didn't leave the provocation unchallenged. The response to his retaliation came just a few hours after the start of Turkey's operation, and in of course it didn't come from Assad, but from Moscow. First the Kremlin speaker Dmitry Peskov vaguely threatened that "An operation against the legitimate Syrian authorities is the worst possible scenario", and then Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov was even more direct, saying the Syrian forces were honoring the 2018 accords, but would not refrain from responding to provocations.
Translated into simpler language, this means that potential Erdogan actions could ultimately lead to a direct clash between Russian and Turkish forces. Right now, the Syrian army is advancing successfully, and getting the edge in the civil war only thanks to the total air supremacy provided by the Russian planes stationed at the two air bases in Khmeimim and Tartus. However, if the Turkish forces go into full-out assault mode, the Russian airforce will be faced with a tough choice: bomb the hell out of them, risking a direct conflict with Turkey, or abandoning the obviously weaker Assad ground forces, which would undermine all strategic achievements done so far by Russia in the region.
As of now, the situation very much resembles a high-risk geopolitical poker game between these two regional powers. Especially knowing that if Turkey is somehow directly hit by Russia, they'd probably invoke Article 5 of the NATO pact, and request allied support from the other countries in the alliance, and that could have unforeseen consequences for global security.
How things will unfold from here on, is a volatile and highly unpredictable equation with lots of variables. In the above mentioneed speech at home, Erdogan said he's determined to enforce the safety zone in the contested region "at any cost". In the meantime, Assad's regime and his Russian mentors also demonstrate determination, and they don't seem likely to back down and withdraw behind the demarcation line established in 2018. The Russian proposal for redrawing the safety zone was also soundly rejected by the speaker of the Turkish president as "unacceptable" and "out of question".
Another complicating factor is the fact that for nearly three months, the Assad offensive in Idlib has driven another 900 thousand people away from their homes, and they'll certainly be looking for refuge in neighboring Turkey, which is already having serious trouble dealing with the 3.5 million Syrian refugees on its territory.
Turkey is preparing very hard to launch their operation plans any time now. Their operation in Idlib looks like just a matter of time. The official Turkish data indicates that their military has dumped about 30 thousand troops along the border with Syria, plus huge amounts of military equipment. Reuters also reports that Turkey has already placed about 15 thousand troops and officers within Syria itself, all of them prepared to attack. The scale of these preparations is truly humongous; for instance, the border town of Reyhanli is now overrun with special forces, waiting for the signal to pour into Syria.
So where do we go from here? Well, there are a few possible scenarios, a good, bad, and worst one. The worst-case scenario is further escalation. Erdogan could try to up the ante for Russia and Assad. In a sense, he's already doing it by sending heavy equipment to the frontline, including tanks, armed vehicles and artillery, in support of the rebels in Idlib. This scenario would seriously threaten Turkey's relations with Russia.
Another course of action is of course diplomacy. But in this case, Erdogan is risking looking weak if he tries to re-negotiate the conditions of the Astana accords. In that case, Turkey could agree to shrink the safety zone along the border, and try to squeeze the refugees more tightly there, which would exasperate the humanitarian crisis. In that case, he'd need to request financial aid from the EU (another one), to cover the expenses for maintaining the refugee buffer. But that creates a risk of turning that area into no-man's-land, or another Gaza strip, since Assad mostly seems interested in controlling the strategic keypoints around Idlib, and would gladly let Turkey deal with the humanitarian problem. Yep, that's how much he cares for his own people.
A third scenario is if Erdogan requests support from the West. If Turkey decides to at least partially sacrifice the improved relations with Russia, they could ask their (former?) allies for help, especially the US. They're already doing that to some extent; Mike Pompeo, at least in words, has indicated (via Tweeter, no less) that there are hints of the US possibly supporting the Turkish position. He has also sent the regional US envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey to the region, to coordinate possible measures in case of a major clash with the Syrian-Russian forces.
How much of this means real actions from the US, remains to be seen. But if that were to happen at all, Erdogan would have to make some tough decisions, like reviewing his policy on the Syrian Kurds (an important US ally against ISIS), and rethink his deal with Russia for the C-400 missiles that caused his country to be cut off the F-35 deal. And since he still seems remarkably adamant on both points, the US support is likely to remain just on paper.
Right now, it seems that the likeliest scenario is the first one, a dangerous and deadly poker play, where proxy war could easily grow into a full-out conventional one. With all the relevant consequences for all sides involved, and all neighboring regions.
(no subject)
Date: 29/2/20 18:26 (UTC)https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51678462
(no subject)
Date: 2/3/20 09:05 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 3/3/20 09:19 (UTC)With Erdogan's recent raising of stakes it's looking pretty grim. He patched things up with Uncle Vlad last time. Will he do so again? Will Erdogan's actions break NATO? Because I fear that the Don will probably wash his hands of his two good friends bombing the fuck out of Syria while attempting to kill as many of each other's forces as possible. The Syrians will just be even more collateral.
What a total FUBAR of colossal proportions. Oh well.
(no subject)
Date: 3/3/20 11:38 (UTC)