Politics, Macron style
12/11/19 10:31![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
kiaa posting in ![[community profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/community.png){kind=small}
talkpoliticsThe Economist interview:
Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead
A remarkably sincere interview by Macron, indeed. He used the opportunity to lay out his vision for a new type of European architecture, particularly in the security domain. In a nutshell, he urged for a closer cooperation with Russia and emancipation from the US. Well, that's kind of risky when you think about it.
"Brain dead", he called NATO. He does a point, to some extent. Indeed, there's little coordination and cooperation between the US and their "lesser" allies as of now. Mostly because of Trump's unilateralism and isolationism, which, paradoxically, is mixed with the usual American supremacism (America first, baby!) But also, Europe's laziness, complacency and selfishness (why defend ourselves when it's in America's interest to defend us all). It's a two-way street really.
Further, Macron believes the US doesn't necessarily share the same interests as its European partners (why exactly he believes all European partners have the same interests, provided that there are new blocs forming, like the Visegrad Three for example, is beyond me). Macron believes Trump's Ameica views Islamist terrorism and Russia's actions in the Ukraine primarily as Europe's problem, as they affect the Old World much more than America, which is able to afford sitting back and watching from a safe distance. Of course that's a stupid approach, since the world is so globalized, and no event happens in isolation, without affecting the rest of the world. But yeah. That's Trump we're talking about.
Macron believes (and in this case correctly) that America's primary interest in maintaining the defensive umbrella over Europe is to get something in return (a quid pro quo of some sorts if you like), namely to keep those lucrative defense trade deals flowing. "France didn not sign up for this", Macron argues, indicating that he doesn't trust Trump's commitment to guaranteeing the mutual security within NATO as per Article 5 of the alliance's treaty. And he may have a good reason to have those doubts.
This uncertainty explains Macron's efforts to include as many European countries in his new defense plan as possible, although it's true that no immediate results could be expected for the time being. It also explains his reluctance to show solidarity with what he calls "a really hardline" position by America towards Russia. In Macron's mind, Russia as a partner doesn't have a long-term alternative for Europe, so Europe should make a long-term commitment to sorting things out with Russia, and warming up the bilateral relations - especially on issues like terrorism and national security. He recommends that the first step in that direction should be to avoid any conflicts (like cyber warfare). So he wants to initiate open talks with Russia, and find out what guarantees Putin wants for its national security. Once Russia starts feeling safe enough, we could talk of guaranteeing the halting of EU's and NATO's expansion to the east. Which in turn casts some light on Macron's recent decision to scrap the EU talks with Macedonia and Albania (which we discussed here last week).
While there's surely some internal logic to this sort of worldview (what with the US being a unreliable partner as of now, and all that; "We have the right to be sincere enemies to our friends' enemies"), the problem is, it seems to be built around a long-term view on the prospects for Russia, and only a short-term one for the US. And this is what undermines Macron's efforts to build a new European defense bloc that could exist in parallel to NATO.
Macron also told The Economist that Russia only has three strategic options: one, to try being a superpower by itself; two, to become China's vassal; and three, to restore its balanced relations with Europe. So he believes the latter scenario is most viable in the long-term. Obviously, Putin wouldn't be happy to turn his country into China's junior partner. Meanwhile, achieving a superpower status is not that easy, in part because Russia's dwindling, ageing population simply can't sustain it, and Putin's "identity-driven conservatism" hinders him from pursuing a migration policy that would infuse fresh blood into his society. So the only option left is the third one, embracing Europe.
Well, that's what Macron believes anyway. But is it really true? Firstly, there already is huge migration within Russia. Its official stats about the population influx is hardly reliable, because there's a no-visa mode between Russia and all the former Soviet republics. It's notable that Russia is ranked 5th in the world in terms of locally based expats sending money back home to their countries (i.e. migrant-originating asset drain), just behind Germany, and slightly ahead of China and France.
Secondly, Putin's ideological constructs are only able to persist because of his powerful propaganda machine. His real-life policies are mostly directed toward furthering Russia's superpower aspirations. In Putin's mind and that of his foreign-policy advisors, Russia has no other option in defending itself but become a superpower itself, otherwise it'll forever be doomed to be stomped upon by other global powers (think of the "suffocate the continental Eurasian heartland" doctrine as per Brzezinsky's Grand Chessboard plan). In fact, one of Putin's fave quotes which he regularly uses (seemingly jokingly), belongs to Tzar Alexander III, something to the effect of, "Russia only has two allies, its army and its navy". With this in mind, putin would surely be happy to accept any concessions Europe would be willing to offer him, for example Macron's intervention in support of restoring Russia's vote at the European Security Council. But let's not fool ourselves, those concessions would hardly divert him from what Macron is calling "Putin's anti-European project", driven by his inherent conservatism. Macron mistake is that he trusts that Europe can be Putin's potential ally, while in reality Putin sees things differently: for him Europe is just a geopolitical battleground between Russia and the US.
Of course, Putin's superpower project is not necessarily eternal - there's always a chance some future successor to view Russia as part of some sort of wider European project, as Yeltsin once did (at least for a while). Wouldn't that be refreshing? But don't hold your breath about it - you'd have to wait and pray.
Now, things are quite different as far as the US is concerned. Trump's isolationism, so typical for his administration, will hardly be perpetuated by any of his potential Democrat successors beyond 2020 (provided that they defeat him). The US has a long-term cooperation with Europe spanning back to the Marshall plan, and these relations won't end with Trump, especially because the strong trade relations dictate so. It looks very likely that Trump will leave office in a year (or earlier?) - and even if that happens in 5 years, the US will still try to amend things after that. And it'd still be much easier for Europe to take the offered hand than establish a cooperation model with Putin's Russia.
As for NATO, Macron is saying it's getting ever harder to clearly define what NATO membership really means, and what threats the alliance is really capable of dealing with. Still, NATO is a working structure that has conducted a number of real military operation, and is still coordinating a number of powerful national militaries. What's more, it provides a sense of togetherness between a lot of countries, some of which used to be enemies in the past. Macron himself acknowledges that NATO's operative compatibility is "efficient". But he still insists that a parallel defense architecture should be created, even though there's a risk it could undermine the working mechanism currently in existence, no matter how many times Macron repeats the mantra that such a parallel EU project would only "complement" NATO.
So we should ask ourselves, is it really worth it trying to create something that many believe would almost certainly be perceived by Trump as a threat, and for the sake of a very long-term prospect for a cooperation with Russia that is far from guaranteed? That's what's preventing Macron's military ambitions for the EU to go beyond the talks, pilot projects, and minor coordination in the defense industry. A more resolute advancement of that project would only make sense if the US adopts Trump's approach even after Trump is gone, and if Russia suddenly makes a complete U-turn and shows an outright pro-European stance (starting with a withdrawal from Ukraine).
Macron is young and ambitious, and he obviously wants to sound bold and confident. He wants to look like a visionary, sound prophetic even at times. But let's face it, his geopolitical views are hardly uncontestable, and neither are they universally appealing. They're untested and unproven, to begin with. He's evidently willing to plunge head-on into an expensive, politically uncertain geopolitical project. But we'll need much more than his sheer eloquence to be convinced that Europe's geopolitical change of position is really necessary.
Emmanuel Macron warns Europe: NATO is becoming brain-dead
A remarkably sincere interview by Macron, indeed. He used the opportunity to lay out his vision for a new type of European architecture, particularly in the security domain. In a nutshell, he urged for a closer cooperation with Russia and emancipation from the US. Well, that's kind of risky when you think about it.
"Brain dead", he called NATO. He does a point, to some extent. Indeed, there's little coordination and cooperation between the US and their "lesser" allies as of now. Mostly because of Trump's unilateralism and isolationism, which, paradoxically, is mixed with the usual American supremacism (America first, baby!) But also, Europe's laziness, complacency and selfishness (why defend ourselves when it's in America's interest to defend us all). It's a two-way street really.
Further, Macron believes the US doesn't necessarily share the same interests as its European partners (why exactly he believes all European partners have the same interests, provided that there are new blocs forming, like the Visegrad Three for example, is beyond me). Macron believes Trump's Ameica views Islamist terrorism and Russia's actions in the Ukraine primarily as Europe's problem, as they affect the Old World much more than America, which is able to afford sitting back and watching from a safe distance. Of course that's a stupid approach, since the world is so globalized, and no event happens in isolation, without affecting the rest of the world. But yeah. That's Trump we're talking about.
Macron believes (and in this case correctly) that America's primary interest in maintaining the defensive umbrella over Europe is to get something in return (a quid pro quo of some sorts if you like), namely to keep those lucrative defense trade deals flowing. "France didn not sign up for this", Macron argues, indicating that he doesn't trust Trump's commitment to guaranteeing the mutual security within NATO as per Article 5 of the alliance's treaty. And he may have a good reason to have those doubts.
This uncertainty explains Macron's efforts to include as many European countries in his new defense plan as possible, although it's true that no immediate results could be expected for the time being. It also explains his reluctance to show solidarity with what he calls "a really hardline" position by America towards Russia. In Macron's mind, Russia as a partner doesn't have a long-term alternative for Europe, so Europe should make a long-term commitment to sorting things out with Russia, and warming up the bilateral relations - especially on issues like terrorism and national security. He recommends that the first step in that direction should be to avoid any conflicts (like cyber warfare). So he wants to initiate open talks with Russia, and find out what guarantees Putin wants for its national security. Once Russia starts feeling safe enough, we could talk of guaranteeing the halting of EU's and NATO's expansion to the east. Which in turn casts some light on Macron's recent decision to scrap the EU talks with Macedonia and Albania (which we discussed here last week).
While there's surely some internal logic to this sort of worldview (what with the US being a unreliable partner as of now, and all that; "We have the right to be sincere enemies to our friends' enemies"), the problem is, it seems to be built around a long-term view on the prospects for Russia, and only a short-term one for the US. And this is what undermines Macron's efforts to build a new European defense bloc that could exist in parallel to NATO.
Macron also told The Economist that Russia only has three strategic options: one, to try being a superpower by itself; two, to become China's vassal; and three, to restore its balanced relations with Europe. So he believes the latter scenario is most viable in the long-term. Obviously, Putin wouldn't be happy to turn his country into China's junior partner. Meanwhile, achieving a superpower status is not that easy, in part because Russia's dwindling, ageing population simply can't sustain it, and Putin's "identity-driven conservatism" hinders him from pursuing a migration policy that would infuse fresh blood into his society. So the only option left is the third one, embracing Europe.
Well, that's what Macron believes anyway. But is it really true? Firstly, there already is huge migration within Russia. Its official stats about the population influx is hardly reliable, because there's a no-visa mode between Russia and all the former Soviet republics. It's notable that Russia is ranked 5th in the world in terms of locally based expats sending money back home to their countries (i.e. migrant-originating asset drain), just behind Germany, and slightly ahead of China and France.
Secondly, Putin's ideological constructs are only able to persist because of his powerful propaganda machine. His real-life policies are mostly directed toward furthering Russia's superpower aspirations. In Putin's mind and that of his foreign-policy advisors, Russia has no other option in defending itself but become a superpower itself, otherwise it'll forever be doomed to be stomped upon by other global powers (think of the "suffocate the continental Eurasian heartland" doctrine as per Brzezinsky's Grand Chessboard plan). In fact, one of Putin's fave quotes which he regularly uses (seemingly jokingly), belongs to Tzar Alexander III, something to the effect of, "Russia only has two allies, its army and its navy". With this in mind, putin would surely be happy to accept any concessions Europe would be willing to offer him, for example Macron's intervention in support of restoring Russia's vote at the European Security Council. But let's not fool ourselves, those concessions would hardly divert him from what Macron is calling "Putin's anti-European project", driven by his inherent conservatism. Macron mistake is that he trusts that Europe can be Putin's potential ally, while in reality Putin sees things differently: for him Europe is just a geopolitical battleground between Russia and the US.
Of course, Putin's superpower project is not necessarily eternal - there's always a chance some future successor to view Russia as part of some sort of wider European project, as Yeltsin once did (at least for a while). Wouldn't that be refreshing? But don't hold your breath about it - you'd have to wait and pray.
Now, things are quite different as far as the US is concerned. Trump's isolationism, so typical for his administration, will hardly be perpetuated by any of his potential Democrat successors beyond 2020 (provided that they defeat him). The US has a long-term cooperation with Europe spanning back to the Marshall plan, and these relations won't end with Trump, especially because the strong trade relations dictate so. It looks very likely that Trump will leave office in a year (or earlier?) - and even if that happens in 5 years, the US will still try to amend things after that. And it'd still be much easier for Europe to take the offered hand than establish a cooperation model with Putin's Russia.
As for NATO, Macron is saying it's getting ever harder to clearly define what NATO membership really means, and what threats the alliance is really capable of dealing with. Still, NATO is a working structure that has conducted a number of real military operation, and is still coordinating a number of powerful national militaries. What's more, it provides a sense of togetherness between a lot of countries, some of which used to be enemies in the past. Macron himself acknowledges that NATO's operative compatibility is "efficient". But he still insists that a parallel defense architecture should be created, even though there's a risk it could undermine the working mechanism currently in existence, no matter how many times Macron repeats the mantra that such a parallel EU project would only "complement" NATO.
So we should ask ourselves, is it really worth it trying to create something that many believe would almost certainly be perceived by Trump as a threat, and for the sake of a very long-term prospect for a cooperation with Russia that is far from guaranteed? That's what's preventing Macron's military ambitions for the EU to go beyond the talks, pilot projects, and minor coordination in the defense industry. A more resolute advancement of that project would only make sense if the US adopts Trump's approach even after Trump is gone, and if Russia suddenly makes a complete U-turn and shows an outright pro-European stance (starting with a withdrawal from Ukraine).
Macron is young and ambitious, and he obviously wants to sound bold and confident. He wants to look like a visionary, sound prophetic even at times. But let's face it, his geopolitical views are hardly uncontestable, and neither are they universally appealing. They're untested and unproven, to begin with. He's evidently willing to plunge head-on into an expensive, politically uncertain geopolitical project. But we'll need much more than his sheer eloquence to be convinced that Europe's geopolitical change of position is really necessary.
