A Balkan setback for Russia
13/2/19 19:53![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
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talkpoliticsGreece approves Macedonia NATO bid
Thus, the green-light for Macedonia's accession to NATO has been given. Despite the Russian resistance and back-stage maneuvering. The protocol has been signed, and now what's left are just some formalities, namely collecting the signatures of all 29 member countries. Greece, which had serious reservations about Macedonia's name, symbolically ratified this first.
Russia chose a losing position, insisting for years how this step would be an insult to their interests. Well, who cares.
The Macedonian case shows that resisting any NATO expansion has become a fixation for Russia, regardless of the results. And this effort was doomed right from the get-go. But Putin doesn't seem to care about the potential setback from such a position. If there's a chance for confrontation, he'll use it. In a way, if the prospects of success are zero, all the better for him and his PR story.
Realistically, it's hard to conceive of a threat to the Russian interests in a country that sports a total of 20 gas stations and a single power plant (the latter belonging to the rogue Russian senator, Lebedev who recently fled his country). Those are the Russian investments in Macedonia. A huge number of countries and borders separate Russia from Macedonia, most of them already NATO members. Curiously, the Pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodox card wasn't played in this case. Even the "traditional historical links" card that Russia often likes to play on the Balkans, was absent in this case. Those "links" date from the 19th century, and there was no Macedonian national identity back then. So, no PR cards up Putin's sleeve this time.
Unlike Serbia, Macedonia is remote and alien to the Russians. All we could speak of would be a possible link to the South Stream or Turkish Stream projects, but the size of that market is so minuscule (not to mention the low living standard there) that Macedonia would practically be irrelevant to Russia even in the best case scenario.
The thing is, the 2014 Ukrainian crisis made things from bad to worse between Russia and the West, and the following year Macedonia got its own taste of anti-government protests (against Nikola Gruevski's government). That coincidence sufficed for the Russian knee-jerk reflex to kick in, and Putin decided to side with the incumbent prime-minister. He wasn't even bothered by the fact that just a year prior, the EU had bathed Gruevski with praise for his pro-Western reforms, and the PM himself and his VMRO-DPMNE party were staunch pro-NATO advocates. But yeah, what do any principles matter when you can use a situation to your benefit?
Of course, in the case with remote irrelevant Macedonia, it wasn't about urgent loans, nor spec-ops, or even finding Gruevski asylum somewhere in the remote Russian rural province.
All the critical statements by the Russian foreign ministry, the sharp tone in pro-Kremlin outlets such as Sputnik and RT, the suspicious activity around the social networks, and the visit of Gruevski's pal, Macedonian president Ivanov to the Kremlin, all of this wasn't enough for the West to recognize a massive orchestrated effort on Russia's part to knock Macedonia out of its chosen geopolitical orbit.
Further on, the logic of events didn't leave much room for maneuvering, either. The West did mobilize itself to help the new Social-Democrat / ethnic Albanian coalition to not just come to powr but also demonstrate a real progress in the NATO and EU integration. And Russia, with its allergy to any NATO expansion, decided to use the main conflict that was still stopping Macedonia's European integration, the name quarrel with Greece.
So when the West, in its attempt to create a good example on the Balkans, did its best to mediate this thing between Greece and Macedonia, Russia chose a tactic that by definition doesn't allow any chance for success. In fact, Russia offered both sides to reach no solution whatsoever, and leave things as they were. And that was no longer an option for any of them. So they rejected it.
Now, the Russian criticism may have a point: there was no grace and elegance in the way things were settled, and the agreement was only realized thanks to the strong pressure from the West. It didn't come natural for either side (remember the huge protests in Greece, and their counterpart in Macedonia). But the deal did get 90% of the Macedonian referendum votes, despite the mere 38% turnout (50% being necessary for it to become automatically valid). The polling question was also rather manipulative, and that didn't help much either: there was not a word about the name change there; instead, there was a promise of a NATO and EU entry. In order to get enough votes in the Macedonian parliament, the government had to promise amnesty to those opposition MPs who had taken part in the 2017 unrest in the parliament, where 100+ people were injured. Besides, the document had to be signed by the parliament speaker rather than the president, because the latter (remember, Gruevski's buddy) refused, which in turn placed him under investigation for veto abuse and constititional violations.
Now, Macedonia is a parliamentary republic, so all formalities were followed, but the whole process didn't really look like reconciliation much.
As for Greece, where no constitutional change was required for the deal to happen, a simple parliamentary majority was needed, but approving the Prespa Agreement led to the collapse of the ruling coalition.
Given all these complications, the process looked rather shaky - but ironically, it was reinforced by Russia's destructive position. It was exactly because of Moscow's openly hostile behavior that the West became determined to push the process forward at any cost.
Even so, Russia's long-term plan in case of a collapse of the Greek-Macedonian negotiations remains unclear. Putin didn't seem to have any best-case-scenario plan. He just wanted to disrupt. And he failed.
The leaders of the Greek opposition say they don't like the agreement, but that doesn't mean they'd push for its rejection if they came to power. The Macedonian nationalists from VMRO-DPMNE, especially the circle around former PM Gruevski, may criticize the agreement as loud as they want, even flirt with Moscow, but they frequently say their purpose is EU and NATO entry, so Putin can forget about luring them into his orbit, too.
Granted, criticism of the agreement is used by the politicians both in Greece and Macedonia as a means to score points and possibly get closer to power, but the thing is, once they achieve this, they'd all gladly sign the supposedly unpopular decisions of their rival predecessors. So, Putin loses in all cases.
Ultimately, the result of the Russian involvement in the Macedonian problem is a disaster. Greece, which at first didn't expel any Russian diplomats even after the whole Skripal scandal, now kicked out two of them out because of their manipulations on the Macedonian subject. As for the Macedonian government, they've clearly recognized an enemy in Russia. What's more, Macedonia will now enter NATO much faster than anyone in Skopje had hoped for. All of this has become yet another point of contention in the otherwise rather strained relations between Russia and the West. Putin's attempts to resist the inevitable have badly backfired, adding one more humiliation to his portfolio, and seriously undermining the Russian interests on the Balkans.
Thus, the green-light for Macedonia's accession to NATO has been given. Despite the Russian resistance and back-stage maneuvering. The protocol has been signed, and now what's left are just some formalities, namely collecting the signatures of all 29 member countries. Greece, which had serious reservations about Macedonia's name, symbolically ratified this first.
Russia chose a losing position, insisting for years how this step would be an insult to their interests. Well, who cares.
The Macedonian case shows that resisting any NATO expansion has become a fixation for Russia, regardless of the results. And this effort was doomed right from the get-go. But Putin doesn't seem to care about the potential setback from such a position. If there's a chance for confrontation, he'll use it. In a way, if the prospects of success are zero, all the better for him and his PR story.
Realistically, it's hard to conceive of a threat to the Russian interests in a country that sports a total of 20 gas stations and a single power plant (the latter belonging to the rogue Russian senator, Lebedev who recently fled his country). Those are the Russian investments in Macedonia. A huge number of countries and borders separate Russia from Macedonia, most of them already NATO members. Curiously, the Pan-Slavism and Pan-Orthodox card wasn't played in this case. Even the "traditional historical links" card that Russia often likes to play on the Balkans, was absent in this case. Those "links" date from the 19th century, and there was no Macedonian national identity back then. So, no PR cards up Putin's sleeve this time.
Unlike Serbia, Macedonia is remote and alien to the Russians. All we could speak of would be a possible link to the South Stream or Turkish Stream projects, but the size of that market is so minuscule (not to mention the low living standard there) that Macedonia would practically be irrelevant to Russia even in the best case scenario.
The thing is, the 2014 Ukrainian crisis made things from bad to worse between Russia and the West, and the following year Macedonia got its own taste of anti-government protests (against Nikola Gruevski's government). That coincidence sufficed for the Russian knee-jerk reflex to kick in, and Putin decided to side with the incumbent prime-minister. He wasn't even bothered by the fact that just a year prior, the EU had bathed Gruevski with praise for his pro-Western reforms, and the PM himself and his VMRO-DPMNE party were staunch pro-NATO advocates. But yeah, what do any principles matter when you can use a situation to your benefit?
Of course, in the case with remote irrelevant Macedonia, it wasn't about urgent loans, nor spec-ops, or even finding Gruevski asylum somewhere in the remote Russian rural province.
All the critical statements by the Russian foreign ministry, the sharp tone in pro-Kremlin outlets such as Sputnik and RT, the suspicious activity around the social networks, and the visit of Gruevski's pal, Macedonian president Ivanov to the Kremlin, all of this wasn't enough for the West to recognize a massive orchestrated effort on Russia's part to knock Macedonia out of its chosen geopolitical orbit.
Further on, the logic of events didn't leave much room for maneuvering, either. The West did mobilize itself to help the new Social-Democrat / ethnic Albanian coalition to not just come to powr but also demonstrate a real progress in the NATO and EU integration. And Russia, with its allergy to any NATO expansion, decided to use the main conflict that was still stopping Macedonia's European integration, the name quarrel with Greece.
So when the West, in its attempt to create a good example on the Balkans, did its best to mediate this thing between Greece and Macedonia, Russia chose a tactic that by definition doesn't allow any chance for success. In fact, Russia offered both sides to reach no solution whatsoever, and leave things as they were. And that was no longer an option for any of them. So they rejected it.
Now, the Russian criticism may have a point: there was no grace and elegance in the way things were settled, and the agreement was only realized thanks to the strong pressure from the West. It didn't come natural for either side (remember the huge protests in Greece, and their counterpart in Macedonia). But the deal did get 90% of the Macedonian referendum votes, despite the mere 38% turnout (50% being necessary for it to become automatically valid). The polling question was also rather manipulative, and that didn't help much either: there was not a word about the name change there; instead, there was a promise of a NATO and EU entry. In order to get enough votes in the Macedonian parliament, the government had to promise amnesty to those opposition MPs who had taken part in the 2017 unrest in the parliament, where 100+ people were injured. Besides, the document had to be signed by the parliament speaker rather than the president, because the latter (remember, Gruevski's buddy) refused, which in turn placed him under investigation for veto abuse and constititional violations.
Now, Macedonia is a parliamentary republic, so all formalities were followed, but the whole process didn't really look like reconciliation much.
As for Greece, where no constitutional change was required for the deal to happen, a simple parliamentary majority was needed, but approving the Prespa Agreement led to the collapse of the ruling coalition.
Given all these complications, the process looked rather shaky - but ironically, it was reinforced by Russia's destructive position. It was exactly because of Moscow's openly hostile behavior that the West became determined to push the process forward at any cost.
Even so, Russia's long-term plan in case of a collapse of the Greek-Macedonian negotiations remains unclear. Putin didn't seem to have any best-case-scenario plan. He just wanted to disrupt. And he failed.
The leaders of the Greek opposition say they don't like the agreement, but that doesn't mean they'd push for its rejection if they came to power. The Macedonian nationalists from VMRO-DPMNE, especially the circle around former PM Gruevski, may criticize the agreement as loud as they want, even flirt with Moscow, but they frequently say their purpose is EU and NATO entry, so Putin can forget about luring them into his orbit, too.
Granted, criticism of the agreement is used by the politicians both in Greece and Macedonia as a means to score points and possibly get closer to power, but the thing is, once they achieve this, they'd all gladly sign the supposedly unpopular decisions of their rival predecessors. So, Putin loses in all cases.
Ultimately, the result of the Russian involvement in the Macedonian problem is a disaster. Greece, which at first didn't expel any Russian diplomats even after the whole Skripal scandal, now kicked out two of them out because of their manipulations on the Macedonian subject. As for the Macedonian government, they've clearly recognized an enemy in Russia. What's more, Macedonia will now enter NATO much faster than anyone in Skopje had hoped for. All of this has become yet another point of contention in the otherwise rather strained relations between Russia and the West. Putin's attempts to resist the inevitable have badly backfired, adding one more humiliation to his portfolio, and seriously undermining the Russian interests on the Balkans.
