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talkpoliticsWhen less than a month ago Putin and his Iraqi counterpart Abbadi officially announced Mission Accomplished in their fight against ISIS, they hardly had illusions that the war was really completely won. Abbadi did tell his people that they were freed of the threat and confirmed that "the dream for freedom is now a reality", but then he went on to insure himself against being proven wrong, saying that ISIS' dream was over and now was the time to roll up the sleeves and work hard to erase all the effects of its existence, and never let terrorism come back again. But instead of declaring a complete and final victory, he urged vigilance and preparedness against the various terrorist attacks for his country, "because terrorism is an eternal enemy".
Putin was also active on the issue. He said the Russia-Assad alliance had managed to defeat the toughest terror group in just a couple of years. This instantly provoked a reaction and a counter-declaration by the White House, which said that the Russian triumphant trumpets were premature, citing previous occasions of similar declarations of victory that had been followed by failure to consolidate the military achievements and stabilize the situation, creating conditions that would prevent the return of terrorist groups (Iraq and Afghanistan instantly spring to mind).
The latter does have a point. Most experts on the Middle East believe that after losing the territories it used to control (both in Mossul and Raqqa), ISIS will now return to its roots of a terrorist group, and will wage a guerrilla insurrection of the asymmetric type. They've already done that before, after all.
What we now call ISIS (or Daesh) is of course a successor of a splinter group from Al Qaeda, which was founded in 2003 by Zarkawi. It changed name several times over the years, and morphed into various forms: from a Jihadist conspiracy to militant group to a quasi-state that at some point had a territory roughly equal to the UK, plus all the oil. Now ISIS is laying low again, merging with the local population and using the chaos and the power vacuum after the civil war. Documents found in Raqqa after the siege show that the group had quietly been preparing for such an outcome from as early as 2016. Now, beside the lone-wolf form of terror attacks, there's real possibility that the Islamic State would again rise where it previously failed (and where it was born), in Syria/Iraq.
They'll try to blend with the civil population. Their militant units have become smaller and more dispersed, no more squadrons or battalions but mere cells. At some point the Iraqi military will have to carry out operations against small guerrilla groups, so the allies are trying to prepare them for that early on. ISIS will be changing tactics, and so should the Iraqi military. Many in Iraq have compared ISIS' current situation to that of a wounded wolf, the only animal that never runs when hurt, but stays and fights fiercely instead. Estimates point to at least 3000 militants now hiding among the civilians, mostly in isolated desert regions and inaccessible mountain villages.
The US intelligence has also braced itself for such a scenario after the fall of Mossul. The intel suggested there should be several thousand jihadists in Iraq's second city, and the siege was going to last for months, and be fought from one house to another. Instead, the allies took the city within days and met almost no resistance. This raises the question where everyone has gone. It's very likely that most of them may've fled across border. They had the chance to flee through the back door, and they probably did just that. The constant truces and cease-fires had a great role for that. They were meant to ensure the withdrawal of the civil population from the war zones, but they also allowed the militants to mix up with the civilians, so they could continue the battle. There were accusations that the US forces had secured the safe passage of several hundred militants, guarding them on the way. The allegations come from Russian media, so you may understand why we should be taking them with a huge grain of salt - but still.
The recent attacks, despite ISIS' apparent defeat, are proof that they're changing tactics. For instance, there were militants dressed as pro-government militias south of Kirkuk who have started creating fake checkpoints and are attacking influential local leaders and government bureaucrats. They managed to kill a chief of local police and his son, a local tribal chieftain and his family, etc. They've ambushed military convoys in the region, killing regular Iraqi troops. All in all, ISIS is not gone, it's still active. It just doesn't control a territory any more.
What's more, an Iraqi national security colonel from the Hawija province says the hiding jihadists continue to actively work among the civilian population, threatening with severe punishment if it cooperates with the authorities. If history is any guide, if the power vacuum persists, ISIS v.2.0 would swiftly succeed v.1.0.
So what's to be done to prevent that? Well, the most important thing is to work very actively with the Sunni community. The reason is that they feel under-represented in the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad, so they're the main source of manpower for the Islamic State. There are three key things that should urgently be done in post-war Iraq: 1) electing a legitimate Sunni representation in the Sunni-dominated regions, 2) efficient restoration of the most affected Sunni regions, and 3) pursuing a strictly secular policy by the Shia government. Because it was exactly the weak governance and corruption of the central power that allowed ISIS to take Mossul with almost no resistance, along with all the military equipment of the Iraqi military, and then enjoy the tacit support of the Sunni people who were wary of all the lawlessness and political repression. This should never happen again.
The outside players also have their role for stopping a potential return of ISIS. If Putin keeps his intention to withdraw the Russian troops from the region, it's not very clear if Assad would have the resource to fill the security vacuum, and prevent the Jihadists from returning from the remote desert and mountain regions. In turn, the US military instructors should make sure the Iraqi military is prepared for the incoming guerrilla war, and it won't collapse on its own again like it did during ISIS' initial advance on Mossul. The US should also watch carefully both the government in Baghdad (preventing it from pressing the Sunni too much), and their closest allies in Iraq, the Kurds who carried the bulk of the military campaign against ISIS, and who are longing for an independent state of their own. Because failure on any of these points would again throw the region into the chaos of civil war, and precipitate the ascent of ISIS v.2.0.
Putin was also active on the issue. He said the Russia-Assad alliance had managed to defeat the toughest terror group in just a couple of years. This instantly provoked a reaction and a counter-declaration by the White House, which said that the Russian triumphant trumpets were premature, citing previous occasions of similar declarations of victory that had been followed by failure to consolidate the military achievements and stabilize the situation, creating conditions that would prevent the return of terrorist groups (Iraq and Afghanistan instantly spring to mind).
The latter does have a point. Most experts on the Middle East believe that after losing the territories it used to control (both in Mossul and Raqqa), ISIS will now return to its roots of a terrorist group, and will wage a guerrilla insurrection of the asymmetric type. They've already done that before, after all.
What we now call ISIS (or Daesh) is of course a successor of a splinter group from Al Qaeda, which was founded in 2003 by Zarkawi. It changed name several times over the years, and morphed into various forms: from a Jihadist conspiracy to militant group to a quasi-state that at some point had a territory roughly equal to the UK, plus all the oil. Now ISIS is laying low again, merging with the local population and using the chaos and the power vacuum after the civil war. Documents found in Raqqa after the siege show that the group had quietly been preparing for such an outcome from as early as 2016. Now, beside the lone-wolf form of terror attacks, there's real possibility that the Islamic State would again rise where it previously failed (and where it was born), in Syria/Iraq.
They'll try to blend with the civil population. Their militant units have become smaller and more dispersed, no more squadrons or battalions but mere cells. At some point the Iraqi military will have to carry out operations against small guerrilla groups, so the allies are trying to prepare them for that early on. ISIS will be changing tactics, and so should the Iraqi military. Many in Iraq have compared ISIS' current situation to that of a wounded wolf, the only animal that never runs when hurt, but stays and fights fiercely instead. Estimates point to at least 3000 militants now hiding among the civilians, mostly in isolated desert regions and inaccessible mountain villages.
The US intelligence has also braced itself for such a scenario after the fall of Mossul. The intel suggested there should be several thousand jihadists in Iraq's second city, and the siege was going to last for months, and be fought from one house to another. Instead, the allies took the city within days and met almost no resistance. This raises the question where everyone has gone. It's very likely that most of them may've fled across border. They had the chance to flee through the back door, and they probably did just that. The constant truces and cease-fires had a great role for that. They were meant to ensure the withdrawal of the civil population from the war zones, but they also allowed the militants to mix up with the civilians, so they could continue the battle. There were accusations that the US forces had secured the safe passage of several hundred militants, guarding them on the way. The allegations come from Russian media, so you may understand why we should be taking them with a huge grain of salt - but still.
The recent attacks, despite ISIS' apparent defeat, are proof that they're changing tactics. For instance, there were militants dressed as pro-government militias south of Kirkuk who have started creating fake checkpoints and are attacking influential local leaders and government bureaucrats. They managed to kill a chief of local police and his son, a local tribal chieftain and his family, etc. They've ambushed military convoys in the region, killing regular Iraqi troops. All in all, ISIS is not gone, it's still active. It just doesn't control a territory any more.
What's more, an Iraqi national security colonel from the Hawija province says the hiding jihadists continue to actively work among the civilian population, threatening with severe punishment if it cooperates with the authorities. If history is any guide, if the power vacuum persists, ISIS v.2.0 would swiftly succeed v.1.0.
So what's to be done to prevent that? Well, the most important thing is to work very actively with the Sunni community. The reason is that they feel under-represented in the Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad, so they're the main source of manpower for the Islamic State. There are three key things that should urgently be done in post-war Iraq: 1) electing a legitimate Sunni representation in the Sunni-dominated regions, 2) efficient restoration of the most affected Sunni regions, and 3) pursuing a strictly secular policy by the Shia government. Because it was exactly the weak governance and corruption of the central power that allowed ISIS to take Mossul with almost no resistance, along with all the military equipment of the Iraqi military, and then enjoy the tacit support of the Sunni people who were wary of all the lawlessness and political repression. This should never happen again.
The outside players also have their role for stopping a potential return of ISIS. If Putin keeps his intention to withdraw the Russian troops from the region, it's not very clear if Assad would have the resource to fill the security vacuum, and prevent the Jihadists from returning from the remote desert and mountain regions. In turn, the US military instructors should make sure the Iraqi military is prepared for the incoming guerrilla war, and it won't collapse on its own again like it did during ISIS' initial advance on Mossul. The US should also watch carefully both the government in Baghdad (preventing it from pressing the Sunni too much), and their closest allies in Iraq, the Kurds who carried the bulk of the military campaign against ISIS, and who are longing for an independent state of their own. Because failure on any of these points would again throw the region into the chaos of civil war, and precipitate the ascent of ISIS v.2.0.
