The newest world order

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Trump and Putin (plus some help from the right-wing clowns now rearing their heads across Europe) might really be the gravediggers of neoliberalism, the EU, Merkel, the "refugees" et al.

Although they'll have to come to terms between themselves on Syria somehow. Whatever the case, Russia's spiraling down will continue no matter what. Also, China's actions will be crucial. In a few years they'll be number one in the world and they'll be unstoppable - not just because of their military power and sheer numbers, but also the economy that's based on real production rather than the money-printing industry.

The US will have to work towards some kind of alliance - whether it'll be with Russia remains to be seen. Otherwise they don't stand a chance. The monopolar model may've been irretrievably lost already at this point.

In general, a weakened EU will be a breath of fresh air for the US (because short-term profit could be done at the expense of others), but only for a while. There'll be bigger players ready to take a chunk of their pie in the years to come, and Trump will be treading on thin ice in that respect. Not sure the guys he'll be surrounding himself with, are aware of that, or even capable of grasping it, let alone responding to these new realities adequately. But we shall see. You never know with that guy. He could surprise us yet again.

Comments

[dexeron.livejournal.com]

The monopolar model may've been irretrievably lost already at this point.

There are bigger implications there than most would realize. A unipolar world is inherently unstable, and geopolitics seems to want to return to a multpolar model. The bipolar model we used to have was always the most "secure" in terms of global conflict. That's not to say that the world under the "benevolent" supervision of the US-USSR dichotomy never saw conflict, but conflict never escalated beyond tightly confined regions of interest. (I'm sure the people in those regions didn't see it as quite so wonderful.) There were crises of refugees and localized wars of proxy, but everything was "wonderfully" neat and tidy, and terrorism stayed, for the most part out of sight and out of mind for folks in the "first" world, except for when the news reporting on a plane hijacking interrupted their favorite nighttime television program.

The monopolar world left after the collapse of the USSR has been far less stable, and there is a lot to be said about that in terms of Democratic Peace Theory and other analyses of global conflict and politics. When we say "less" stable, of course, we must recognize that actual armed conflict remains at a low level in comparison to world history, but it's more "noticeable," less contained, more directly affecting the previously insulated viewers at home.

This necessitates a change in approach. A threat like the salafist takfiri Daesh organization might, under a bipolar world, be less able to see the successes it has because within the "spheres" outlines by the various powers, they are able to strongly influence policy and exert their influence (militarily and otherwise.) A unipolar world, on the other hand, leads to a nation overextending itself, and this means that it cannot be everywhere at once, control everything at once. The unipolar state, I would argue, is unstable, and will eventually revert to a multipolar one, but in the meantime various groups will rise up and exert their own control over their own regions. This is not always a bad thing: the salafists are an example of the dangers of this, but other nations might introduce democratic reforms, or throw off old oppressors and take their place as nations in their own right (of course Democratic Peace Theory warns about the instability of new democracies even when it preaches the peaceful coexistence of established ones...)

Long story short, while the rise of China (and perhaps a second rise of Russia as a third pole) might "negatively" affect American influence, I'm not certain that this is a bad thing, per se. In some ways it might make more of the world safer and more secure for more people. My main concern is that, instead of ending conflicts, it will merely relegate them to approved proxy actors, to the detriment of the people living in those nations (which could, of course, lead to the slow-smoldering resentment that, should a unipolar situation again arise, will erupt into the next "uprising.")

[dreamville-bg.livejournal.com]

Good overview. And quite worrying, especially for someone like myself, living in or around one of those contested buffer areas.

[johnny9fingers.livejournal.com]

Yes apart from terrorism. Throughout the post-war period terrorism existed and attacks were sporadic and occasional but nevertheless apparent throughout Europe.

The IRA/INLA and "Loyalist" terror groups opposing them; the Red Brigades; ETA; RAF/Baader-Meinhof all had significant terror attacks in the first world during the bipolar cold war. The US may have escaped such sorts of terrorist attacks, but the reasons for that may not be connected to the overall structure of interlocking bipolar competition/interests/proxy engagements and more to do with actual geography, rather than political geography. But I'm in general agreement, not that my opinion counts for much.

[dexeron.livejournal.com]

I think the main difference was that such attacks were, relatively speaking, contained. You had occasional outliers, like Pan Am 103, but I think (and correct me if I'm getting my history wrong) that most flare ups remained relatively relegated to the regions and nations directly involved in those conflicts: i.e., IRA attacks happened, but they didn't happen in the USA or USSR. That's not a blanket statement of course, but the sheer number of attacks reaching farther, and creating greater crises (such as the current refugee crises) were less apparent.

I think what has made the difference is that a unipolar world is, by its very nature, somewhat of a power vacuum. So, for example, the same ideals post WWI that led to the rise of Arab Nationaism still exist in the Middle East, and without two large poles basically pulling the strings in those regions (and propping up or tearing down various actors) other groups have been free to fill the void and set themselves up as minor regional poles. That has meant armed forces with greater reach and funding, leading to a flare-ups of instability and violence seen in wider regions.

You're still correct, though. It's not like terrorism or other instabilities never happened under the bi-polar world. I do think that, at least in part, the seeming lack of instability during the bi-polar world was just the fact that folks living in the USA and USSR were happily isolated from a lot of it when it did happen. Now that it's showing up at home, it seems like a "new" thing. It might actually be to a greater extent now than it used to be (which is my argument) but anyone pretending that it's a new thing hasn't been paying attention.

[airiefairie.livejournal.com]

Some would easily wonder that more isolationism and less nation-building would be good for the world... But on the other hand, allowing more space for world extremism and rogue dictatorships would only encourage those to advance further. It is like a catch 22 situation...

[luzribeiro.livejournal.com]