Who bought the Maidan?
31/5/15 15:54A couple of weeks ago, Donetsk celebrated one year since the "liberation" of the so called People's Republic. Among the official guests were envoys from a number of nationalist parties from across Europe (sponsored by Putin), including representatives of the French FN of Marine Le Pen. Jean-Luc Chafauzer, the French rep, pretty much used the mic to regurgitate Russia's conspiracy theory that the Maidan revolution had been orchestrated, that the US ambassador, Ms Nuland had been picking up the members of the Ukrainian government, and that the US wanted to divide Europe, and put a barrier to further Euro-Russian partnership.
Another speaker, German journalist Manuel Ochsenreiter of Die Zeit published a large article with the provocative title, "Did the Americans buy the Maidan?" As you might've guessed by now, that article was re-published by the major Kremlin-friendly media, and has now become part of Russia's official and public narrative.
Basically, that narrative argues that in order to understand America's attitude to Ukraine, we should look back in time - to 1991 when Bush Sr was visiting Kiev. The Cold War had presumably just ended with a victory for the West, the Soviet Union was still in place but was already shaking to its core. So what to do next? Bush Sr didn't have an interest in a total Soviet collapse, he was afraid there'd be no powerful factor in the region to sustain order. So the POTUS stood before the Ukrainian MPs who were pushing for independence, and he warned them not to succumb to "self-destructive nationalism".
But the Ukrainians were not very impressed. In December the same year they voted for their own independence - there was a popular referendum, which also included Crimea. The US couldn't ignore that fact, so they chose to get into closer relations with Ukraine. In cooperation with Russia, an agreement was reached where the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was scrapped in exchange for assurances from Russia about Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The relations between Ukraine and America became cordial - Ukrainian military personnel was even trained in the US. In the 2nd half of the 90s, the US became Ukraine's closest military partner. The relations with NATO also improved, and the Ukrainians naturally started dreaming of a NATO membership - and that, at the time of pro-Russian president Yanukovich. Russia didn't seem too concerned.
But this idyllic situation didn't last long. Because the economic and political reform in Ukraine began stagnating, the regime remained corrupt, and the Americans gradually started losing interest in that part of the world. But that interest was reinvigorated after the Orange Revolution in 2004. The new president Yushchenko was pro-Western. He wanted closer relations with the US - probably in part because his wife had grown up there, and had worked at the Department of State. But mainly because his society was in need of an overhaul, and they had figured the only was to proceed was to get closer to the West.
It was at that time that the notion was born that the US was pulling the strings in Ukraine. Ian Traynor wrote at The Guardian that the whole Yushchenko election campaign had been US-made. Traynor was citing evidence related to electoral observers and protest groups that had been paid for with US money. He spoke of poll results also financed by America. Few agreed with his accusations at the time, but among those few were people like the influential political science professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, who believed the US had never stopped meddling in Ukraine's internal matters - and still hasn't to this day, a decade after the Orange Revolution. He's convinced that the Maidan protests that brought the downfall of Yanukovich had been prepared for more than a year and a half with the help of lots of money from the Americans.
In a series of article for Foreign Affairs and the NYT, Mearsheimer accuses the West of failing to understand Russia's strategic interest in Ukraine. The way the US wouldn't allow Canada or Mexico to enter a military alliance that's directed by a major US geopolitical rival, Russia woulnd't like to see Ukraine entering NATO. He also proposes that Ukraine should maintain a neutral, buffer status, much akin to Austria during the Cold War.
In other words, he concludes, there was a coup in Ukraine. America wanted a change of regime because it wanted to increase its influence in Ukraine, and in the meantime to create another source of crisis in Europe, which it could then control. And he explicitly mentions an amount, and a specific phone call that was part of it all.
5 billion dollars - that's the amount that deputy Secretary of State on foreign policy Victoria Nuland mentions in a leaked phone conversation with the US ambassador in Kiev in January 2014 - just a couple of weeks after Yanukovich was deposed and fled to Russia. Nuland also muses on the question which people from the opposition should be handed state power - as if it all depends on her. Those facts surfaced because the phone call had been tapped - apparently by the Ukrainian secret services, still loyal to Yanukovich. So it was published. And it caused a huge scandal.
5 billion dollars. Sounds like a lot of money from a first sight. But was it sufficient to purchase an entire revolution? The money was spent between 1991-2014. Most of it came from the US Department of State and state organizations like USAID. That agency operates with budget money and is obliged to follow the president's orders. In other words, it's a political instrument. And of course it always acts with a purpose. But how exactly was its money spent on Ukraine?
The USAID office in Kiev is located in the city suburbs on the territory of the US embassy. A giant building with a tall fence. They've never stopped answering the question about the money ever since that leak happened - claiming that they do not finance revolutions, only aid the civic society and the NGOs. They promise they have not financed the Orange Revolution in 2004 or the Maidan protests in 2014. Their narrative is that "There were Ukrainian citizens at the square, who rose against the corrupt government".
USAID came to Ukraine in 1992 by invitation from the Ukrainian government, and started work in Kiev. The same happened in Russia, Georgia and a number of post-Soviet countries. No doubt, they had initially expected to stay there for just a few years - until things improved in those societies. The US was pouring a lot of money in various projects at that time, aiming to boost democracy: civic groups against corruption, election observers, expert assistance for MPs, etc. Still more money the US was giving for health-care, ecological projects, and for stimulating the economy. In recent years though, the amounts have been constantly dwindling. In 2011 those amounted to 200 million dollars, and last year they were 86 million. This year it'll be even less.
In conclusion, we could say the US interest in Ukraine has been fluctuating for the last quarter of a century. At one point it seemed important to help an emerging democracy, and at some other point Ukraine was viewed rather as a strategic rival to Russia. And if the situation again escalates in the next few months, America's policy would probably have to be readjusted once more, and president Obama would have to ponder on the question of those possible arms delieveries that he almost granted to Kiev the last time. If for anything, at least for the reason that many of his political opponents, and even part of his political allies, would insist on getting an answer to a very important question: would America allow Putin to make more inroads or not? And would it finish the job it had presumably started, or leave the Ukrainians to their means?
Another speaker, German journalist Manuel Ochsenreiter of Die Zeit published a large article with the provocative title, "Did the Americans buy the Maidan?" As you might've guessed by now, that article was re-published by the major Kremlin-friendly media, and has now become part of Russia's official and public narrative.
Basically, that narrative argues that in order to understand America's attitude to Ukraine, we should look back in time - to 1991 when Bush Sr was visiting Kiev. The Cold War had presumably just ended with a victory for the West, the Soviet Union was still in place but was already shaking to its core. So what to do next? Bush Sr didn't have an interest in a total Soviet collapse, he was afraid there'd be no powerful factor in the region to sustain order. So the POTUS stood before the Ukrainian MPs who were pushing for independence, and he warned them not to succumb to "self-destructive nationalism".
But the Ukrainians were not very impressed. In December the same year they voted for their own independence - there was a popular referendum, which also included Crimea. The US couldn't ignore that fact, so they chose to get into closer relations with Ukraine. In cooperation with Russia, an agreement was reached where the Ukrainian nuclear arsenal was scrapped in exchange for assurances from Russia about Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
The relations between Ukraine and America became cordial - Ukrainian military personnel was even trained in the US. In the 2nd half of the 90s, the US became Ukraine's closest military partner. The relations with NATO also improved, and the Ukrainians naturally started dreaming of a NATO membership - and that, at the time of pro-Russian president Yanukovich. Russia didn't seem too concerned.
But this idyllic situation didn't last long. Because the economic and political reform in Ukraine began stagnating, the regime remained corrupt, and the Americans gradually started losing interest in that part of the world. But that interest was reinvigorated after the Orange Revolution in 2004. The new president Yushchenko was pro-Western. He wanted closer relations with the US - probably in part because his wife had grown up there, and had worked at the Department of State. But mainly because his society was in need of an overhaul, and they had figured the only was to proceed was to get closer to the West.
It was at that time that the notion was born that the US was pulling the strings in Ukraine. Ian Traynor wrote at The Guardian that the whole Yushchenko election campaign had been US-made. Traynor was citing evidence related to electoral observers and protest groups that had been paid for with US money. He spoke of poll results also financed by America. Few agreed with his accusations at the time, but among those few were people like the influential political science professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, who believed the US had never stopped meddling in Ukraine's internal matters - and still hasn't to this day, a decade after the Orange Revolution. He's convinced that the Maidan protests that brought the downfall of Yanukovich had been prepared for more than a year and a half with the help of lots of money from the Americans.
In a series of article for Foreign Affairs and the NYT, Mearsheimer accuses the West of failing to understand Russia's strategic interest in Ukraine. The way the US wouldn't allow Canada or Mexico to enter a military alliance that's directed by a major US geopolitical rival, Russia woulnd't like to see Ukraine entering NATO. He also proposes that Ukraine should maintain a neutral, buffer status, much akin to Austria during the Cold War.
In other words, he concludes, there was a coup in Ukraine. America wanted a change of regime because it wanted to increase its influence in Ukraine, and in the meantime to create another source of crisis in Europe, which it could then control. And he explicitly mentions an amount, and a specific phone call that was part of it all.
5 billion dollars - that's the amount that deputy Secretary of State on foreign policy Victoria Nuland mentions in a leaked phone conversation with the US ambassador in Kiev in January 2014 - just a couple of weeks after Yanukovich was deposed and fled to Russia. Nuland also muses on the question which people from the opposition should be handed state power - as if it all depends on her. Those facts surfaced because the phone call had been tapped - apparently by the Ukrainian secret services, still loyal to Yanukovich. So it was published. And it caused a huge scandal.
5 billion dollars. Sounds like a lot of money from a first sight. But was it sufficient to purchase an entire revolution? The money was spent between 1991-2014. Most of it came from the US Department of State and state organizations like USAID. That agency operates with budget money and is obliged to follow the president's orders. In other words, it's a political instrument. And of course it always acts with a purpose. But how exactly was its money spent on Ukraine?
The USAID office in Kiev is located in the city suburbs on the territory of the US embassy. A giant building with a tall fence. They've never stopped answering the question about the money ever since that leak happened - claiming that they do not finance revolutions, only aid the civic society and the NGOs. They promise they have not financed the Orange Revolution in 2004 or the Maidan protests in 2014. Their narrative is that "There were Ukrainian citizens at the square, who rose against the corrupt government".
USAID came to Ukraine in 1992 by invitation from the Ukrainian government, and started work in Kiev. The same happened in Russia, Georgia and a number of post-Soviet countries. No doubt, they had initially expected to stay there for just a few years - until things improved in those societies. The US was pouring a lot of money in various projects at that time, aiming to boost democracy: civic groups against corruption, election observers, expert assistance for MPs, etc. Still more money the US was giving for health-care, ecological projects, and for stimulating the economy. In recent years though, the amounts have been constantly dwindling. In 2011 those amounted to 200 million dollars, and last year they were 86 million. This year it'll be even less.
In conclusion, we could say the US interest in Ukraine has been fluctuating for the last quarter of a century. At one point it seemed important to help an emerging democracy, and at some other point Ukraine was viewed rather as a strategic rival to Russia. And if the situation again escalates in the next few months, America's policy would probably have to be readjusted once more, and president Obama would have to ponder on the question of those possible arms delieveries that he almost granted to Kiev the last time. If for anything, at least for the reason that many of his political opponents, and even part of his political allies, would insist on getting an answer to a very important question: would America allow Putin to make more inroads or not? And would it finish the job it had presumably started, or leave the Ukrainians to their means?
(no subject)
Date: 1/6/15 13:45 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 1/6/15 19:22 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 1/6/15 21:48 (UTC)All wars begin and end with propaganda: so do most peace-times. There are no truths, merely the effectiveness of the competing narratives. Derrida would be amused at his bastard children, no doubt, but I opt for an earlier form of critical analysis. However, given that, are you of the opinion that this particular front of the Russian propaganda campaign will end to its advantage?
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 04:41 (UTC)That evil, evil T_P, right? I do love the occasional generalization or two. This one was particularly entertaining.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 06:28 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 06:59 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 07:58 (UTC)"Meta", meaning self-referential and taken to another level of abstraction, entered the popular lexicon with the post-structuralists: T_P has to talk about "talking about politics" because that appears to be the new battlefield - talking about the "talking war" between the expositions of the various competing narratives as if they have the same value...or at least that appears to be the current meta-narrative.
This could go on for paragraphs of increasing abstraction.
As to who will win the propaganda war, I'd generally follow the money: it has a proven track record, unless a narrative can be found that truly strikes some cultural chord. When that happens, lots of people tend to end up prematurely dead.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:02 (UTC)Which is not what I'm doing here, am I?
In conclusion: abstraction fractals FTW, yo!
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:17 (UTC)When politics hefted the tools given it by Lit-Crit and Philosophical thinkers of the post-war period it gave us our present competing-narrative-subjectivity-for-all-to-use as a universal basis for engaging in the debate. What we have found, however, is that facts are not subject to espousal of belief: Canute can not stop the tide from coming in. All narratives do not have the same value. And part of why we engage here, in our dissections and discussions of what is going on, is to point out these anomalies.
I like talking about talking. :)
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:44 (UTC)I don't mind talking about talking, as long as it could further a point that's being made. Problem is, I'm still trying to figure out what your point is.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 10:02 (UTC)Excepting of course we don't. We have historical data and scientific understanding (prejudgements based on prejudices, no doubt) that renders, for example, the narrative of the Young Earth Creationists ludicrous to most people. There are other problems too: complexity makes some arguments opaque to many people. Some narratives have greater value, and have a greater alignment to what is the case than others, yet cannot compete with the strength of belief that those other narratives engender: be they YECs in America, or the jihadist striving for the return of a mediƦval caliphate.
I asked your opinion because I value a reply. I cannot believe that the Russian mindset is all of a single purpose, inclination, or even all that enthusiastic in accepting official propaganda; and you are closer to Russia than I am and view it clearer. The Soros thing seems to be another of America's great exports to the universal market of conspiracy theories: yet I reckon Apple has greater power to destabilise world economies, maybe Google too.
We all know that aid comes with metaphorical handcuffs. Sorting between the conflicting narratives in the Ukraine needs more perspective (time) given their complexity, But what we need to do is find some way for the mods to freeze Russia, the Ukraine, the US, and the EU, and stop the stupidity from getting any worse. But the only maintainer is the UN, and it is a toothless and beggered old strumpet, abused by the Permanent Members, and a place where geopolitical points can be buried in a mire of necessary paperwork, only to surface later when time has made them totally irrelevant.
I think that some sort of supra-national government is a good idea. So far they've tried it twice and failed one and a half times. Now that China and India are coming online economically it might be time to recognise that there are too many great powers out there, all with their own agendas, and things will get pretty hot without some sort of proper reorganisation, even if it just a set of common goals expressed in a treaty. And maybe too, we have to redraw all the boundaries of our artificial nations. I'd suggest reform the UN, give it teeth and claws. Make India, Japan, and Germany permanent members of the security council: the number of permanent members therefore rising to eight. And use the technology we have at our disposal to have a universal debate about the boundaries of nationstate after the dissolution of empire. This may mean that the Brits lose Scotland and Cornwall, the Chinese lose Tibet, India loses Kashmir, Spain loses the Basque Country, etc and etc. But maybe these things need to happen/will happen anyway. Non-violent (relatively) management of the situation would seem to me preferable to our traditional way of settling these things. And folk secede from Unions, and then they join new ones, sometimes even the same ones.
We need to explore the idea that there is a better way, irrespective of narrative momentum.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 10:16 (UTC)I don't know where you're getting that idea from.
> I asked your opinion because I value a reply
What's the question? If I am of the opinion that this particular front of the Russian propaganda campaign will end to its advantage? I've already answered (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1983733.html?thread=149601781#t149601781) that one.
> I cannot believe that the Russian mindset is all of a single purpose, inclination, or even all that enthusiastic in accepting official propaganda
Me neither. But the Russian mindset is often inclined to trust a higher authority - and that's what seems to be happening in this case.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 10:28 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:07 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:35 (UTC)Frustrated and insulted - ye gods, it's a forum for debate: T_P would be doing it wrong if such were not true at least some of the time.
Passive aggressive seems to be one of two default positions English people have, the other being drunken hooliganism: whether structured in the form of colonial armies, semi-structured, like football hooliganism, or completely unstructured, like most town centres on a Saturday night. So criticising an English person for being passive aggressive is almost cultural defamation. :)
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:46 (UTC)-- Daily Quote.
(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:48 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 08:53 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/15 06:22 (UTC)