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talkpoliticsThe data about the production of poppy in Afghanistan shows that at the eve of the allies' withdrawal, Afghanistan continues to be the world's biggest producer of narcotic substances in the world. Data from the UNODC (the UN drugs and crime agency) for 2013 shows that poppy production has grown by 36% in Afghanistan, compared to the preceding year. The UNODC concludes that the poppy production has become a "virus that permeates the very organism of the country, and grows ever more serious and dangerous by the day". The surge of opium poppy production is a serious threat to the population's health, to stability and development not just in Afghanistan but the entire region, and ultimately the European countries and Russia, which are its main markets.
Many analyses show that for the 2001-07 period alone, which is just the first 5-6 years of the international allied presence in Afghanistan, the volume of poppy production has multiplied 40 times, but we shouldn't forget that during the years of Taliban rule that production was still quite big (4500 tons in 1999, 3200 tons in 2000, etc). We should also point out that in 2013 the total area of opium plantations had already increased over 25 times compared to 2001 (the time when the Taliban ordered the production to be stopped).
Unfortunately, most analyses by the foreign experts and media only focus on the scope of the global economic damage from this trade, but little is being said about the long-term negative consequences on the Afghan society itself. As we know, even before the US intervention in 2001, the Afghan farmers didn't have access to education and health care, and because of the Tablian policies, the international organizations couldn't provide the necessary help. Despite that, the production of opium poppy was nowhere near the enormous volumes it has enjoyed since the arrival of the Americans. And this, despite Afghanistan receiving billions of economic and humanitarian aid every year.
Both the Afghan government bureaucrats and a number of Western experts believe that the actions of the rebels on one side, and the miserable condition of the Afghan farmers on the other, are the main reasons for the steep growth of opium production. Others beg to differ, stating a tendency of gradual shifting of the main opium fields to the southern regions of the country, where the bulk of the fighting occurs. And in fact the local farmers are by far wealthier than their northern counterparts. In the meantime, the poorest farmers in Central, Eastern and Central Afghanistan have taken advantage of the various programs for fighting drugs in the recent years. In other words, there's an obvious direct correlation between poverty and drug production. Btw, the 2007 UNODC report also states drug trade as being directly related to poverty.
Other experts believe that the Taliban share in the Afghan drug market is slim, which means that the flourishing of this business is not so much due to the Taliban presence, but to other factors. For example, a Foreign Policy analysis claims that the notion that the Taliban are responsible for the boom of the Afghan drug market, is fantasy. The data that it cites, shows that the Afghan farmers sell about 7000 tons of opium on average every year, at the price of $130 per kilo, then the traders process it into 1000 tons of heroin and sell it for $2500 per kilo at the local market and $4000 per kilo in the neighboring countries. What the farmers get out of this business is about $900 million annually, the domestic traffickers about $1.4 billion, and the heroin dealers in the neighboring countries, about $1.5 billion. The share of the Taliban in all this is disputable, most estimates ranging between 70 and 500 million, i.e. between 2% and 12% of the entire 4-billion dollar annual overall income from the entire Afghan drug market.
To be perfectly blunt, many Afghan experts are outright blaming the foreign military presence for these negative tendencies. They believe the US and NATO are not only failing to combat the drug trade in Afghanistan, but with their presence they've become a catalyst for the huge growth of the drug production - if not a direct protector thereof. In the last 12 years the foreign military presence has deepened the problems of the Afghani people. America is not really fighting a real war against Afghan drug trafficking, because heroin from Afghanistan practically doesn't affect the US market, but the European and Russian one. They even directly blame particular individuals for the growth of drug trade, many of those names being among the top Afghan government bureaucrats, influential politicians, military commanders and of course regional warlords.
Both the foreign and local experts however converge upon the opinion that with the withdrawal of the ISAF forces from Afghanistan, the European countries (which, surprise-surprise, bear the bulk of the consequences from all this) will find it ever more difficult to counter this heroin tsunami. Since even despite the huge NATO presence in Afghanistan, drug trade not only hasn't been curbed but has flourished, we could expect a significant expansion of Afghani heroin to the EU markets, once that military presence is ended. Besides, the withdrawal of the ISAF forces is related to moving a large amount of military personnel and equipment across the Asian-European transportation corridors, which will facilitate the emergence of new sustainable long-term channels for drug transit from South Asia to the EU.
That said, the West's refusal to cooperate with such key players like Russia and Iran in the fight against Afghani drug trafficking, is causing a lot of concern. Many analysts believe that excluding Russia from the G-8, among other things, is an attempt on NATO's part to transfer its own responsibility for the huge boom of drug production onto someone else. Given the staggering proportions of this drug trade in recent years, it's more than urgent that, despite the confrontation between Russia and the West, they should join efforts with all other affected sides, including the EU and US, to tackle this impending threat. Namely, the opium poppy fields, the opium and heroin labs in Afghanistan, and the delivery of materials for the production of narcotics.
By the way, from the point of view of the US, which now looks prone to ending their long-term cooperation with Russia in the fight on drug trade, the Afghani drug trafficking is not as real and direct a threat as it is for Europe and Russia. And that's a potential tool for gaining geopolitical advantage. The US is currently trying to settle geopolitical scores with Russia, and in this game they even seem prone to neglecting Europe's long-term security, which is a double-edged sword really, and a potential boomerang that could ultimately backfire.
The Europeans, however, should not budge to the US persuasions to quit their joint projects with Russia in the area of countering drug trade, because it is Europe and Russia who are the main "recipients" of these drugs. In other words, halting the dialogue with Moscow could cause serious problems for Brussels both in the social-economical sphere and, most of all, in the sphere of security.
In the face of the threat coming from the Afghani drug trade, the international community should put all efforts in two directions: resolute actions against the drug producers and smugglers, and stimulating the alternative development of the Afghani economy. The latter being much more important. That is to say, the international community should be more actively engaged in helping the social-economic development of Afghanistan, because only ambitious economic decisions (including a program for alternative development through the accelerated industrialization of Afghanistan) would allow them to counter drug production, along with all the negative effects that it brings.
Many analyses show that for the 2001-07 period alone, which is just the first 5-6 years of the international allied presence in Afghanistan, the volume of poppy production has multiplied 40 times, but we shouldn't forget that during the years of Taliban rule that production was still quite big (4500 tons in 1999, 3200 tons in 2000, etc). We should also point out that in 2013 the total area of opium plantations had already increased over 25 times compared to 2001 (the time when the Taliban ordered the production to be stopped).
Unfortunately, most analyses by the foreign experts and media only focus on the scope of the global economic damage from this trade, but little is being said about the long-term negative consequences on the Afghan society itself. As we know, even before the US intervention in 2001, the Afghan farmers didn't have access to education and health care, and because of the Tablian policies, the international organizations couldn't provide the necessary help. Despite that, the production of opium poppy was nowhere near the enormous volumes it has enjoyed since the arrival of the Americans. And this, despite Afghanistan receiving billions of economic and humanitarian aid every year.
Both the Afghan government bureaucrats and a number of Western experts believe that the actions of the rebels on one side, and the miserable condition of the Afghan farmers on the other, are the main reasons for the steep growth of opium production. Others beg to differ, stating a tendency of gradual shifting of the main opium fields to the southern regions of the country, where the bulk of the fighting occurs. And in fact the local farmers are by far wealthier than their northern counterparts. In the meantime, the poorest farmers in Central, Eastern and Central Afghanistan have taken advantage of the various programs for fighting drugs in the recent years. In other words, there's an obvious direct correlation between poverty and drug production. Btw, the 2007 UNODC report also states drug trade as being directly related to poverty.
Other experts believe that the Taliban share in the Afghan drug market is slim, which means that the flourishing of this business is not so much due to the Taliban presence, but to other factors. For example, a Foreign Policy analysis claims that the notion that the Taliban are responsible for the boom of the Afghan drug market, is fantasy. The data that it cites, shows that the Afghan farmers sell about 7000 tons of opium on average every year, at the price of $130 per kilo, then the traders process it into 1000 tons of heroin and sell it for $2500 per kilo at the local market and $4000 per kilo in the neighboring countries. What the farmers get out of this business is about $900 million annually, the domestic traffickers about $1.4 billion, and the heroin dealers in the neighboring countries, about $1.5 billion. The share of the Taliban in all this is disputable, most estimates ranging between 70 and 500 million, i.e. between 2% and 12% of the entire 4-billion dollar annual overall income from the entire Afghan drug market.
To be perfectly blunt, many Afghan experts are outright blaming the foreign military presence for these negative tendencies. They believe the US and NATO are not only failing to combat the drug trade in Afghanistan, but with their presence they've become a catalyst for the huge growth of the drug production - if not a direct protector thereof. In the last 12 years the foreign military presence has deepened the problems of the Afghani people. America is not really fighting a real war against Afghan drug trafficking, because heroin from Afghanistan practically doesn't affect the US market, but the European and Russian one. They even directly blame particular individuals for the growth of drug trade, many of those names being among the top Afghan government bureaucrats, influential politicians, military commanders and of course regional warlords.
Both the foreign and local experts however converge upon the opinion that with the withdrawal of the ISAF forces from Afghanistan, the European countries (which, surprise-surprise, bear the bulk of the consequences from all this) will find it ever more difficult to counter this heroin tsunami. Since even despite the huge NATO presence in Afghanistan, drug trade not only hasn't been curbed but has flourished, we could expect a significant expansion of Afghani heroin to the EU markets, once that military presence is ended. Besides, the withdrawal of the ISAF forces is related to moving a large amount of military personnel and equipment across the Asian-European transportation corridors, which will facilitate the emergence of new sustainable long-term channels for drug transit from South Asia to the EU.
That said, the West's refusal to cooperate with such key players like Russia and Iran in the fight against Afghani drug trafficking, is causing a lot of concern. Many analysts believe that excluding Russia from the G-8, among other things, is an attempt on NATO's part to transfer its own responsibility for the huge boom of drug production onto someone else. Given the staggering proportions of this drug trade in recent years, it's more than urgent that, despite the confrontation between Russia and the West, they should join efforts with all other affected sides, including the EU and US, to tackle this impending threat. Namely, the opium poppy fields, the opium and heroin labs in Afghanistan, and the delivery of materials for the production of narcotics.
By the way, from the point of view of the US, which now looks prone to ending their long-term cooperation with Russia in the fight on drug trade, the Afghani drug trafficking is not as real and direct a threat as it is for Europe and Russia. And that's a potential tool for gaining geopolitical advantage. The US is currently trying to settle geopolitical scores with Russia, and in this game they even seem prone to neglecting Europe's long-term security, which is a double-edged sword really, and a potential boomerang that could ultimately backfire.
The Europeans, however, should not budge to the US persuasions to quit their joint projects with Russia in the area of countering drug trade, because it is Europe and Russia who are the main "recipients" of these drugs. In other words, halting the dialogue with Moscow could cause serious problems for Brussels both in the social-economical sphere and, most of all, in the sphere of security.
In the face of the threat coming from the Afghani drug trade, the international community should put all efforts in two directions: resolute actions against the drug producers and smugglers, and stimulating the alternative development of the Afghani economy. The latter being much more important. That is to say, the international community should be more actively engaged in helping the social-economic development of Afghanistan, because only ambitious economic decisions (including a program for alternative development through the accelerated industrialization of Afghanistan) would allow them to counter drug production, along with all the negative effects that it brings.
(no subject)
Date: 19/8/14 20:32 (UTC)What many people seem to fail to realize is that "war on drugs" does not necessarily constitute military actions - what makes a war on drugs really efficient is the implementation of strategies known to reduce drug problems. And the US has failed miserably on that count. What's more, the US has continued to support allies of whom it's known that they're heavily involved in drug trafficking. And thus, the problem with insurgency gets perpetuated, because the insurgents ultimately get the bulk of their funds from drug trafficking.
Also the double standard is notable, in that those traffickers who help finance the insurgency get killed or captured by the military, while those who support government forces are left alone. This suggests that the war on drugs is used to target select enemies rather than tackle the drug trafficking problem itself.
(no subject)
Date: 19/8/14 20:56 (UTC)Seriously though, pull back the bombers, send in the dusters - drop some Spike or Marksman or both and at least postpone the drug problem for a few years.
It might be a stupid idea, but it's probably a cheaper stupid idea....