The new Central Asian game
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talkpoliticsPutin's Russia may be pushing for the creation of an Eurasian customs union that goes beyond just trade but is designed to re-establish the old economic and political ties between Russia and the Central Asian states, and Kazakhstan may be meant to be the capstone in this structure (as far as Asia is concerned), but shall we look at one of the smaller nations in the scheme, Kyrgyzstan? Because, despite the obvious economic progress of its big Kazakh neighbour, actually Kyrgyzstan is offering the most dynamic changes these days. And an "interesting time" of changes is always the most fruitful ground for reaping beneficial fruits. Needless to say, the US is not sleeping, having sniffed the potential in this situation. The moment is potentially beneficial for gaining geopolitical positions that had been impossible to acquire until very recently.
After the presidential election in Kyrgyzstan, the country has noticeably stepped up the fortification efforts in its relations with Turkey, adding a new dimension to them. Most analysts never miss to mention the close relations between Almazbek Atambayev (the new president) with the political and business elites in Turkey. Of course, it's not just about politics and economy, it's about this coveted goal of pan-Turkism, that's been so loudly proclaimed, and has persisted for so many decades. But it's specifically the biz relations that define the short-term planning of the foreign policies of Kyrgyzstan. And that's being taken in consideration by the various think-tanks in the US, whenever they're making their analysis and crafting their strategies for Central Asia.
The strengthening of the Kyrgyz-Turkish relations during the rule of presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev was mostly defined by several main factors, including:
- Political cooperation within the pan-Turkic project (initiated and lead by Turkey);
- Cultural and humanitarian cooperation;
- Cooperation in the education sector;
- Tighter relations in small and middle business.
No doubt, at this point the range of issues that are being discussed on an inter-government level hasn't changed, and remains limited to the above mentioned points. But the nature of the cooperation is presently shifting. Firstly, there's the complicated relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan, the latter trying to assert a more central role in, well, Central Asia. And secondly, the Turkish-Kyrgyz duo that's hoping to also include Azerbaijan into a trio in the mid-term. And Azerbaijan, with the exception of its jealously protective position on some of its key energy projects, is generally quite open to political and economic cooperation with their cousins. Thirdly, the main factor for Turkey's choice of Kyrgyzstan for its vehicle for activating the region (as opposed to, say, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan), has been the very political system that Turkey promotes around the region. The famed Turkish model, a unique blend between Muslim and secular values carefully wrapped in a political package and meticulously maintained and shaved and perfumed, has been very appealing for the Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan. And beyond. It's seen as a viable model for national development in a number of societies in the Middle East, too. Only, Turkey is now trying to adapt it to its own new goals, and make it something really unique on its own, as opposed to being a mere copy-pasta from similar Western models. Now it has the potential to have a real appeal for the neighbouring societies, and thus become the vehicle for Turkey's influence in the region.
In this context, it's pretty clear that in the conditions of an increasing role of Islam in the previously secular Central Asian societies, the US could not afford to ignore the religious factor as an instrument for pressure and/or consolidation any more. It's noteworthy that in the 2005-2010 period, all US efforts in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were directed at discrediting Islam. And that approach failed. Granted, as usual, the US never dared to risk an outright exploitation of the contradictions between the religious and secular segments in these societies, but instead they've tried to involve third parties. Many have argued that the central role in this respect belongs to Israel, whose backstage influence on policy decisions has been quite successful in recent times.
In Kyrgyzstan the influence of the Israeli lobby, partly supported by Bakiyev's group, is mostly limited to legislative blocking of various religious initiatives. In Kazakhstan, given the vast variety of religious factions, and respectively a myriad of religious views flocking in and out of the country, a basis has been created for the development of reactionary forces garnering terrorism and extremism. Ironically, it's exactly the oppressive methods of the regime that have kept those at bay so far. In Uzbekistan, Israel has the most powerful position in Central Asia, represented by the Jewish diaspora. It's outright hostile to the Islamisation of the country and is actively trying to counter it, putting the emphasis on the extremist organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Al-Akramiyah, etc. But in Kyrgyzstan, after the 2010 Tulip Revolution, the situation has changed radically. In principle this must've prompted the US to change its approach to the situation.
Meanwhile, the interest for cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in such a country like Qatar remains pretty ambiguous. During the visit of the Kyrgyz PM Omurbek Babanov in Qatar last month, there were negotiations about possible new projects in mining, agriculture and tourism, although the main point on the agenda was the future of the US air base at Manas and the possibility for opening other military training camps across the country. In the case with Kyrgyzstan, the US role is still largely seen as complementary to Turkey's involvement in the region, because Turkey is by far the most active player in Central Asia, and probably the only one with a clear agenda. Not to mention it's being welcomed as a brother, unlike China and even Russia. As far as the involvement of the Arab world (here represented by Qatar), it seems it'll remain mostly passive, and will be only limited to education and humanitarian initiatives (or why not the exportation of Islam into politics). However, the military and political dimension of the issue will always remain at the forefront. Moreover, in the Arab case it'll be mixed with the ethno-cultural and religious aspect, the Centarl Asian nations being seen as part of a larger community of nations under a shared Turkic legacy (see video below).
[Error: unknown template video]
In the meantime, Iran's difficult situation on the international stage (mostly due to the economic and diplomatic isolation and the ban on energy exports), in the US plan is to be used for weakening Iran's attention on the crucial Central Asian region, especially diverting it away from Iran's cousin, Tajikistan. The fuel and energy shortages in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who are mainly dependent on Russian supplies of fuel, is a good reason to seek for diversification of the oil import routes. And that's the chance for the US to step in.
So it's no surprise that last month Kyrgyzstan called for Azerbaijan to build a new oil refinery on its territory, one that could relieve some of the already very difficult situation in both Kyrgyzstan itself, and also Tajikistan (who has suffered from the gas and electricity quarrels with Uzbekistan). The purely political look on the situation suggests that while Azerbaijan and Turkey might be sharing a lot of poltical goals, what still divides them is the approach to this cooperation with Central Asia, where the burden of the fuel and energy sector is supposed to fall upon Azerbaijan, while the military and cultural aspect should be managed by Turkey. But what unites them is their belief that they should work as a tandem, and seek to reduce the Iranian presence in Tajikistan, offering the Tajik leadership a favourable way to alleviate the energy crisis. The problem is, because of the high level of Tajik-Iranian relations, that'll be extremely difficult. And let's add some more variables to the equation: the rift between Turkey and Uzbekistan, where the Uzbek authorities are accusing Turkey of harbouring Uzbek terrorists and sponsoring Uzbek underground organisations who are banned in Uzbekistan. All that said, presently the US cannot rely on Turkey and Azerbaijan on any issues regarding Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, so they'll have to look for other ways to increase their influence, and push Russia back (according to the well-known Grand Chessboard doctrine; after all, let's not forget that Zbygniew Brezinski is Obama's geopoliticalmentor advisor).
At this point, the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan suggests that the traditionally stable influence of the Islamic culture is still preserved in the southern parts of the country, but at the same time in the north, despite the still strong positions of secularism, there's a tendency of Islam becoming more influential and acquiring a more stable political and idological form. So it's not unreasonable to expect that in the mid-term, the US (using Muslim countries like Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Gulf countries) would increase the efforts to develop Islam in Kyrgyzstan to a level that implies the involvement of the masses in the decision-making process, and this way achieving "grassroots influence" (and possibly selling it as "democracy"). This principle also intersects with the planned withdrawal of the allied troops from Afghanistan, so there'll be a favourable atmosphere for importation and exportation of religious ideologies across Central Asia.
As a result, we could expect the creation of a wide network of Islamic NGOs, and the opening of numerous religious education centres in those countries. What's more, there's a possibility of transferring religious values and political behaviour based on religious principles into the local power elites, who previously hadn't gravitated around the religious circles, and who never had Islam on their agenda. Whether this will backfire on the West in a longer term, as Islamism gets on the rise across the whole region, is a speculation I'd rather leave to you.
In general, at this stage it becomes apparent that such an approach is going to be used by all the big players involved, including Russia. After the meeting between the Orthodox Bishop of Kyrgyzstan (Theodosiy) and the mayor of Bishkek (Isa Omurkulov), the news was that the local government would provide funds for the construction of an Orthodox school for a thousand pupils (the official label is "a secular school with Orthodox elements"). The struggle for influence in Central Asia (like in the case with Kazakhstan) is entering a new stage. But given that any issues related to religion ought to be approached with extreme caution, these games can only lead to a sharpening civil conflict, this time not just on ethnic but alerady on religious grounds as well. But perhaps that's the end game after all: to cause turbulence and draw dividends from it. Because "no good crisis should go to waste", and "the biggest fish is caught in the muddiest waters". There's geopolitical influence and ultimately, economic interests at stake in this game. Those oil pipelines have to be built, plus those military bases to protect them.
No doubt, by pulling out the "religious card" in the Central Asian game, any player is risking (or perhaps deliberately counting on) causing inter-religious conflicts. This should always be the first thing to take into account, and the ironic thing is that, while it may bring some short- to mid-term gains, in the long run the likelihood of this resulting into all sorts of unpredictable backlashes, has never been higher than it is now. While the Arab spring sweeps across the Middle East, and the ulcer of the Palestinian issue keeps festering for decades, everyone seems to be neglecting that "other" region, the one that's been in the periphery of the big events for a long time, but which is now ready to wake up from its sleep. Whether it'll be a good dream or a nightmare, is yet to be seen. But something tells me the next "interesting times" are going to come up exactly from that corner of the world. Because, although still too few people might realise it, the stakes there are very high.
After the presidential election in Kyrgyzstan, the country has noticeably stepped up the fortification efforts in its relations with Turkey, adding a new dimension to them. Most analysts never miss to mention the close relations between Almazbek Atambayev (the new president) with the political and business elites in Turkey. Of course, it's not just about politics and economy, it's about this coveted goal of pan-Turkism, that's been so loudly proclaimed, and has persisted for so many decades. But it's specifically the biz relations that define the short-term planning of the foreign policies of Kyrgyzstan. And that's being taken in consideration by the various think-tanks in the US, whenever they're making their analysis and crafting their strategies for Central Asia.
The strengthening of the Kyrgyz-Turkish relations during the rule of presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev was mostly defined by several main factors, including:
- Political cooperation within the pan-Turkic project (initiated and lead by Turkey);
- Cultural and humanitarian cooperation;
- Cooperation in the education sector;
- Tighter relations in small and middle business.
No doubt, at this point the range of issues that are being discussed on an inter-government level hasn't changed, and remains limited to the above mentioned points. But the nature of the cooperation is presently shifting. Firstly, there's the complicated relationship between Russia and Kazakhstan, the latter trying to assert a more central role in, well, Central Asia. And secondly, the Turkish-Kyrgyz duo that's hoping to also include Azerbaijan into a trio in the mid-term. And Azerbaijan, with the exception of its jealously protective position on some of its key energy projects, is generally quite open to political and economic cooperation with their cousins. Thirdly, the main factor for Turkey's choice of Kyrgyzstan for its vehicle for activating the region (as opposed to, say, Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan), has been the very political system that Turkey promotes around the region. The famed Turkish model, a unique blend between Muslim and secular values carefully wrapped in a political package and meticulously maintained and shaved and perfumed, has been very appealing for the Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan. And beyond. It's seen as a viable model for national development in a number of societies in the Middle East, too. Only, Turkey is now trying to adapt it to its own new goals, and make it something really unique on its own, as opposed to being a mere copy-pasta from similar Western models. Now it has the potential to have a real appeal for the neighbouring societies, and thus become the vehicle for Turkey's influence in the region.
In this context, it's pretty clear that in the conditions of an increasing role of Islam in the previously secular Central Asian societies, the US could not afford to ignore the religious factor as an instrument for pressure and/or consolidation any more. It's noteworthy that in the 2005-2010 period, all US efforts in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were directed at discrediting Islam. And that approach failed. Granted, as usual, the US never dared to risk an outright exploitation of the contradictions between the religious and secular segments in these societies, but instead they've tried to involve third parties. Many have argued that the central role in this respect belongs to Israel, whose backstage influence on policy decisions has been quite successful in recent times.
In Kyrgyzstan the influence of the Israeli lobby, partly supported by Bakiyev's group, is mostly limited to legislative blocking of various religious initiatives. In Kazakhstan, given the vast variety of religious factions, and respectively a myriad of religious views flocking in and out of the country, a basis has been created for the development of reactionary forces garnering terrorism and extremism. Ironically, it's exactly the oppressive methods of the regime that have kept those at bay so far. In Uzbekistan, Israel has the most powerful position in Central Asia, represented by the Jewish diaspora. It's outright hostile to the Islamisation of the country and is actively trying to counter it, putting the emphasis on the extremist organisations like Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Al-Akramiyah, etc. But in Kyrgyzstan, after the 2010 Tulip Revolution, the situation has changed radically. In principle this must've prompted the US to change its approach to the situation.
Meanwhile, the interest for cooperation with Kyrgyzstan in such a country like Qatar remains pretty ambiguous. During the visit of the Kyrgyz PM Omurbek Babanov in Qatar last month, there were negotiations about possible new projects in mining, agriculture and tourism, although the main point on the agenda was the future of the US air base at Manas and the possibility for opening other military training camps across the country. In the case with Kyrgyzstan, the US role is still largely seen as complementary to Turkey's involvement in the region, because Turkey is by far the most active player in Central Asia, and probably the only one with a clear agenda. Not to mention it's being welcomed as a brother, unlike China and even Russia. As far as the involvement of the Arab world (here represented by Qatar), it seems it'll remain mostly passive, and will be only limited to education and humanitarian initiatives (or why not the exportation of Islam into politics). However, the military and political dimension of the issue will always remain at the forefront. Moreover, in the Arab case it'll be mixed with the ethno-cultural and religious aspect, the Centarl Asian nations being seen as part of a larger community of nations under a shared Turkic legacy (see video below).
[Error: unknown template video]
In the meantime, Iran's difficult situation on the international stage (mostly due to the economic and diplomatic isolation and the ban on energy exports), in the US plan is to be used for weakening Iran's attention on the crucial Central Asian region, especially diverting it away from Iran's cousin, Tajikistan. The fuel and energy shortages in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan who are mainly dependent on Russian supplies of fuel, is a good reason to seek for diversification of the oil import routes. And that's the chance for the US to step in.
So it's no surprise that last month Kyrgyzstan called for Azerbaijan to build a new oil refinery on its territory, one that could relieve some of the already very difficult situation in both Kyrgyzstan itself, and also Tajikistan (who has suffered from the gas and electricity quarrels with Uzbekistan). The purely political look on the situation suggests that while Azerbaijan and Turkey might be sharing a lot of poltical goals, what still divides them is the approach to this cooperation with Central Asia, where the burden of the fuel and energy sector is supposed to fall upon Azerbaijan, while the military and cultural aspect should be managed by Turkey. But what unites them is their belief that they should work as a tandem, and seek to reduce the Iranian presence in Tajikistan, offering the Tajik leadership a favourable way to alleviate the energy crisis. The problem is, because of the high level of Tajik-Iranian relations, that'll be extremely difficult. And let's add some more variables to the equation: the rift between Turkey and Uzbekistan, where the Uzbek authorities are accusing Turkey of harbouring Uzbek terrorists and sponsoring Uzbek underground organisations who are banned in Uzbekistan. All that said, presently the US cannot rely on Turkey and Azerbaijan on any issues regarding Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, so they'll have to look for other ways to increase their influence, and push Russia back (according to the well-known Grand Chessboard doctrine; after all, let's not forget that Zbygniew Brezinski is Obama's geopolitical
At this point, the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan suggests that the traditionally stable influence of the Islamic culture is still preserved in the southern parts of the country, but at the same time in the north, despite the still strong positions of secularism, there's a tendency of Islam becoming more influential and acquiring a more stable political and idological form. So it's not unreasonable to expect that in the mid-term, the US (using Muslim countries like Turkey, Azerbaijan and the Gulf countries) would increase the efforts to develop Islam in Kyrgyzstan to a level that implies the involvement of the masses in the decision-making process, and this way achieving "grassroots influence" (and possibly selling it as "democracy"). This principle also intersects with the planned withdrawal of the allied troops from Afghanistan, so there'll be a favourable atmosphere for importation and exportation of religious ideologies across Central Asia.
As a result, we could expect the creation of a wide network of Islamic NGOs, and the opening of numerous religious education centres in those countries. What's more, there's a possibility of transferring religious values and political behaviour based on religious principles into the local power elites, who previously hadn't gravitated around the religious circles, and who never had Islam on their agenda. Whether this will backfire on the West in a longer term, as Islamism gets on the rise across the whole region, is a speculation I'd rather leave to you.
In general, at this stage it becomes apparent that such an approach is going to be used by all the big players involved, including Russia. After the meeting between the Orthodox Bishop of Kyrgyzstan (Theodosiy) and the mayor of Bishkek (Isa Omurkulov), the news was that the local government would provide funds for the construction of an Orthodox school for a thousand pupils (the official label is "a secular school with Orthodox elements"). The struggle for influence in Central Asia (like in the case with Kazakhstan) is entering a new stage. But given that any issues related to religion ought to be approached with extreme caution, these games can only lead to a sharpening civil conflict, this time not just on ethnic but alerady on religious grounds as well. But perhaps that's the end game after all: to cause turbulence and draw dividends from it. Because "no good crisis should go to waste", and "the biggest fish is caught in the muddiest waters". There's geopolitical influence and ultimately, economic interests at stake in this game. Those oil pipelines have to be built, plus those military bases to protect them.
No doubt, by pulling out the "religious card" in the Central Asian game, any player is risking (or perhaps deliberately counting on) causing inter-religious conflicts. This should always be the first thing to take into account, and the ironic thing is that, while it may bring some short- to mid-term gains, in the long run the likelihood of this resulting into all sorts of unpredictable backlashes, has never been higher than it is now. While the Arab spring sweeps across the Middle East, and the ulcer of the Palestinian issue keeps festering for decades, everyone seems to be neglecting that "other" region, the one that's been in the periphery of the big events for a long time, but which is now ready to wake up from its sleep. Whether it'll be a good dream or a nightmare, is yet to be seen. But something tells me the next "interesting times" are going to come up exactly from that corner of the world. Because, although still too few people might realise it, the stakes there are very high.
(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 18:07 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 18:36 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 19:08 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 20:30 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 20:49 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 20:55 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 21:06 (UTC);-)
(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 21:08 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 21:09 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 21:49 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:14 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 16:36 (UTC)What the hell are you talking about? The highest points in the Rocky Mountains are about 14,000 ft tall, and most of them in the north... Hindu Kush (that big mountain in the east) is 24,580 ft tall; Koh-i-Baba (in the central part of the country) is 16,870 ft tall; hell, the Unai Pass that's the main road from Northern and Central Afghanistan to Kabul is 9,843 ft high! The pass - the place where you're supposed to cross the mountain. You can't just go there and build a railway right through those mountains, especially when you don't have the technology of the US, and especially if you intend to use it for mass transportation! Really, just look at the map. It takes less than 5 seconds.
What are you suggesting - building a 200 mile long tunnel?
You see that stretch of lower ground on the border with Iran? You might like to suggest using it to pass. Really. Try to use it, I dare you.
Why do you pretend to have any idea of what you're talking about at all? It's hilarious.
(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 17:01 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 17:07 (UTC)I think we're done here.
(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 21:44 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:09 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:15 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:19 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:22 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:30 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:36 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 15:47 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 17:41 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 2/6/12 20:43 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 30/5/12 22:14 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 19:57 (UTC)Reading your entire article I think this is what you're hinting towards that this possibility is dangerous. Why is that a bad thing? Sure the leaders of the country want to push for a secular state because its always easier to deal with other countries when you're not visibly Muslim (like the suppression of Islam in Turkey, once one of the central regions of Islamic authority ironically) but if the people are still Muslim in their identities why would it be a threat? Why does everyone consider the rise of Islamic practice as threatening? We would have to consider the same about the rise of Christian practice in the States, Germany and South America.
Am I the only one who also finds it disturbing that Israel is supposedly behind policies that are meant to essentially suppress any Islamic religious expansioin the region? Shit disturbers. Its really just going to backfire. They're suppressing a traditional relgion of the region for a diaspora community of around 5000 people (2007). Seriously? How they can even wield so much influence is beyond me. It will give rise to anti-Semitism and people who weren't inclined to do so before will gravitate towards traditional religious views if their ability to do so is under threat.
(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 20:23 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 31/5/12 20:37 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 1/6/12 20:40 (UTC)