Greenland, and beyond
6/1/26 21:07![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
nairiporter posting in ![[community profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/community.png){kind=small}
talkpoliticsRecent talk about the United States asserting control over Greenland, whether framed as acquisition, pressure, or "strategic necessity", should be taken seriously not for its feasibility, but for what it signals. Greenland is not a vacant asset, it is an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, a NATO ally. Treating it as a bargaining chip implicitly weakens the principle that borders and sovereignty among allies are not subject to unilateral revision.
From a NATO perspective, this kind of rhetoric introduces strategic ambiguity where cohesion is essential. NATO's strength depends less on raw military capacity than on mutual trust and predictability. If a leading member appears willing to coerce or sideline another ally over territory, it complicates alliance decision-making and gives adversaries an opportunity to test fractures, particularly in the Arctic, where Russia and China are already probing for influence.
More broadly, this episode reflects a tension between transactional power politics and the rules-based order the US has historically championed. Even if intended as leverage or domestic signaling, normalising the idea that great powers can "reallocate" strategic geography undermines the norms the West relies on to criticise similar behaviour elsewhere. The long-term cost is not Greenland itself, but the erosion of credibility when the same standards are no longer consistently applied.
From a NATO perspective, this kind of rhetoric introduces strategic ambiguity where cohesion is essential. NATO's strength depends less on raw military capacity than on mutual trust and predictability. If a leading member appears willing to coerce or sideline another ally over territory, it complicates alliance decision-making and gives adversaries an opportunity to test fractures, particularly in the Arctic, where Russia and China are already probing for influence.
More broadly, this episode reflects a tension between transactional power politics and the rules-based order the US has historically championed. Even if intended as leverage or domestic signaling, normalising the idea that great powers can "reallocate" strategic geography undermines the norms the West relies on to criticise similar behaviour elsewhere. The long-term cost is not Greenland itself, but the erosion of credibility when the same standards are no longer consistently applied.
(no subject)
Date: 6/1/26 19:23 (UTC)Also, seizing Greenland would allow the US to cut off Canada and European allies from having access to each other. Whether by undersea cable, by air, by sea.
Trump and company want NATO and NORAD dead.
(no subject)
Date: 6/1/26 22:12 (UTC)