Bad times for Eastern Europe
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talkpoliticsHungary: Viktor Orban's Fidesz to quit Europe's centre-right EPP
Victor Orban has no friends left around the top floors in Europe. His decision to withdraw his ruling party from the larger European People's Party marks an end of his traditional alliance with the more traditionalist segments of European politics.
Orban's further swing towards the radical is no surprise, of course. But the act is symptomatic of a broader alienation of the East European member countries from the mainstream EU line, spanning an arc from Slovenia to Poland that's been following a line that Orban once dubbed "non-liberal democracy".
While four years ago it seemed like populist forces across the Old World were gaining momentum, now Joe Biden's win in the US, and his vow to put an end to the America First doctrine, means the clouds will be gathering more over leaders such as Orban who were openly worshiping Donald Trump. Couple that with Angela Merkel's planned withdrawal from active politics come fall, and you'd see how politicians of the Orban type will be losing the last major leader who at least heeded their interests, albeit reluctantly. All their channels for dialogue with the EU might come to a close pretty soon.
The combination of a US administration that's not so prone to suffering their whims, and a new German leader who doesn't share Merkel's affinity to the region, is threatening to leave that part of Europe in the wild. The change could also encourage the European Commission to take firmer measures against Poland and Hungary along the primacy of law rationale, even freeze funds they're so dependent upon.
Donald Tusk, former Polish PM and EC chairman until a couple of years ago, said as much. He argued the situation in DC, and the prospect of change in Berlin, would complicate things for Poland. The change could include a Germany that'd be less prone to cooperation with Eastern Europe, plus a very principled US position on the primacy of law and democracy.
When Andrzej Duda, the incumbent Polish president, himself a staunch nationalist, ran for re-election last summer, he pleaded with Trump to give him a last-minute support. Just a few days before the election, Trump showered Duda with praise for the "great work" he had done, and said the Poles consider him "a great leader". Subsequently, Duda narrowly won by 51%.
Although Biden is supposed to be welcomed by EU's Eastern members for his more nuanced position on Russia, and the hopes for a more pro-Ukrainian line from the US, he'll be facing quite a few challenges in his relations with these leaders, most of whom gained their prominence for praising and siding with Trump.
Duda did congratulate Biden for his victory of course, but only on December 15, more than a month after Merkel had done. The Polish leader is concerned this might affect his country's relations with the new US administration. Although Poland is a strategic US ally in the region, probably the most devoted one in Europe.
Orban's government openly supported Trump at the US election, and is now prepared to return to more frozen relations akin to the Obama times. Their foreign minister was recently cited saying his country was open for closer cooperation with the US, provided that Biden showed "more respect" for Hungary.
Being EU's longest-serving leader, Merkel witnessed Orban's cementing of power in Hungary, his subversion of the judicial system and the media, his populist criticism of immigration, especially during the 2015/16 Syrian refugee crisis. His anti-immigration position was both a rallying cry for nationalists across the region and an act of disregard for Merkel's open doors policy.
And yet, Merkel is still a big advocate for the Eastern European countries, because she's very familiar with the conflicts and challenges they're facing, having grown up in DDR, and studied in Prague. She's also a fan of the Solidarity movement in Poland, which triggered the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989. And now, all her potential successors at the helm are from West Germany.
It's unclear if Germany will keep its level of understanding and readiness for cooperation with Eastern Europe that Merkel had, Tusk argues (himself a former Solidarity activist). Her experience from communist times was essential for her understanding of the eastern part of Europe, especially when it came to the EU-Russia relations.
As for Merkel's position on Russia, an issue of great importance to the Eastern European countries, most of which are former Soviet satellites, it's more nuanced. Although she's been criticized for the Nord Stream 2 project between Russia and Germany, she also made sure Putin's greatest rival, Alexey Navalny received proper treatment in the best German hospital after his poisoning by the Russian secret services. She also maintains a pro-Ukrainian position after the Crimean annexation. As disappointed and even occasionally humiliated as she may feel about his attitude, she's been able to swallow her feelings and keep a pragmatic approach to Russia, keeping all channels for dialogue open. The same way her door has always remained ajar for Orban, despite his re-invented role as the champion of nationalism.
One thing is for sure, though. Despite all the political differences, Germany's economic ties to Eastern Europe will remain strong. Out of all the 11 former communist EU member countries, 7 have Germany as their largest trade partner, including Hungary and Poland. These ties guarantee that so far the "rebels" can only rant, but not bite.
The next big test will be the primacy of law. Germany was a mediator on a deal in December that allowed the EC to propose freezing of fund payments to countries undermining the principle of judicial system autonomy. Hungary and Poland are both subject to such investigations as of now.
Since Merkel will not be running for re-election in autumn, soon she won't be around to intervene on their behalf, even if she wanted it. Chances are that the new German leadership will have a more stereotypical attitude to our region, especially by leaders who haven't grown up in Eastern Germany, or were too young when the Berlin Wall fell. Trouble is, Eastern Europe just doesn't have another partner as reliable in Germany to vouch for them.
Victor Orban has no friends left around the top floors in Europe. His decision to withdraw his ruling party from the larger European People's Party marks an end of his traditional alliance with the more traditionalist segments of European politics.
Orban's further swing towards the radical is no surprise, of course. But the act is symptomatic of a broader alienation of the East European member countries from the mainstream EU line, spanning an arc from Slovenia to Poland that's been following a line that Orban once dubbed "non-liberal democracy".
While four years ago it seemed like populist forces across the Old World were gaining momentum, now Joe Biden's win in the US, and his vow to put an end to the America First doctrine, means the clouds will be gathering more over leaders such as Orban who were openly worshiping Donald Trump. Couple that with Angela Merkel's planned withdrawal from active politics come fall, and you'd see how politicians of the Orban type will be losing the last major leader who at least heeded their interests, albeit reluctantly. All their channels for dialogue with the EU might come to a close pretty soon.
The combination of a US administration that's not so prone to suffering their whims, and a new German leader who doesn't share Merkel's affinity to the region, is threatening to leave that part of Europe in the wild. The change could also encourage the European Commission to take firmer measures against Poland and Hungary along the primacy of law rationale, even freeze funds they're so dependent upon.
Donald Tusk, former Polish PM and EC chairman until a couple of years ago, said as much. He argued the situation in DC, and the prospect of change in Berlin, would complicate things for Poland. The change could include a Germany that'd be less prone to cooperation with Eastern Europe, plus a very principled US position on the primacy of law and democracy.
When Andrzej Duda, the incumbent Polish president, himself a staunch nationalist, ran for re-election last summer, he pleaded with Trump to give him a last-minute support. Just a few days before the election, Trump showered Duda with praise for the "great work" he had done, and said the Poles consider him "a great leader". Subsequently, Duda narrowly won by 51%.
Although Biden is supposed to be welcomed by EU's Eastern members for his more nuanced position on Russia, and the hopes for a more pro-Ukrainian line from the US, he'll be facing quite a few challenges in his relations with these leaders, most of whom gained their prominence for praising and siding with Trump.
Duda did congratulate Biden for his victory of course, but only on December 15, more than a month after Merkel had done. The Polish leader is concerned this might affect his country's relations with the new US administration. Although Poland is a strategic US ally in the region, probably the most devoted one in Europe.
Orban's government openly supported Trump at the US election, and is now prepared to return to more frozen relations akin to the Obama times. Their foreign minister was recently cited saying his country was open for closer cooperation with the US, provided that Biden showed "more respect" for Hungary.
Being EU's longest-serving leader, Merkel witnessed Orban's cementing of power in Hungary, his subversion of the judicial system and the media, his populist criticism of immigration, especially during the 2015/16 Syrian refugee crisis. His anti-immigration position was both a rallying cry for nationalists across the region and an act of disregard for Merkel's open doors policy.
And yet, Merkel is still a big advocate for the Eastern European countries, because she's very familiar with the conflicts and challenges they're facing, having grown up in DDR, and studied in Prague. She's also a fan of the Solidarity movement in Poland, which triggered the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989. And now, all her potential successors at the helm are from West Germany.
It's unclear if Germany will keep its level of understanding and readiness for cooperation with Eastern Europe that Merkel had, Tusk argues (himself a former Solidarity activist). Her experience from communist times was essential for her understanding of the eastern part of Europe, especially when it came to the EU-Russia relations.
As for Merkel's position on Russia, an issue of great importance to the Eastern European countries, most of which are former Soviet satellites, it's more nuanced. Although she's been criticized for the Nord Stream 2 project between Russia and Germany, she also made sure Putin's greatest rival, Alexey Navalny received proper treatment in the best German hospital after his poisoning by the Russian secret services. She also maintains a pro-Ukrainian position after the Crimean annexation. As disappointed and even occasionally humiliated as she may feel about his attitude, she's been able to swallow her feelings and keep a pragmatic approach to Russia, keeping all channels for dialogue open. The same way her door has always remained ajar for Orban, despite his re-invented role as the champion of nationalism.
One thing is for sure, though. Despite all the political differences, Germany's economic ties to Eastern Europe will remain strong. Out of all the 11 former communist EU member countries, 7 have Germany as their largest trade partner, including Hungary and Poland. These ties guarantee that so far the "rebels" can only rant, but not bite.
The next big test will be the primacy of law. Germany was a mediator on a deal in December that allowed the EC to propose freezing of fund payments to countries undermining the principle of judicial system autonomy. Hungary and Poland are both subject to such investigations as of now.
Since Merkel will not be running for re-election in autumn, soon she won't be around to intervene on their behalf, even if she wanted it. Chances are that the new German leadership will have a more stereotypical attitude to our region, especially by leaders who haven't grown up in Eastern Germany, or were too young when the Berlin Wall fell. Trouble is, Eastern Europe just doesn't have another partner as reliable in Germany to vouch for them.
