Vlad eternal
14/7/20 15:04![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
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talkpoliticsVladimir Putin should be very pleased. Thanks to the constitutional referendum he can now stay in power until 2036, and why not beyond. He'll be 83 years old at that time. Which means he could become the longest reigning Tzar in Russia since Peter the Great.
Except, instead of fortifying Vlad's control and that of his circle, his latest machinations seem to have weakened its legitimacy. In fact his victory now loads his reign with more expectations: finding a cure for a stagnant economy, the added burden of Covid-19, and the poorly judged oil standoff with Saudi Arabia that saw the price of oil plummet, hurting Russia. Putin is now facing problematic regional elections in autumn, his regime has used judicial persecution as a tool to silence and get rid of his most prominent opponents, including the arrest of former Kommersant journalist Ivan Safronov.
It's also unclear whether the referendum will achieve one of its main goals. By removing the issue of inheritance, Putin was aiming to calm down the elites, and preserve their loyalty. As former Kremlin shadow power broker Gleb Pavlovsky says, despite his reputation of a cunning strategist, Putin and his circle look more like a political jazz band, masters of improvisation rather than an organised political class.
Caption: My country. My Constitution. My reset. On July 1, just nod and keep paying us taxes.
From a first sight, the result of the vote (conducted between June 25 and July 1 due to the social distancing measures, where entire polling sections were literally stationed at children's playgrounds and in the backs of trucks), and where a unprecedented number of suspicious incidents occurred that smelled of voting irregularities, could be translated as Putin's triumph. His press secretary Dmitry Peskov at least defined it so. 78% of Aye votes are no small thing, after all. People have shown they support the proposed constitutional changes. And these include a whole package of 200 diverse populist moves, like tying pension rise to inflation, a protected status for the Russian language, banning gay marriages, etc. This long list also had the main amendment embedded in it, the thing Putin wanted changed in the first place. The reason he called the referendum, when you strip the stunt of all the populism and propaganda. People called it "Putin's reset", since it'll now allow him to run for president beyond 2024. The old Constitution barred him from doing so, but now the obstacle is gone.
Despite the high Aye vote, there was much anxiousness and lack of confidence in the authorities' actions in the build-up to the event. Putin himself twice urged his compatriots to go to the polls, the first of these addresses he made while giving out social aid, the second while posing at the background of the monument to the Soviet soldier in Rzhev, the town where the bloodiest battles against the Nazi happened in the Battle for Moscow in WW2. Today that town, about an 3 hour drive away from the capital, radiates misery and desperation with its broken streets and half-ruined houses, a symbol of the gap between posh Moscow and the abandoned countryside.
The wide and loud Kremlin campaign that was used to promote the constitutional amendments did do its job well, especially because Putin himself was actively involved. It seems a large number of people voted Yes just because they wanted to directly support Vlad, transferring their hopes to him personally, and giving him responsibility for their future. The direct giving out of social aid during the campaigning must have helped too, especially at a time of pandemic. This move appealed to those people who entirely rely on the government to improve their well-being.
And yet, despite the massive propaganda, not all Putin supporters decided to vote Yes. Some expressed reservations, saying they were not against Vlad, but opposed the rule of thieves and traitors, alluding to some sycophants from his immediate surrounding.
These folks are not just a few, they're a considerable segment. They're asking themselves why these changes were necessary now, haven't all those problems been present for ages, and are Putin's propositions the real solution. Why not cut the mortgage interest rates for example if you really want to help larger families? Why the half-assed economic measures that he so conveniently glued to his political maneuvers?
So I'd say the result from the vote shouldn't be making the Kremlin complacent. Although it may seem like a new credit of trust, it does raise the Russians' expectations a lot. In a couple of years, questions on this deal will start to arise. If people's life hasn't improved but has deteriorated instead, and if Vlad fails to pull some new excuses from his sleeve, he might have a problem.
In fact, the real vote of confidence will be in autumn, when 20 Russian regions and large cities will be testing their support for the regime on a new election. Bear in mind that this will be happening at a time of deteriorating economy, due to the pandemic and the oil problems. estimates show that this year has seen a 1.3 trillion Rouble contraction of the regional budgets, and the big unemployment spike is yet to happen (it actually started in April, more than doubling since then).
Given the fact that unlike the referendum vote, the regional elections will happen within a single day, it'll be much easier to monitor the ballot count. One of the prominent opposition leaders, Alexey Navalny is urging his supporters to use "smart voting", i.e. supporting the most popular opposition candidate for the particular region, so they could loosen the monopoly of the ruling United Russia party. This yielded some nice results at the Moscow regional election last year, when the local legislature saw a number of opposition members entering for the first time in many years.
In turn, the regime has its own tactic in the battle against such initiatives. Recently, the Committee of Prosecution charged Navalny with slandering war veterans. Pro-Kremlin activists used his criticism against supporters of the constitutional amendments as a pretext. He called them lackeys, and though his words were directed at some showbiz celebrities, he was accused of insulting war veterans. Ridiculous, no?
Of course, the regional election is not the only risk for Putin's regime. Although he's undoubtedly the most popular politician in Russia, recent Levada Center polls suggest trust in him has dropped to a mere 25%.
He did receive his blank check with the referendum. He'll now have a chance to re-draw the ruling elite and the political institutions to his liking. But the price for this is a kind of legitimacy grey area. I mean, the future of the elite and the groups that have the resources, has always been a labyrinth of dangers that no one has a clear map to. Putin may have won himself some time, but his improvisations are evidently getting ever less convincing.
Except, instead of fortifying Vlad's control and that of his circle, his latest machinations seem to have weakened its legitimacy. In fact his victory now loads his reign with more expectations: finding a cure for a stagnant economy, the added burden of Covid-19, and the poorly judged oil standoff with Saudi Arabia that saw the price of oil plummet, hurting Russia. Putin is now facing problematic regional elections in autumn, his regime has used judicial persecution as a tool to silence and get rid of his most prominent opponents, including the arrest of former Kommersant journalist Ivan Safronov.
It's also unclear whether the referendum will achieve one of its main goals. By removing the issue of inheritance, Putin was aiming to calm down the elites, and preserve their loyalty. As former Kremlin shadow power broker Gleb Pavlovsky says, despite his reputation of a cunning strategist, Putin and his circle look more like a political jazz band, masters of improvisation rather than an organised political class.
Caption: My country. My Constitution. My reset. On July 1, just nod and keep paying us taxes.
From a first sight, the result of the vote (conducted between June 25 and July 1 due to the social distancing measures, where entire polling sections were literally stationed at children's playgrounds and in the backs of trucks), and where a unprecedented number of suspicious incidents occurred that smelled of voting irregularities, could be translated as Putin's triumph. His press secretary Dmitry Peskov at least defined it so. 78% of Aye votes are no small thing, after all. People have shown they support the proposed constitutional changes. And these include a whole package of 200 diverse populist moves, like tying pension rise to inflation, a protected status for the Russian language, banning gay marriages, etc. This long list also had the main amendment embedded in it, the thing Putin wanted changed in the first place. The reason he called the referendum, when you strip the stunt of all the populism and propaganda. People called it "Putin's reset", since it'll now allow him to run for president beyond 2024. The old Constitution barred him from doing so, but now the obstacle is gone.
Despite the high Aye vote, there was much anxiousness and lack of confidence in the authorities' actions in the build-up to the event. Putin himself twice urged his compatriots to go to the polls, the first of these addresses he made while giving out social aid, the second while posing at the background of the monument to the Soviet soldier in Rzhev, the town where the bloodiest battles against the Nazi happened in the Battle for Moscow in WW2. Today that town, about an 3 hour drive away from the capital, radiates misery and desperation with its broken streets and half-ruined houses, a symbol of the gap between posh Moscow and the abandoned countryside.
The wide and loud Kremlin campaign that was used to promote the constitutional amendments did do its job well, especially because Putin himself was actively involved. It seems a large number of people voted Yes just because they wanted to directly support Vlad, transferring their hopes to him personally, and giving him responsibility for their future. The direct giving out of social aid during the campaigning must have helped too, especially at a time of pandemic. This move appealed to those people who entirely rely on the government to improve their well-being.
And yet, despite the massive propaganda, not all Putin supporters decided to vote Yes. Some expressed reservations, saying they were not against Vlad, but opposed the rule of thieves and traitors, alluding to some sycophants from his immediate surrounding.
These folks are not just a few, they're a considerable segment. They're asking themselves why these changes were necessary now, haven't all those problems been present for ages, and are Putin's propositions the real solution. Why not cut the mortgage interest rates for example if you really want to help larger families? Why the half-assed economic measures that he so conveniently glued to his political maneuvers?
So I'd say the result from the vote shouldn't be making the Kremlin complacent. Although it may seem like a new credit of trust, it does raise the Russians' expectations a lot. In a couple of years, questions on this deal will start to arise. If people's life hasn't improved but has deteriorated instead, and if Vlad fails to pull some new excuses from his sleeve, he might have a problem.
In fact, the real vote of confidence will be in autumn, when 20 Russian regions and large cities will be testing their support for the regime on a new election. Bear in mind that this will be happening at a time of deteriorating economy, due to the pandemic and the oil problems. estimates show that this year has seen a 1.3 trillion Rouble contraction of the regional budgets, and the big unemployment spike is yet to happen (it actually started in April, more than doubling since then).
Given the fact that unlike the referendum vote, the regional elections will happen within a single day, it'll be much easier to monitor the ballot count. One of the prominent opposition leaders, Alexey Navalny is urging his supporters to use "smart voting", i.e. supporting the most popular opposition candidate for the particular region, so they could loosen the monopoly of the ruling United Russia party. This yielded some nice results at the Moscow regional election last year, when the local legislature saw a number of opposition members entering for the first time in many years.
In turn, the regime has its own tactic in the battle against such initiatives. Recently, the Committee of Prosecution charged Navalny with slandering war veterans. Pro-Kremlin activists used his criticism against supporters of the constitutional amendments as a pretext. He called them lackeys, and though his words were directed at some showbiz celebrities, he was accused of insulting war veterans. Ridiculous, no?
Of course, the regional election is not the only risk for Putin's regime. Although he's undoubtedly the most popular politician in Russia, recent Levada Center polls suggest trust in him has dropped to a mere 25%.
He did receive his blank check with the referendum. He'll now have a chance to re-draw the ruling elite and the political institutions to his liking. But the price for this is a kind of legitimacy grey area. I mean, the future of the elite and the groups that have the resources, has always been a labyrinth of dangers that no one has a clear map to. Putin may have won himself some time, but his improvisations are evidently getting ever less convincing.
(no subject)
Date: 14/7/20 13:51 (UTC)