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talkpoliticsIn continuation of yesterday's post, I'll go on about this weird term, communitarianism. It's a political philosophy that started in the 70s/80s of the 20th century, mostly in the US. It's got nothing to do with communism, socialism, communalism, collectivism or any such concepts. It doesn't fit the usual left-right dichotomy, but it's been increasingly witnessed these days. Just look at the level of polarization that US politics has reached. This is no longer about progressive ideas vs conservative ideas.
Basically, communitarianism relies on the individual's relation with those circles from which he or she originates, the people with whom they spend most of their time, and interact on most occasions. It emphasizes on these links in government policy as well, meaning it wants a government that has strong national sovereignty and is a social state at the same time.
So let's look back to the US election campaigns from the last 4 years. I wouldn't say it's clearly defined as a right vs left battle. Unlike Bernie Sanders, who has failed to get the Dem nomination yet again, Biden isn't necessarily leftist. Trump, in turn, skillfully borrows some communitarian tactics, meaning he heavily relies on the national state. So I think a more communitarian-leaning opponent like Sanders would've had a better chance defeating him. But that ship has sailed already.
To reiterate, the current transition between two phases of capitalism is comparable to the 30s. Back then, fascism prevailed unfortunately. Right now, the incoming organized capitalism has two options. If it develops along Roosevelt's New Deal guidelines, some useful economic and social reform could happen, that would help heal some defects of neoliberalism.
But the type of organized capitalism we're heading into, could also end up as fascism in some form just as well. New authoritarian tendencies are being observed in the US, UK, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, and in other places around the world. These are red lights that should be noted. Just 75 years after the devastating WW2, fascism no longer looks dead and buried in Europe.
This is worrying. Indeed, the imminent turn to organized capitalism very much resembles the 30s, in that it's being largely run by right-wing populist, and on occasion even outright neo-fascist forces. The main reason, I think, is in the close ties between leftist politicians and cosmopolitanism. Progressivism has been associated with economic liberalism for far too long. So I think the leftist political forces should take a close hard look at themselves, and recognize the challenges leading to organized capitalism if they were to prevent the return to fascism.
At the core of the concept of organized capitalism is the question if business enterprises are solely part of private business, i.e. they entirely belong to the shareholders - or they're more like a sort of public infrastructure, whose economic decisions are to follow certain institutionally established collective interests. As we're witnessing right now, a number of Western governments (Germany, Britain, France) are considering a nationalization of private enterprises under the pretext of saving entire segments of the economy from collapse during the recession (the "too big to fail" motivation).
For example, while Germany has not started full-out nationalization of such sectors, the process has already begun with the government becoming a co-shareholder in several large private companies, infusing fresh capitals into their portfolio so as to prevent them from collapsing. The government claims it has no intention to obtain the control package of shares in those companies, or even decision-making shares that would affect the companies' policies (example: Lufthansa, where the government has put restrictions on itself about the amount of shares it could buy, so that it doesn't obtain a vetoing majority). That seems like a half-assed step, which neither helps prevent those companies from keeping the systematic errors that may've brought them to their current predicament, nor does it help the public much in trusting that the government won't do the tempting next step at some point, and take over those companies anyway (if things get bad with the economy).
As for the new EU member states in East Europe, those have become dependent banana republics in some form or another, appendices to the West European economies, completely dependent on their policies. Even the so called Visegrad Three (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), which are supposed to be in the best shape in all of East Europe, are essentially economic dominions - not so much of countries like Germany, France and those in North Europe, but fiefs to the HQs of the multinational companies dominating those developed economies. At no point in recent history have there been economies that are so heavily dependent on multinational companies, and whose policies are so unequivocally focused on attracting direct foreign investment - the last time this happened was during the peak of colonialism, with the various iterations of the East India Companies. And we all know how that ended for the colonized. So East Europe should think hard about this process, as it's inherently dangerous for them.
And mind you, some of them are currently pushing to join the Euro zone. Having in mind the past experience of the South European countries, the Baltics and Slovenia, I'd strongly advise against it at this point. Especially the Southern European experience shows that economies that don't have competitive institutions comparable to those of Germany, upon entering a currency union with such a strong economy, would get under severe economic pressure for a long time. If they share the same currency with the pressuring dominator, they'd have no tools to let the steam off through devaluation. In the long term, that'd lead to their de-industrialization (losing entire manufacturing sectors). And, like we've established, this brings economic marginalization, disenfranchisement, populism, and political extremism.
So, will the world undergo a major structural political and economic change due to the Covid-19 crisis? I'm sure the recession will be wide enough to warrant a transition from liberal capitalism to organized capitalism - in fact it has already begun, but the crisis will rather escalate and accelerate it. This means a structural transformation of capitalism for the next couple of decades - but not necessarily its dismantling.
One final thing. Will the EU survive, given the strong tendencies of a resurgence of the national state? I don't think the EU will collapse under the pressure of the upcoming crisis. But I could imagine a Europe more cautious about the further expansion of its supranational institutions (the European Commission, the European Human Rights Court, the European Central Bank). Rather, the region, and the world as a whole, will witness much more focus being put on bilateral agreements and relations between separate governments and legislatures. And a departure from the free-for-all type of market, at least for a while.
Basically, communitarianism relies on the individual's relation with those circles from which he or she originates, the people with whom they spend most of their time, and interact on most occasions. It emphasizes on these links in government policy as well, meaning it wants a government that has strong national sovereignty and is a social state at the same time.
So let's look back to the US election campaigns from the last 4 years. I wouldn't say it's clearly defined as a right vs left battle. Unlike Bernie Sanders, who has failed to get the Dem nomination yet again, Biden isn't necessarily leftist. Trump, in turn, skillfully borrows some communitarian tactics, meaning he heavily relies on the national state. So I think a more communitarian-leaning opponent like Sanders would've had a better chance defeating him. But that ship has sailed already.
To reiterate, the current transition between two phases of capitalism is comparable to the 30s. Back then, fascism prevailed unfortunately. Right now, the incoming organized capitalism has two options. If it develops along Roosevelt's New Deal guidelines, some useful economic and social reform could happen, that would help heal some defects of neoliberalism.
But the type of organized capitalism we're heading into, could also end up as fascism in some form just as well. New authoritarian tendencies are being observed in the US, UK, Poland, Hungary, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, and in other places around the world. These are red lights that should be noted. Just 75 years after the devastating WW2, fascism no longer looks dead and buried in Europe.
This is worrying. Indeed, the imminent turn to organized capitalism very much resembles the 30s, in that it's being largely run by right-wing populist, and on occasion even outright neo-fascist forces. The main reason, I think, is in the close ties between leftist politicians and cosmopolitanism. Progressivism has been associated with economic liberalism for far too long. So I think the leftist political forces should take a close hard look at themselves, and recognize the challenges leading to organized capitalism if they were to prevent the return to fascism.
At the core of the concept of organized capitalism is the question if business enterprises are solely part of private business, i.e. they entirely belong to the shareholders - or they're more like a sort of public infrastructure, whose economic decisions are to follow certain institutionally established collective interests. As we're witnessing right now, a number of Western governments (Germany, Britain, France) are considering a nationalization of private enterprises under the pretext of saving entire segments of the economy from collapse during the recession (the "too big to fail" motivation).
For example, while Germany has not started full-out nationalization of such sectors, the process has already begun with the government becoming a co-shareholder in several large private companies, infusing fresh capitals into their portfolio so as to prevent them from collapsing. The government claims it has no intention to obtain the control package of shares in those companies, or even decision-making shares that would affect the companies' policies (example: Lufthansa, where the government has put restrictions on itself about the amount of shares it could buy, so that it doesn't obtain a vetoing majority). That seems like a half-assed step, which neither helps prevent those companies from keeping the systematic errors that may've brought them to their current predicament, nor does it help the public much in trusting that the government won't do the tempting next step at some point, and take over those companies anyway (if things get bad with the economy).
As for the new EU member states in East Europe, those have become dependent banana republics in some form or another, appendices to the West European economies, completely dependent on their policies. Even the so called Visegrad Three (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic), which are supposed to be in the best shape in all of East Europe, are essentially economic dominions - not so much of countries like Germany, France and those in North Europe, but fiefs to the HQs of the multinational companies dominating those developed economies. At no point in recent history have there been economies that are so heavily dependent on multinational companies, and whose policies are so unequivocally focused on attracting direct foreign investment - the last time this happened was during the peak of colonialism, with the various iterations of the East India Companies. And we all know how that ended for the colonized. So East Europe should think hard about this process, as it's inherently dangerous for them.
And mind you, some of them are currently pushing to join the Euro zone. Having in mind the past experience of the South European countries, the Baltics and Slovenia, I'd strongly advise against it at this point. Especially the Southern European experience shows that economies that don't have competitive institutions comparable to those of Germany, upon entering a currency union with such a strong economy, would get under severe economic pressure for a long time. If they share the same currency with the pressuring dominator, they'd have no tools to let the steam off through devaluation. In the long term, that'd lead to their de-industrialization (losing entire manufacturing sectors). And, like we've established, this brings economic marginalization, disenfranchisement, populism, and political extremism.
So, will the world undergo a major structural political and economic change due to the Covid-19 crisis? I'm sure the recession will be wide enough to warrant a transition from liberal capitalism to organized capitalism - in fact it has already begun, but the crisis will rather escalate and accelerate it. This means a structural transformation of capitalism for the next couple of decades - but not necessarily its dismantling.
One final thing. Will the EU survive, given the strong tendencies of a resurgence of the national state? I don't think the EU will collapse under the pressure of the upcoming crisis. But I could imagine a Europe more cautious about the further expansion of its supranational institutions (the European Commission, the European Human Rights Court, the European Central Bank). Rather, the region, and the world as a whole, will witness much more focus being put on bilateral agreements and relations between separate governments and legislatures. And a departure from the free-for-all type of market, at least for a while.
