What now, Tsipras?
21/4/15 15:00The payment schedule on the Greek sovereign debt looks pretty full as of now. First, Greece will have to pay 200 million euro back to the IMF, come May 1. And then in June, there are a bunch of new payments to the IMF worth a total of 2.5 billion. Those are installments that Greece received from the IMF as part of the earlier aid package.
Christine Lagarde, the IMF chairlady has made it clear that she'll insist that the payments be made on time. For the last three decades, the IMF has never given a single day of deferment to their debtors. There hasn't been a single case of a developing country requesting such, respectively. Greece would be the first if they dare do that. But even so, the IMF doesn't look likely to grant the request. In other words, there'll be no exceptions - because they've got strict rules, and they don't see a reason to make a compromise with them.
The ECB is also amping up the pressure. Mario Draghi, the ECB chairman is already using terms like, "a rule-based institution" to characterise that institution. However, if past experience is any guide, the rules could often be interpreted in many ways. Many critics believe the ECB doesn't have a mandate to buy state bonds en masse. This of course didn't prevent Draghi from flooding the financial markets with 60+ bn euro.
As per their own rules, the ECB didn't have the right to accept the Greek state bonds as compensation, since Greece's fiscal ratings had already reached the bottom. There was a time when this rule could be bypassed through exceptions that could be hastily voted and approved. But after Tsipras came into office, the ECB decided to backtrack on their initial decision, and cut Greece's way to the important financial markets.
The ECB now explains they don't expect the Greek reform program to be successful. Since the Greek banks were cut off from direct access to ECB's fresh money, they've become completely dependent on the Emergency Liquidity Assistance funds of the Greek Central Bank. These loans are not only far more expensive, they first have to explicitly be approved by the ECB. In result, the latter is holding these banks on a short leash, and occasionally raising the ceiling of the loans in the meantime - but to a much lesser extent compared to the time of the previous Greek governments.
Last month the ECB came up with instructions that were designed to limit the amounts that the Greek banks could spend for buying bonds from the Greek state. This way the pressure on Athens was increased immensely. It's currently much more beneficial for the Greeks to look for loans at the capital markets. After the meeting between the Greek financial minister Yanis Varoufakis and the IMF chairlady Christine Lagarde (last week), the profitability of the Greek three-year bonds reached a record 27%, the highest rate since the time of the partial remittal of the Greek debt in 2012.
This is why the Greeks are now insisting on faster payment of the already promised bailout worth 7.2 bn euro. However, the creditors are holding the money because they don't consider the reformist efforts of Tsipras' government to be sufficient. In February, the Eurogroup decided to extend the aid program until June. The decision was declared a success, but it failed to bring any clarity on the issue. In turn, the Greeks interpreted it as a "new framework" for negotiations, as Tispras himself told Angela Merkel. The rest of Europe is only imagining to be seeing in all that a confirmation of Greece's commitment to keep the austerity course of Tsipras' predecessor.
The trouble is that the new Greek government came to power exactly on promises to reject that policy. The reason Tsipras was elected is because he vowed to end the reforms imposed by the Eurogroup, which the majority of Greek voters evidently consider to be antisocial and economically counter-productive. Given the depleted national treasury, Lagarde has called for all participants in the negotiations to hurry up. Because this isn't a case that could be solved in the last minute with some kind of political decision. Now the financial ministers are the main players, particularly those from the Eurogroup, and the respective institutions that they've authorised.
Last week Tsipras expressed tremendous optimism that by the end of the month an agreement would be reached, despite some points of contention about the labour market, the pension reform, on taxation and privatisation. On Friday, the ministers of finance of the Euro zone will again convene in Riga. The German minister of finance Schaeuble has hastened to cool the enthusiasm a bit, saying that nothing particularly new is expected to happen in Latvia.
So the pressure on the Greek government to submit to the requirements of the creditors for cuts and reform, is building up by the day. Alexis Tsipras is the first Greek politician to ever skip the Bible during his inauguration ceremony, for being atheist. But that didn't stop him from seeking even the aid of the immensely influential Greek Orthodox Church. Its primate, Archbishop Ieronimos II has proposed that the church, which has a multi-billion wealth at its disposal both in terms of treasury and real estate, to help in finding new financial sources for the treasury - not without some strings attached, of course.
Christine Lagarde, the IMF chairlady has made it clear that she'll insist that the payments be made on time. For the last three decades, the IMF has never given a single day of deferment to their debtors. There hasn't been a single case of a developing country requesting such, respectively. Greece would be the first if they dare do that. But even so, the IMF doesn't look likely to grant the request. In other words, there'll be no exceptions - because they've got strict rules, and they don't see a reason to make a compromise with them.
The ECB is also amping up the pressure. Mario Draghi, the ECB chairman is already using terms like, "a rule-based institution" to characterise that institution. However, if past experience is any guide, the rules could often be interpreted in many ways. Many critics believe the ECB doesn't have a mandate to buy state bonds en masse. This of course didn't prevent Draghi from flooding the financial markets with 60+ bn euro.
As per their own rules, the ECB didn't have the right to accept the Greek state bonds as compensation, since Greece's fiscal ratings had already reached the bottom. There was a time when this rule could be bypassed through exceptions that could be hastily voted and approved. But after Tsipras came into office, the ECB decided to backtrack on their initial decision, and cut Greece's way to the important financial markets.
The ECB now explains they don't expect the Greek reform program to be successful. Since the Greek banks were cut off from direct access to ECB's fresh money, they've become completely dependent on the Emergency Liquidity Assistance funds of the Greek Central Bank. These loans are not only far more expensive, they first have to explicitly be approved by the ECB. In result, the latter is holding these banks on a short leash, and occasionally raising the ceiling of the loans in the meantime - but to a much lesser extent compared to the time of the previous Greek governments.
Last month the ECB came up with instructions that were designed to limit the amounts that the Greek banks could spend for buying bonds from the Greek state. This way the pressure on Athens was increased immensely. It's currently much more beneficial for the Greeks to look for loans at the capital markets. After the meeting between the Greek financial minister Yanis Varoufakis and the IMF chairlady Christine Lagarde (last week), the profitability of the Greek three-year bonds reached a record 27%, the highest rate since the time of the partial remittal of the Greek debt in 2012.
This is why the Greeks are now insisting on faster payment of the already promised bailout worth 7.2 bn euro. However, the creditors are holding the money because they don't consider the reformist efforts of Tsipras' government to be sufficient. In February, the Eurogroup decided to extend the aid program until June. The decision was declared a success, but it failed to bring any clarity on the issue. In turn, the Greeks interpreted it as a "new framework" for negotiations, as Tispras himself told Angela Merkel. The rest of Europe is only imagining to be seeing in all that a confirmation of Greece's commitment to keep the austerity course of Tsipras' predecessor.
The trouble is that the new Greek government came to power exactly on promises to reject that policy. The reason Tsipras was elected is because he vowed to end the reforms imposed by the Eurogroup, which the majority of Greek voters evidently consider to be antisocial and economically counter-productive. Given the depleted national treasury, Lagarde has called for all participants in the negotiations to hurry up. Because this isn't a case that could be solved in the last minute with some kind of political decision. Now the financial ministers are the main players, particularly those from the Eurogroup, and the respective institutions that they've authorised.
Last week Tsipras expressed tremendous optimism that by the end of the month an agreement would be reached, despite some points of contention about the labour market, the pension reform, on taxation and privatisation. On Friday, the ministers of finance of the Euro zone will again convene in Riga. The German minister of finance Schaeuble has hastened to cool the enthusiasm a bit, saying that nothing particularly new is expected to happen in Latvia.
So the pressure on the Greek government to submit to the requirements of the creditors for cuts and reform, is building up by the day. Alexis Tsipras is the first Greek politician to ever skip the Bible during his inauguration ceremony, for being atheist. But that didn't stop him from seeking even the aid of the immensely influential Greek Orthodox Church. Its primate, Archbishop Ieronimos II has proposed that the church, which has a multi-billion wealth at its disposal both in terms of treasury and real estate, to help in finding new financial sources for the treasury - not without some strings attached, of course.
(no subject)
Date: 21/4/15 15:02 (UTC)Not that it should happen, but I think if it did it would teach us all a valuable lesson about responsible lending. Cause I don't think any lessons from the last, I don't know, forever, has sunk in yet.
Part 1
Date: 21/4/15 15:35 (UTC)part 2
Date: 21/4/15 15:36 (UTC)And the latest rounds of demands on Greece are rather bogus, according to Ryan Cooper (The Week), "Structural reform" is one of the main sticking points for a new agreement, although Mr Cooper suggests the IMF is really not working what structural reform should be. And Mr. Cooper also notes
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Date: 21/4/15 21:22 (UTC)(no subject)
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Date: 28/4/15 14:11 (UTC)(no subject)
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From:(frozen) I think we've had enough of you at this point.
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Date: 22/4/15 06:30 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 22/4/15 13:02 (UTC)(no subject)
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Date: 28/4/15 14:12 (UTC)If Europeans want to be consistent, then they need to pick and choose their 'heroes' carefully. And so do people who said "Yay, Iceland screwed the banks!" when they realize that GREECE screwing the banks might affect THEM. So sorry, bub, either it's heroic to default on your debts and sticking it to the man or it's irresponsible hucksterism. Can't be both. Pick one.
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Date: 22/4/15 12:37 (UTC)(no subject)
Date: 22/4/15 14:00 (UTC)And thus, everyone gets indebted. And a culture of indefinite indebtedness emerges.
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Date: 24/4/15 04:59 (UTC)The Greek situation is, and let me underline this for everyone, exactly what the German situation was after The Great War. I'm not Godwinning here, just pointing out that if Greece is expected to hew to these Troika-forced austerity measures, history dictates that the likely result will be the rise of a world-destabilizing despot out to punish those that punished them just like it did with Hitler. (Rather than re-hash what I've said elsewhere, just read (http://liberal.livejournal.com/3363384.html) what I've said elsewhere.)
Money is not a "thing." It is credit created by banks through the act of lending. It can be tied to a physical thing, but in the end this physical tie is tenuous at best and manipulated at worst, so the tie is secondary.
The Troika as it is called has historically worked to obfuscate this basic tenet of money. I won't wade into conspiratorial waters here, which would be pointless at best. The conspiracy behind the Why in no way detracts from the reality of the Yep, Obfuscatory history.
When credit is called in by a creditor, there is a reason. It is NOT simply "because someone has to pay the piper for the last dance" or some folk wisdom bullshit that evidently proves more efficacious at obfuscation than more elaborate obfuscation.
What's amazing is the level of denial evidently foisted upon otherwise well-informed individuals about the very nature of money. While I was here in TP and posting, did anybody read these posts?!?
Ganging up on
As to alternatives (http://talk-politics.livejournal.com/1973102.html?thread=149354606#t149354606), there are some. How about the German Sparkassan Banks? Greece could borrow at 0% (because that's what real banks do) just like Germany (http://ellenbrown.com/2015/02/10/why-public-banks-outperform-private-banks-unfair-competition-or-a-better-mousetrap/) does today. You don't hear that Germany is doing every day what it expects Greece to avoid doing, do you? Not in the press controlled by banking-supported advertising dollars (at least here in the States).
If Greece succumbs to these austerity measures, this kind of fiscal waterboarding (as Finance Minister Varoufakis once put it (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11369851/Yanis-Varoufakis-Greeces-future-finance-minister-is-no-extremist.html), expect the next despot for the history books. Just don't expect me to wander once again into this viper's den of sniping and bitter personal attacks that pass for "modification" anytime soon.
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Date: 24/4/15 06:01 (UTC)Money isn't a thing, yes, but if you really want to get to the bottom of all this, you'll have to ask yourself, why exactly Greece? Why not, say Finland? Why isn't this happening to the tiny Czech Republic? Why the Greeks? What is it about Greece that has put it into this predicament? I see you're fond of history, why not investigate a bit further back into Greece's financial practices for the last couple of decades, and seek for the specific reasons for this result there?
And while we're about history, you didn't comment on Greece calling the Germans "Nazi", and demanding WW2 reparations. I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on that, too.
More than one person expressing disagreement with one other person is not "ganging up". Mind you, I'm not sure how exactly responding to being addressed first, constitutes "ganging up". And neither does the fact that several people do not share another one person's opinions make them part of a "viper den" (quite an untypically rude generalization, btw).
By the way, what personal attacks are you talking about? Would branding Merkel "Hitler" fall into that category as well? Because the way Greece (the state, not just "some people" within it) has reacted to this situation is anything BUT mature - devolving all this into personal attacks on Germany or one or more of its leaders, is anything BUT a constructive approach to the situation, and helps nobody.
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Date: 24/4/15 06:49 (UTC)This of course is just the top of the iceberg. People at both sides of the Rhodope Mountains know from first-hand experience of hundreds of stories of Greek farmers having been granted significant EU subsidies and using the money to buy houses, cars and yachts, or to run hotels - essentially for anything but what the money had actually been intended for. Despite all the yelling that we hear from those quarters right now, the data speaks for itself. And multiple anecdata do make data.
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Date: 24/4/15 17:39 (UTC)(frozen) (no subject)
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Date: 24/4/15 19:53 (UTC)Of course not. Then again, when people who know each other well—especially in real life—all move against anyone who questions a point raised by one of their circle of friends, one outside this circle of conviviality is drawn to the English word "gang" whether it is deserved or not.
The key to understanding whether or not this is happening should be to note how long the respondents in the common circle take before responding. Those in first might be accused of not, for example, following links and trying to understand another's argument.
Another key might be to look at, say, a comm and note who writes most of the OPs, then going back, again say, a year or two, and noting how the OP count shifts. And taking extra care to see how people outside that circle I mentioned are treated when they make their own comments. And perhaps seeing if the OP count of outsiders falls or rises as the (for lack of a better term) Rudeness Scale of Comments rises or falls.
Just sayin.'
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Date: 24/4/15 06:28 (UTC)-- from one of the so-called vipers.
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Date: 24/4/15 06:37 (UTC)personally attackingapproaching you with such an on-topic inquiry; and may you forgive me for the ignorance radiating through my question - it could be explained with the fact that I must've missed some of those awesomely informative posts of yours).(no subject)
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Date: 24/4/15 12:00 (UTC)(no subject)
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