Fetish and Constitutionalism
9/9/12 19:55In 'Does Australia have a Constitution?' Howard Schweber and Kenneth Mayer argue that a constitution has two components. First, it establishes the organs of the state, defining and legitimising them, and establishes the mechanisms for resolving political conflict. Second, it defines the limits of authority for those organs ('usually (but not necessarily) by defining a set of "rights"').
Schweber and Mayer contend that Australia lacks a constitution because the document called 'the Australian Constitution' fails to contain either of those components (short version: there is an organ of the State called 'the Prime Minister' but that organ is not mentioned in the Constitution, thus failing the first part; the limits of authority for those organs is not defined in the Constitution).
For discussion, I'm going to raise the question of whether Schweber and Mayer are correct when they assert these two components of a constitution, or whether they fall victim - as so many of us do - to the fetishing of constitutions.
There strong association in public discussion between constitutions and rights. Australia has been criticised for being one of the few liberal democracies in the world without a charter of rights. It should be noted that James Bryce, at one point one of the greatest liberal writers in the Anglophone world, praised the Australian Constitution for its lack of 'rights'. When Bryce was writing, he had already finished his book, The American Commonwealth, which claimed the growing inequality and increasing poverty within America was, in part, due to the American rights-discourse. The lack of rights in Australian constitutional law was indicative of its modernity, he said, and Australia's commitment to democracy.
Have we reached a point in political and legal theory where we entrench the concept of rights so deeply into our discourse that we are unable to challenge it? Is Schweber and Mayer's analysis a product of that fetishism of constitutions which sees constitutional law as, necessarily, a higher form -- a more moral form? -- of law?
Schweber and Mayer contend that Australia lacks a constitution because the document called 'the Australian Constitution' fails to contain either of those components (short version: there is an organ of the State called 'the Prime Minister' but that organ is not mentioned in the Constitution, thus failing the first part; the limits of authority for those organs is not defined in the Constitution).
For discussion, I'm going to raise the question of whether Schweber and Mayer are correct when they assert these two components of a constitution, or whether they fall victim - as so many of us do - to the fetishing of constitutions.
There strong association in public discussion between constitutions and rights. Australia has been criticised for being one of the few liberal democracies in the world without a charter of rights. It should be noted that James Bryce, at one point one of the greatest liberal writers in the Anglophone world, praised the Australian Constitution for its lack of 'rights'. When Bryce was writing, he had already finished his book, The American Commonwealth, which claimed the growing inequality and increasing poverty within America was, in part, due to the American rights-discourse. The lack of rights in Australian constitutional law was indicative of its modernity, he said, and Australia's commitment to democracy.
Have we reached a point in political and legal theory where we entrench the concept of rights so deeply into our discourse that we are unable to challenge it? Is Schweber and Mayer's analysis a product of that fetishism of constitutions which sees constitutional law as, necessarily, a higher form -- a more moral form? -- of law?
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Date: 9/9/12 11:47 (UTC)It may be not so important in civilized countries like Australia or GB. But for less developed countries the existence of constitution can serve a very good service in the long run.
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Date: 9/9/12 15:32 (UTC)Indeed, they only seem to be controlled by population. Because there is no such thing as population will indeed. People have different and conflicting interests. And the only choices that can be maid by the population are election or referendums. But the crowd is gullible and controllable and I can't believe that Hitler's electorate made an informed choice.
> How can you justify curtailing the right of populations to govern themselves?
Because the population will is abstraction and violation of rights is everyday reality.
But I agree with Churchill who said
I really don't see how the problem can be solved.
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Date: 9/9/12 22:20 (UTC)Is that your only response to this post?
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Date: 9/9/12 14:45 (UTC)Some are. The powerful remain free to challenge specific rights, though perhaps not the concept of rights per se. Since rights are a vehicle of power, they become avenues of power-mongering, as much as anything else. Rights are like money, I suppose. People are allowed to debate or challenge whether or not specific rights "exist", but usually the only rights that get debated are the rights of the maligned, marginal, and powerless.
In America, the right to own guns trumps the right to vote of poorer people. The rights of Wall St. are more protected than the rights of laborers. I think the combination of rights and capitalism have created an inherently unequal discourse in American politics.
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Date: 9/9/12 14:50 (UTC)I thought it was funny - which was the intent of the artist. There are many Americans who do not.
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Date: 9/9/12 14:55 (UTC)(no subject)
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Date: 9/9/12 15:33 (UTC)(no subject)
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Date: 9/9/12 16:01 (UTC)As for rights, the concept needs to be challenged. People don't seem to understand what rights are for. Rights inflation promotes an almost limitless number of rights, many silly, unenforceable or detrimental to society. Cafeteria Rightsism allows people to pick an choose which inalienable rights they feel like upholding, and which they choose to ignore.
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Date: 9/9/12 18:32 (UTC)No, I don't think so. Schweber/Mayer have defined a legal system's "constitution" as just the documents and the set of conventions that defines the extensions and limitations of legal actors' "powers." This requires no evaluative judgment of the sort you suggest here - whereby a constitution is in some sense "more moral," "higher," or capable of being "fetishized." It requires only identifying certain features of what we would describe as "secondary rules," in H.L.A. Hart's useful parlance, as those we normally attribute to things we call "constitutions." Broadly speaking, I think they are correct to identify power-granting and power-limiting functions as core features of any "constitution" we would recognize by the name.
When Bryce was writing, he had already finished his book, The American Commonwealth, which claimed the growing inequality and increasing poverty within America was, in part, due to the American rights-discourse. The lack of rights in Australian constitutional law was indicative of its modernity, he said, and Australia's commitment to democracy.
I am not familiar with Bryce's argument, but it would seem to be a mistake to confuse American "rights-discourse" as preoccupied by the kinds of limitations Schweber/Mayer have in mind when they refer to "rights." Whereas the former definitely reflects a reification of limitations on government power that is peculiarly (and perhaps dysfunctionally) American, the latter's focus is on the circumscription of power, however implemented (i.e., through explicit "rights" or otherwise).
I think Schweber/Mayer might fairly be said to fetishize one aspect of the legal rules we understand to be "constitutions," which is a "constitution"'s status as transcending and enduring throughout normal legislative and political processes. The problem with Australian constitutionalism, in their view, is that its grants of power are mediated only by political consensus, and its limitations on power are set (and always subject to revision) by the Australian judiciary. As such, the Australian "constitution" fails to be "stable" over time, which seems on their account to vitiate any claim that the Australian "constitution" truly has a power-granting function (because legislators can adjust their powers at will) or a power-limiting function (because the judiciary can decide at any time to revise and eliminate those limits).
I think they are wrong to fetishize this aspect of "constitutions," and I think their argument ultimately relies on distinctions from other constitutional traditions that don't hold up when these traditions are properly compared to one another in this respect. "Rights" in the American system, for example, are far more subject to judiciary emendation than they seem to acknowledge (and control of such emendation is a prominent element of our political process); and the distinction between the British and the Australian system comes down not to Parliamentary supremacy or convention-following but the ultimate textual bases for those systems' respective "constitutions" (a curious turn, since they also describe the assumption "only a written text can satisfy the definitional requirements of a 'constitution'" as "a case of American parochialism"). But this is not a fetishization of "constitutions" or of rights, as such.
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Date: 9/9/12 22:27 (UTC)(no subject)
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Date: 10/9/12 11:40 (UTC)I think you summarized it all with one sentence:
The lack of rights in Australian constitutional law was indicative of its modernity, he said, and Australia's commitment to democracy.
If a lack of rights is modern.
WAR IS PEACE,
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY,
and IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH
.
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Date: 10/9/12 13:32 (UTC)(no subject)
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