In my alternate history timeline:

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Involving Israel and Palestine, I've actually developed my alternate timeline version of a peace treaty between Israel and Palestine, and I'm curious what people here would make of it as a hypothetical treaty.

As a background, the Treaty is preceded by Arafat deciding to bluff Sharon into shooting first in an egregiously stupid manner to illustrate that the wars are all Israel's fault, not Palestine's. Sharon decides to let Arafat be Arafat and thus Arafat betrays his true face and then he moves in with an Operation Defensive Shield-style operation. Instead the two sides bluff themselves straight away from OTL's Second Intifada and in the process the discussion of a withdrawal on the OTL (means Our Timeline) model from the Gaza Strip touches off a war between the Hamas/Islamic Jihad unified Islamic Popular Front and Arafat's Palestinian National Authority. Arafat being Arafat, he refuses to accept *anyone* challenging his rule of Palestine and especially when he stands to gain a base to take the war to Israel even more personally (Arafat never actually wants a peace, he just can't restart the war).

The result is a prolonged and bitter Palestinian Civil War between the two factions that ends with the PNA victorious, Arafat killed by the IPF (which gives Abbas a major rally 'round the flag opportunity he easily exploits), and the PNA negotiating a treaty with Israel with both sides remembering the Oslo Accords and the Civil War. As per OTL Abbas is pragmatic and more willing to consider a genuine peace, but with a civil war among Palestinians happening and leaving Israelis and their settlers alone in the process, Israel has less fear of the appearance of *a* Palestine.

Thus, the treaty itself. Any settlement that's willing to accept rule by the PNA as the State of Palestine would become semi-autonomous, paying taxes to the state of Palestine in return for the state of Palestine guaranteeing all property and existing water rights for said settlements. The settlements deep in the interior, such as on the Dead Sea and the ones that bisect the state of Palestine are all removed, in exchange for which Palestine forfeits any claim to Palestinian homes and cities in Israel proper. Thus the Palestinian Right of Return is settled with a mutual transfer of some lands and the Palestinian state gaining authority over some settlements but of a limited variety. Likewise, Israel gains that settlements that are extremely large and densely populated actually are able to stay intact, and the end of any Palestinian claims to a state that involve territory now ruled by Israel, in perpetuity, while knowing also that the settlements are legally guaranteed not only self-governance but no interdiction of water-rights, which the state of Palestine concedes in part for the cynical reason of needing a means to secure global approval and to avoid risking Israel having too much violence against itself in the removal process that might collapse the process before it starts.

The inevitable tensions with Jordan and Egypt that an independent Palestine would actually lead to leads to Palestine gaining light artillery and some categories of small arms, but situated purely on the borders with Jordan and Egypt, at least initially, and the emergence of a Palestinian Army, proper, would unfold over gradual time with mandated requirements on the part of both sides to show goodwill. In return Palestinians officially recognize the state of Israel on its existing borders, while Palestine itself is recognized as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (but has no claim to Hamula and definitely none to the Golan Heights).

In Palestine Christian communities are also free to apply for semi-autonomous status, and East Jerusalem becomes the legal capital of Palestine but in practice the state is governed from Nablus, not East Jerusalem, while Palestine cannot interfere with or bar the rights of Jews in the semi-autonomous territories to practice Judaism in any way, shape, form, or fashion, and secures the property of Jews in the settlements, as they are legally citizens of Palestine with full rights (and in practical terms for the first generation wealthier and with more rights than Palestinians themselves). In secret protocols to this treaty Palestine also agrees to accept Israeli money and investment in rebuilding itself after the civil war, while in a less positive sense early Palestinian history sees some extremely Orwellian rewrites that virtually write out Israel altogether (yes, this is not a nice thing, but this is an attempt at realism, not optimism), and that presents the history of Palestine as the history of Fatah, not the history of any other groups and with Israel barely at all mentioned, as opposed to repeating the usual anti-Semitic slurs and libels against Jews in Palestinian education (and that instead of actually writing more honest views of history, the Palestinian state in this scenario just deletes Israel altogether is a sign of which end of the sliding scale of cynicism the timeline itself is on).



Likewise, with Palestine forfeiting the Right of Return, recognizing that Israel not only is a legitimate state but its boundaries are legitimate and that at least some of the settlements will remain intact, and any claim to a full-scale army with heavy, offensive equipment, the expanded Palestinian National Authority Self-Defense Forces expanded and improved by the Civil War in Palestine are the basis of the new Palestinian Army, but are not expanded for the first years of adherence to the ATL's Treaty of Paris of 2004. Thus, this is *a* variant of a peace treaty between the two states, intended to lead to the existence of Palestine by 2008.

What do you guys think of this idea? Would it be workable? Obviously this is not what either side is offering in real life, this is not for the discussion of historical realities and failures of agreements, such as the PLO's refusal to accept terms in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, or the failure of the Oslo Accords. That is a discussion worth having elsewhere. This is about the scenario in the Alternate history timeline. This is a very important disclaimer and I politely ask any commenters to adhere to it.

Comments

[sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com]

I just don't see any semblence of peace being possible without either A: a major cultural revolution, or B: One side beating the other so badly that the question becomes moot.

In the later scenario my money is on the Isreal.

Strategically Isreal's prime motivator is not the palestinians but their nieghbors. As long as Egypt, Syria, Iran, Jordan, etc... remain a credible threat, Isreal will do exactly as much as the have to to keep a lid on the Palestinians and little else. They won't withdraw to the 1968 borders for the simple reason that those borders where impossible to defend against any serious incursion. (You can hardly expect the IDF to cede high-ground overlooking their capital and major population centers to the enemy)

A full on Palestinian civil war would certainly be a political boon but the question becomes how does everyone else respond?

Does the IDF pick sides or stay nuetral?

What about Egypt?

If the other Arab countries start picking sides how do the Isrealies respond?

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Well, in this case the Palestinian Civil War is the product of the two sides seeing that not shooting at each other can work and is actually in their best interests. Arafat just like OTL tries to control everything but when Sharon broaches the idea of a Gaza withdrawal Hamas and Islamic Jihad start the civil war, kill Arafat (turning him into a martyr), Israel decides to let the Palestinians widen the war and give them a blank check to drop the hammer and instead the Palestinians limit the war to themselves *exactly to keep Israel out of the situation*. By this time the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are well under-way, the Palestinians embraced the War on Terror as a means to crush Hamas and Islamic Jihad and gain access to weaponry (and Bush being Bush they actually do better with this than you'd think).

As a result by the time the civil war's over, both sides want a return to the nobody shooting at anybody phase. So the cultural revolution aspect's already happened. The other Arab states are more focused on the Iraq War and the potential for Iranian expansion (and I should note that the USA ITTL is thinking Palestine coming into existence will end the Iraq War by itself, and when Bush believes that he won't listen to anyone else any more than IOTL, so Iraq's going to Hell in a handbasket, meaning there is a very good reason for the Arab states to be looking at Iraq, not Israel).

So ITTL, while Palestine does come into existence, the other Arab states don't exactly have the opportunity to do anything because 1) Iran's rise is much stronger than IOTL, and 2) the Arab states have a good reason to fear the clusterfuck that is Iraq will go from local to regional thanks to the USA's naivete. Keep in mind that Bush is a man who's very idealistic, and that his guys *were* quite stupid IOTL, ITTL, with Saddam hung and peace about to break out between Israel and Palestine, they make much worse mistakes.....

[sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com]

Ok so I was a little shaky on the point of departure.


So ITTL, while Palestine does come into existence, the other Arab states don't exactly have the opportunity to do anything because 1) Iran's rise is much stronger than IOTL, and 2) the Arab states have a good reason to fear the clusterfuck that is Iraq will go from local to regional thanks to the USA's naivete. Keep in mind that Bush is a man who's very idealistic, and that his guys *were* quite stupid IOTL, ITTL, with Saddam hung and peace about to break out between Israel and Palestine, they make much worse mistakes.....

Such as?

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Well, for one thing assuming the Iraqi insurgency gives a flying fuck about the Israel-Palestine War and thus believing in spite of the evidence that the signing of the treaty will produce an instant peace there. So Bush spends two, not one, years completely blind to the reality that the war is not only there but is growing at a much larger scale than IOTL. It's when the peace has been established, the settlements are starting to be removed, some are applying for Palestinian semi-autonomy, and the Iraq War is seeing full-scale pitched battles in multiple areas at once that Bush wakes up to reality with a vengeance. It takes a while and the US disillusionment with the war is somewhat greater than IOTL because reality is reality, not prone by wishful thinking.

And yes, the POD here is that there is no Second Intifada, Sharon and Arafat never make their mutual actions here, and Palestine as such also has Hamas ground into a fine powder by its own civil war, along with Islamic Jihad, both sides trying to leave Israel out of it lest it smash them both up (which Sharon wants to do and is frustrated at failure to actually get there, but he's hardly going to risk unifying the Palestinian sides against him, either). It's a very cynical view on the whole thing, which is a reason I view it through the more negative lenses of the ATL, not the more positive ones.

[sandwichwarrior.livejournal.com]

The problem is that unless your POD is prior to the invasion you can't really escalate the Iraq war without either A: changing the balance of forces involved or B: having multiple people holding the idiot ball.

If anything, Palestinian unrest would be a drain on the Iraqi insurgency, not fuel for the fire. Forcing the international jihadis to split their attention is only going to help the local nationalist militias and in the end make the Coalition's job easier.

If you really need to be pessimistic, and leave the US in a quagmire worse than IOTL what you should do is let the Nationalists/SOI beat the Sadrists themselves (a long-shot but not impossible, especially if the Sadrists aren't getting the international reinforcments they got IOTL) and in doing so consolidate public support around them. Invent a charismatic war hero/leader for the nationalists and set him up as a competing interest to the US installed provisional government. From there simply borrow some plot points from Syriana (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0365737/) and call it done.

As for Isreal/Palestine itself I find unlikely that the Hamas and Islamic Jihad would display the kind of restraint you seem to have attributed to them. If anything they'd want to widen the conlict as much as possible to force the Isrealies and/or international community to get involved and force their opponents within Palestine into an "enemy mine" situation. "Hafiz, my friend, who would you rather fight? Me or the infadels?"

Of course you also use these very efforts precipitate the cultural revolution by having them backfire and turn everyone (even their erstwhile allies) against them.

Finally there's the question of what is everyone else doing while all this is going down?

How do Isreal's traditional enemies respond to the possibility of a palestinian state? Are the supportive or do the try to sabotage it? Lebanon and Syria both have a lot of political capitol invested in keeping the conlict bubbling afterall.

Likewise How does the existance of a palestinian state and possible nationalist uprising in Iraq effect the greater political landscape? Does the "Arab Spring" kick off early? Is it bigger or smaller than IOTL?

Do the turks start distancing themselves for the EU to kick off the Pan-Arab union their more grandious politicians are always talking about?

What about the Kurds?

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

It is prior to the invasion and to the 9/11 attacks itself. The POD is in 2001. 9/11 leads to Arafat embracing the War on Terror, which is a crucial aspect of the Palestinian Civil War. And I don't think my particular scenario has either showing restraint, what they want is the scenario we have now: control of an Israeli-free Gaza Strip, what they get is something else again. Israel's enemies have bigger problems, namely ATL Iraq, not the Palestine issue at this point. And of course the Islamic Popular Front is less against widening the war so much as under the view that Arafat will give up and then they can start shooting at Israel. Arafat just sees his interest as rooted in crushing them altogether.

The rise of Palestine has huge effects on the international landscape. I'm just getting to this part of the TL, but at a bare minimum the Kurds, Tamil Tigers, Kashmir, Kosovo, and all equivalent issues all over the world just got a shot in the arm, leading to Palestine not being recognized by several states fearful of the precedent it makes. Turkey in particular will not be friendly to Palestine.

During all this, the Iraq Insurgency, with Bush viewing the resolution of the Palestine issue as a magic bullet to end the insurgency on the cheap, starts transforming into the emergence of a neo-Ba'ath stronghold in the north facing the Kurds (who naturally get bolder after Palestine comes into existence), where those two engage mainly in bushwhacking, the Al-Qaeda in Iraq that turns into a giant irregular force, and a Sunni and Shia regular force. The TL itself notes that if the USA hadn't been convinced that Palestine would undercut the insurgency the Iraqi insurgency would be smashed earlier. The USA is not convinced of this, and becomes complacent, leading to Very Bad Things.

One of the more unpleasant side effects, to boot, of the rise of Palestine from a global situation is that the other Arab states soon resent that a separate state of Palestine would have influence over Palestinian refugees, groups who due to the state's neglect of Right of Return now have regional influence on a larger scale than their situation indicated.

With a POD in April, 2001, the whole course of the War on Terror becomes very different. And I might emphasize again that Arafat is never shown in the actual TL to be looking for peace, he's trying to get a better angle to stab Israel in the back. He just gets killed in the civil war instead of pulling it off.

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=5493563&postcount=1

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

How do you deal with the Israeli right wing's urge to dominate the region through the Balkanization of neighboring states?

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Israel removes the settlers in most of the West Bank settlements and also disengages from the Gaza Strip as it did historically, with the rather bigger difference that it hands over the territory in a stage by stage process to the state of Palestine. The whole TL is built on the premise that when Arafat tries to bluff Sharon into shooting first, Sharon decides to bluff Arafat into shooting first instead, thus peace accidentally breaks out.

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

That does not obviate the effort on the part of certain Israeli elements to sow the seeds of civil discord in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

And which Israelis were those? The major cause of internal upheaval in Lebanon and Jordan that wasn't Israeli was the PLO itself. You see, Arafat had this fixation on getting a Hanoi to Israel's Saigon, and he twice in succession tried to overthrow two of his neighbors to get it. Arafat was an idiot damn fool who couldn't win a battle, let alone a war, and so both of his attempts actually failed. Syria's upheavals haven't needed Israeli help any at all, and Egypt has actually been Israel's friend under Mubarak, not its enemy. The new government after that terrorist attack is unlikely to be too hostile to Israel right now as it is.

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

The Lebanese Phalagists were misinformed by Israelis on the PLO's involvement in the assassination of their leader. That misinformation led to the massacres are Sabra and Shatila. That is only one of the many ways that Israelis have sown the seeds of hate.

[rimpala.livejournal.com]

Since it's all hypothetical it's kind of nice to think that maybe, maybe the three major Abrahamic religions could've been excellent to each other and not build up millenia of resentment that probably would never be resolved.