Latin America: the end of the left turn?

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

In the early 2000s, a surprising process (for some) began in Latin America - it was called the "left turn". Simply put, it was a noticeable swing of the political moods to the left, both in the moderate (Brazil, Argentina) and the more radical (Venezuela, Bolivia) sense. It came as a surprise particularly to those who were already busy praising the various neo-liberal theories of world development that were supposed to bring the ultimate utopia. Indeed, after suffering a series of political routs in the 80s and 90s, leftism had been pushed into a corner, and it was sure to welcome this new process as a sort of resurrection of the socialist ideas across the South American continent.

The main reason for this "leftist mega-turn" was the neo-liberal policies of the Latin American governments in the late 90s. Initially, the results looked promising for them: foreign investment soared in the region, economic growth accelerated, especially in the pre-'97 crisis years when the general GDP growth on the continent often passed beyond 5%+. But with the start of the Asian crisis, Latin America found itself in a critical condition once more. The capital inflow plunged sharply. In 1997 the region had enjoyed a massive growth of foreign investment, reaching well beyond $70 bn... and just four or five years later - a meager $5 bn. That was a disaster.

In the early 2000s another crisis followed, caused by the depression in the US. It hit international trade the most and caused a serious damage on the most export-orientated countries of Latin America. Argentina defaulted (causing hunger riots and the departure of one president after another), and Brazil was on the verge of bakruptcy as well. Thus, many hastened to conclude that the policy of neo-liberalism had finally completely discredited itself in Latin America. Most surveys across the region conducted in those years showed that 2/3 of the population deemed the neo-liberal economic system as "bad", or "very bad", claiming that privatisation hadn't brought any positive results, nearly half favoured a bigger role for the government in the economy. So it was no surprise that this was the soil where the seeds of the new "leftist turn" blossomed.

Some dramatic changes in the political and information sphere (originating in the dictatorial regimes of the 80s) were also a significant prerequisite for the change. Representative democracy, freedom of the press, and the rapid development and globalisation of the media brought a situation where the previously fragmented lower segments of society (including the indigenous communities), were able to forge their unity and realise that they were a majority holding real power. In turn, a need for new, young, charismatic (and populist) leaders who could serve as role models, also emerged. And indeed, the leaders of the new turn emerged from the circles of the local populist politicians, community organisers and activists for the most part - like Chávez in Venezuela and Morales in Bolivia. And no surprise, Cuba was seen as an example to emulate, similarly to the way Qatar became the model for the Islamists during the Arab Spring. But Cuba's contribution was not just ideological, it was practical. Both Morales and Chávez would've had no chance of holding their power in the first rough years of their rule, without the help of their Cuban advisors and experts.

The left turn of the 2000s had a bit more serious reason compared to the earlier Latin American radical movements in the 60s/70s, whose pinnacle had been reached with the presidency of Allende in Chile and Alvarado in Peru. So the new "left turn" also affected the leaders of such bigger countries like Brazil and Argentina (along with Chile again), but in a far less radical form of leftism, something close to centre-leftism.

As the left-wing movement in Latin America was reformed and became well noticeable and its influence grew, a division into radicals (such as Chaves) and centre-leftists (like former Brazilian president Lula) started to become visible as well. The radicals came into power in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua; and the centre-left started ruling in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and until recently, Chile. On the international scene, the countries ruled by the radical left were united in a bloc which became known as the Bolivarian alliance (ALBA):

The most significant divisive line between the radicals and the centre-left was about their approach to political democracy. For the centre-leftists, representative democracy and pluralism was the core value of society, they supported the existing constitutions, the principle of the division of power, and they didn't try stomping on their political opponents (for the most part). Meanwhile, for the leftist radicals, democracy was just a means towards achieving their goals. They were trying to marginalise the opposition, using all the administrative resources of their governments. Meanwhile, the centre-left in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay were busy  reinforcing the democratic institutions. Hugo Chaves and his supporters practically dismantled the system of representative democracy and substituted it with a new order in Venezuela, while Lula empowered and included ever wider segments of the Brazilian society in the political process.

The most particular feature of the radicals was their reliance solely on the lowest layers of society. For example, Chávez and his team systematically tinkered with the interests of the various social groups, and systematically drove the opposition into a corner. The radicals would sooner or later make an assault on the big and middle capital, in their attempt to put their hands on all sectors of the economy. In contrast, in Brazil the centre-leftists did their best not to step on the toes of the business circles (for which they were often reproached by Chávez and his supporters). During Lula's reign, his VP was the big textile magnate José Alencar, and now his post is occupied by another centrist, Michel Temer. This way, certain segments of society received a clear signal that the government was ready to compromise for the sake of consensus. The centrists tried to find the economic balance between government and the market. And they must have largely achieved it, which is seen by Brazil's current state of the economy, and their visible presence in the BRICS club.

In contrast to the centrist bloc (Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina), who were trying to achieve some consensus between a broad array of political and social powers, the radicals as a rule were more prone to confrontation. In Venezuela under Chávez, the relations with big business and the Catholic church were damaged beyond repair, and the media were put under total control. This course of events was an inevitable consequence from the radicals' aspirations to create a statist model of "21st century neo-socialism" as some'd call it, a state within the state, where radicals would rule supreme, often with the use of force and intimidation, and where the foreign policy was directed by expansionist aspirations, conducted through the Venezuelan-Cuban alliance which was trying to bring other countries into its orbit (like Nicaragua).

The policies of the centre-left is comparable to the actions of the classical European social-democracy, and is committed to the gradual transformation of these societies, without abrupt, dramatic leaps and plunges.

Despite its worldwide fame, the "left turn" in Latin America started to meet an increasing resistance in the late 2000s. In 2006 the leftist candidate Lopez Obrador was defeated on a scandalous presidential election in Mexico. In 2010, in Chile, a rightist politician was elected for the first time since Pinochet's regime (it was millionaire Sebastian Pinera).

In El Salvador, earlier this year the local left (former rebels), lost the election to the Conservative party. And finally, the most striking blow for the left was the coup in Honduras, where, despite the support from almost all Latin American countries, the leftist president Manuel Zelaya lost his post. Of course, there were some successful moments for the left, like the victory of former Maoist and leftist populist Ollanta Humala in Peru.

One of the reasons for the end of the string of remarkable successes for the leftist forces in Latin America, of course, was the position of the US. But it's unlikely that the US would have such a big effect and importance, were it not for all the problems that the left had already been inflicting upon itself throughout the whole region. No doubt, today in Latin America there's a demand for a new type of policies and ideas, as the younger generation is completely unfamiliar with the memory of the old-style dictatorships, these realities are completely alien to them; and meanwhile vast parts of these societies are still drowning in poverty and lawlessness. The centre-left policies, for the most part, have been directed at strengthening the position of the middle class (and the business elites), which sooner or later tend to tilt things into a liberal, even centre-right direction. Meanwhile, the radical policies of nationalisation of anything and everything of some value, do not have the potential to effectively mitigate the social conflicts, and inevitably cause a backlash, and demands for a different sort of policy.

As a result of these social changes, both the centre-left and the left-wing radicals have preserved only a small set of advantages in their respective countries, and have lost much of their relevancy. Not in one country where the "left turn" had won, did its supporters enjoy very high popularity ratings. Not overwhelmingly high, anyway. But let's see what I'm talking about...

     

In Brazil, on the last presidential election in 2010 Dilma Rousseff only won after a 2nd round, and she got 56% of the vote. And this, despite all the social and economic success of her predecessor and mentor, and his immense popularity across a large palette of social groups (not just the lefist base). It's far from certain that in 2 years, the already matured Brazilian middle class would give her the chance of re-election.

In Argentina, the president Cristina Kirschner won 54% in 2011. But for many, this success is mostly due to her personal charisma and the subconscious associations people make to Evita Peron. Because Cristina is seriously ill with cancer, her participation in the next election is in question. In this case, her leftist-Peronist party could be heading into difficult times.

The Peruvian president Ollanta Humala, who won the election last year (from his second attempt), was only able to snatch 51% of the vote. It should be also noted that in this case the support of the numerous indigenous population worked in his favour, and also the popular distrust to his main rival - the daughter of former dictator Fujimori, and the direct support from Nobel leaureate Vargas Llosa. After coming to power in such circumstances, Humala was constrained in his actions by the Peruvian elite, which had shut all doors to him earlier in 2006, when he had been naive enough to promise that he'd emulate Chávez' example. The elite only gave him green light from the second attempt, and only after he clearly quit his intentions to perform radical reforms.

The only relatively stable position is that of Bolivian president Evo Morales. He won 60% in 2009. The strength of his position is largely due to the fact hat he's an indigenous nationalist, and Bolivia is the only country in the region where the indigenous population constitutes the majority (in fact 2/3). Actually Morales is not Bolivia's first indigenous president (as some have occasionally claimed), but he's definitely the first indigenous nationalist to become head of state, and openly defend the interests of the indigenous population. We should add the big natural resources in the country, Venezuela and Brazil actively investing in their extraction and processing. That has its downsides as well, as became evident from the political crisis in 2008, caused by the wealthy landowners in the east of the country (they even wanted to secede at some point, and there were accusations that they were being sponsored by the US to cause unrest). Morales managed to deal with the problem somehow. So, Bolivia is now enjoying a somewhat decent economic situation. Let's also remember that coca production is legal in Bolivia, and let's face it - much of it is processed into cocaine and shipped to the world markets, contrary to Morales' claims that it's just a local tradition of the indigenous people. This has caused a lot of tensions with the US. And ultimately, despite the success of the Morales regime, its stability depends on the support from Venezuela and Brazil, and it's not clear how long that's going to last.

The Venezuelan persident Hugo Chávez is not just one of the leaders of the "left turn", he's its symbol and flag bearer. His country's prosperity mostly rests upon its vast oil reserves: for the last decade and more, Chávez has conducted broad reforms, struggling against a strong domestic opposition, and leading an active policy of support for various leftist regimes in Latin America. And playing the role of one of USA's most prominent opponents on the international arena. Though Chávez has a strong charisma, and the oil incomes provide the basis for his social programs, the explosive increase of crime, the rampant inflation, the deterioration of the business conditions and other factors have led to a drop in the popularity of the left in Venezuela. On the last parliamentary election a couple of years ago, the United Socialist Party lost a lot of positions, shrinking from 68% to 56%.

Nowadays, the regime Chávez has forged, is at the brink of collapse. The leader of the Venezuelan socialists is very gravely, probably terminally ill. Nevertheless, he'll run on the next presidential election in October. This decision shows that for all these years, Chávez never managed to craft a legitimate mechanism of power transition that would bypass the democratic procedures, China-style. And neither did he find an adequate successor to prepare to sit in his chair after he's gone. Neither a natural leader who'd be able to keep the opposition at bay with his charisma and determination, nor a strong-hand who'd be able to establish a lasting dictatorship that would have the capacity to ban all elections and parties and sustain the regime for long enough. Paradoxically, the "left turn" which began as a consequence of economic and political changes in that society, now largely depends on the fate of one single man. So the ill president is forced to go to battle again, relying on the magic craftsmanship of his Cuban doctors.

In case Chávez dies, the most likely scenario would be either the bloody downfall, or the gradual dismantling of his Bolivarian republic. As much as today Venezuela is the economic and political pillar of the radical wing of leftism in Latin America, the vanishing of the Venezuelan aid would lead to a rapid decline of the other populist regimes in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua. And they'd risk falling back into political isolation.

Meanwhile, the situation in the countries where the centre-left presently rules, would certainly be much better. The major industrialised countries in the region, Brazil and Argentina, will preserve the opportunity to create a developed welfare state, if they play their cards wisely. However, in this case we shouldn't rule out a coming to power of more rightist politicians, or at least an adjustment of the policies into a right-of-centre direction, under the pressure of the business circles and the ever more influential middle class. That's a natural process. And the pendulum will be swinging to the other direction again, even if slowly. But maybe that's the key - the gradual, quiet transition from one state to another, as opposed to the turbulent, forceful, abrupt swings we've been witnessing over the years since the end of the colonial era.

Comments

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

I think that sometimes people really over-exaggerate the influence of the USA in Latin American affairs. Under GWB and Obama the USA hasn't really stepped in to the degree that it did under say, Woodrow Wilson or even JFK. Latin American politics can and does see ideological shifts without US involvement, it's an easy excuse for both sides of the LA spectrum to bash each other without really solving anything. For one thing if the USA really were involved our involvement would be ham-handed and end very badly in more cases than not. As to the survival of Morales in a better sense than the other Chavez clones and Chavez himself, for one thing Morales really *is* doing good things. Most of Chavez's mini-mes are just caudillos in leftist drag, and sooner or later people get sick of dictatorship when it brings repression with no rewards.

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

Let us not forget the horrors of the Reagan/Bush 41 years. That is the kind of interference that Latin America can do without.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Honestly, Reagan was just par for the course. His supporting the Contras is no different than say, JFK authorizing an actual invasion of Cuba (and I don't give a damn that Eisenhower planned it, the actual invasion was the result of JFK's........editing, let's leave it at that).

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

Reagan's actions went farther and deeper than simply supporting the Contras. He bolstered death squad regimes in a variety of countries. The elder Bush went so far as to invade Panama, leaving mass graves in his wake.

JFK made significant changes to the original Cuban invasion plans with significant reductions in the involvement of the US military. The invasion site was shifted to an indefensible position. The suspicions that JFK was merely disposing of an inherited exile problem seem to have some foundation.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

Yes, and how is this uniquely more horrific than other US intervention? Like for instance the CIA subsidizing a general to launch a dictatorship that used dogs to rape people, or the US school of the dictators?

[sophia-sadek.livejournal.com]

I am not familiar with the dog rapist incident. The Latinos I have heard from much preferred Carter and Clinton to Reagan or the Bushes.

BTW, you must admit that the School of the Americas gets more support from the Republican side of the aisle.

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

That was Pinochet, at least according to the war crimes trials.

I would say that perhaps it does, but given how many of the most belligerent Cold Warriors who engaged in the most wide-sweeping dickery were Democrats, not Republicans.......the whole concept is indefensible, and in any event has nothing to do with what I actually said, which is that neither Bush nor Obama have done all that much in Latin America. That makes this 21st Century USA is the evil mastermind paranoia akin to those guys in the Iranian (joke of a) parliament trying to get a bill done to close the Straits of Hormuz in terms of both accuracy and relevance.

[onefatmusicnerd.livejournal.com]

El Salvador...

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

It shouldn't be a surprise that the only trigger a foreign issue could stir among a predominantly US audience, is the aspect of US involvement in said issue, even if it's of secondary, if not tertiary importance.

But fine, here's something for the news-hungry US audience: Iran.

In an effort to bypass the international sanctions, Iran is looking for alternative partners among America's foes: more particularly, Venezuela. Quietly and without too much parading, Iran is trying to broaden its ties in Latin America and gain access to the foreign markets and the coveted natural resources. In the beginning of this year, Ahmadinnerjacket visited Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba and Nicaragua - three of those, part of the Bolivarian alliance. Iran has vowed to invest millions in various projects in the region - the mines of Ecuador, and an ammo factory in Venezuela among them. It's "the foes of my foe are my friends" approach, and the search for sideways for legitimising their regime.

Iran has now made the partnership with Latin America "a top priority". But those countries don't look likely to throw themselves right into the arms of the ayatollahs, because they're growing increasingly weary of the threat of sanctions. Really, any sort of partnership with Iran looks more and more toxic these days. And it's not like the Latin American countries are not hugely dependent on doing good business with the US. Iran may be tickling the situation a bit, but they can't make too big inroads there without stirring a few hives. And the leaders in the region know that too well, and some of them wouldn't shy away from exploiting the subject for their own populist goals.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Here's something curious. The congress in Argentina recently voted for the nationalization of the oil company YPF, and seizing it from Repsol control. The majority in favor was overwhelming, 207 to 32. It can't be that Cristina has such a vast support among the political circles, so there must be something else there.

This is in line with a mass wave of nationalizations in Latin America, most probably in an attempt to meet the deepening crisis, especially the energy crisis, with drastic measures. But the downside of this is that it'll discourage foreign investment. Spain has already threatened to withdraw all its investments from the country (not that Spain is in a very good shape right now, but it's a clear sign of a backlash).

The re-nationalization of YPF in particular was explained with the excuse that Repsol hadn't invested enough for infrastructure, and it hindered the oil and gas production. But all this will in turn force Argentina to import fuels from abroad, and raise the prices in all sectors.

This coincides with Bolivia also nationalizing a big Spanish-owned company, the biggest electricity supplier ETE, owned by Red Electrica. Morales ordered the army to storm the company's HQ in Cochabamba a couple of months ago. His excuse? Very similar to Cristina's: "They hadn't invested 'adequately' enough in Bolivia". Spain is being pushed away, it would seem. Just when Spain itself is in deep shit, Latin America is pushing a dagger through its back. Or so it would seem on the surface.

Deeper down, these seem more likely to be the final desperate moves before the economic domino starts tumbling down across these countries. And when all major sectors are nationalized and they still don't work any better than they used to until now (for lack of adequate infrastructure and staff), there'll be nowhere further to fall back to. And there'll be turmoil. Would the CIA be blamed again, then? I'd bet on "Yes".

[allhatnocattle.livejournal.com]

Curious. Has Chinese investment been sought after? Seeing how Chinese oil companies are buying up oil in Canada ($15billion for Nexen) (http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/Will+Canada+China+Nexen/6979305/story.html) I think China is more then willing to invest if a country is open to investment.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

It's business. After all, the Chinese have the money and will to invest. Isn't the free market a beautiful thing? ;)

[prog-expat.livejournal.com]

"...Latin America is pushing a dagger through its back."

Par for the course for Latin American politics.

[peristaltor.livejournal.com]

Interesting.

But the downside of this is that it'll discourage foreign investment.

Ah, but do they need foreign investment? When they have oil, all they really need to do is extract what they need and sit on the rest. Over time, the price increases will allow them to pay for foreign workers to do what they need.

As opposed to watching the foreign company profit from their resource.

[luvdovz.livejournal.com]

Do they need foreign investment? Not foreign per se, but they do need investment, especially since their infrastructure is far from perfect, and someone has to bring the know-how for its development. After that? Who knows. Maybe they'd kick all foreigners out and sit on their own natural wealth, like Russia does.

Or they could opt for a more open approach.

[root-fu.livejournal.com]

Good post. [: