Pass the baton

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

In the middle of his campaign for a 4th term, last year Hugo Chávez announced that he had defeated cancer, and had forgotten about the whole thing already. He then went on to win the election in October by 55%. But since then, his health has deteriorated drastically, and as we know, in the end of November he was transported to Cuba for treatment. He came back with a very different story from there, hinting that he could not just lose his power but also his life. In a TV address he confirmed that it was imperative that he should undergo a fourth surgery intervention because his cancer had come back.

Nowadays his true condition is practically a state secret in Venezuela, and no one really knows what type of cancer it really is, or any other details to that matter. The power circle around him are already preparing for the inevitable, and Nicolás Maduro (his foreign minister) is effectively the acting president (and is being tipped to succeed him on the presidential post). Maduro is now leading the United Socialist Party and will definitely be the front-runner on the next election, which is sure to come soon. Within 30 days after it's established that Chávez cannot perform his presidential duties, in fact. And the inauguration was supposed to happen tomorrow, but now it'll be postponed until further notice. Which tells a lot about what may be coming ahead for Venezuela.

The surgery was almost a month ago, but the speculations about his health condition still abound. He hasn't appeared in public ever since, and only scattered info trickles down to the public. Maduro himself admits that Chávez' situation is "complicated and delicate", although he did call the surgery "successful" and announced that the president is conscious and stabilised. But in some of the statements coming from various party leaders it's obvious that the situation is dire. The New Year celebrations were cancelled throughout Venezuela, and the thousands of Chávez claques kept re-tweeting things like "In 2012 I wept with Chávez, I loved Chávez, I voted Chávez, I laughed with Chávez and I prayed for Chávez. In 2013 I'll keep being alongside Chávez". Very touching indeed.

The new term is supposed to start on Jan 10, but obviously Chávez won't be available. His party are still refusing to give a clear date about possible election, while the pressure is mounting from the opposition. And there's of course a sense of hope for change in the regime, now that Chávez could be out of the game (for good?) Even if he lives, he'll hardly be in such a condition as to keep ruling. Hence the hope of the opposition that, come the next election, they'd have a real chance against Maduro. He's a former bus driver and union leader, and a close ally to the president ever since he came into Venezuelan politics. One of Maduro's key statements was "Even beyond this life, we'll still be loyal to Chávez". He lacks the charisma of his mentor, but he often likes to imitate his bombastic style and lampoon the "evil American imperialists" and the "bourgeois traitors" in hours-long speeches, the same way Chávez and Castro did. What's more, he enjoys Cuba's support. But he still remains a pale shadow of his boss.

Despite the terminal illness of its patron, Chavismo, this specific mixture of populist nationalism plus militarist conservatism plus hardline socialism, still hasn't lost its appeal among the Venezuelans. The heavy-hand approach to ruling and the intensive social policies of Dear Leader, mostly financed by the nationalised oil industry, have earned him lots of supporters from among the marginalised poor class. But they've also brought him an aura of a merciless dictator. Even without him, the ruling party easily won a landslide victory at the local election in mid December. The opposition only managed to hold its positions in 3 states, and was crushed in 20. Miranda, the wealthiest state, kept its governor Henrique Capriles who had been Chávez' latest presidential rival (44% at the last presidential election). So he's in a pretty good position to be tipped by the opposition on the next election as well, and face Maduro.

The big question now is, could Chavismo keep dominating Venezuelan politics without Chávez. His illness is not just a threat for one person, but for an entire system that's been built around his persona. The Economist recently cited some polls that hint that Capriles, who for the first time has managed to consolidate the fractured opposition, is far more popular than any of the potential candidates of the ruling party. And still, the fact that the president has personally picked up Maduro for his successor could level the field. Especially if we take in consideration the growing sympathies for his party, because of Chávez' personal tragedy. That's why the moment is extremely important for Capriles and the opposition, and the final outcome will largely depend on the way they'll handle the situation.

In their analyses, many experts conclude that the opposition forces will probably approach a possible second attempt at the presidency from a weaker starting position, since Capriles has previously lost this battle once. It'll be a major challenge for them to even appear as a united bloc on the coming election. So Maduro is still the front-runner in a race that hasn't even begun yet.

Chavism is probably able to survive even without Chávez, because it seems it's already deeply rooted into the very structure of the state, in all the institutions of power, particularly the military. In the short-term, the Chavist forces will certainly remain united. In a longer term, there's the example of Peronism which successfully outlived Juan Perón in Argentina. And no doubt, whether dead or alive, Chávez will keep casting his long shadow over Venezuelan politics for years to come.

And still, his absence will inevitably shake up the country, and promise a thorny transition, and a period of political instability and economic and social uncertainty. The effects on the international front will probably be a weakened leftist wave in Latin America, and a somewhat quieter voice of the "anti-imperialist bloc" that's aiming to curb the US geopolitical influence in the Western hemisphere. It's no surprise that Chávez' condition is being closely followed by countries like Cuba and Bolivia, who are hugely dependent on the constant subsidies, oil deliveries and other forms of aid from Venezuela for sustaining their fragile economies.

But whoever the next ruler of Venezuela might be, they're up for some hard economic decisions. The government has already increased public spending to levels that are hardly sustainable. The economy, which has registered 5% growth levels last year (a process that has its downsides), will probably be slowing down in the next months, and inflation will exceed its present 18% levels. Meanwhile, Chávez and his finance experts have dismissed the expectations for devaluing the national currency, which could help cut the budget deficit (currently ~15% of the GDP). Besides, Venezuela is having serious problems with rising crime, crumbling infrastructure, rampant corruption, the dominant black market and the dysfunctional health care system.

If Maduro comes to power, his primary task will be to protect Chavismo from internal disintegration, and prevent self-destructive power struggles that could disrupt the regime. So far Chávez alone has managed to achieve all that, solely relying on his personal authority. But that'll be much harder for Maduro. He's a civilian who'll have to keep the national armed forces in check, an institution that Chávez has turned into the military wing of the ruling party. As a representative of the radical left, Maduro will be having constant frictions with the pragmatic wing, among them some of the most influential military officers and the newly forged industrial tzars who currently form the foundation of the regime.

In turn, if Capriles wins the presidency, he'll have to hold the fractured opposition in one piece, and that won't be an easy task either. It consists of over 30 parties on the right, forming the so-called Democratic Unity Roundtable. Many of them have very divergent opinions about who should be ruling and how, and such a regime would be very unstable, too.

For the time being though, all eyes are still on the sickbed in Havana. Chávez has shown time and time again that he's a survivor, so we shouldn't rule out the unlikely scenario of his return, either.

Comments

[mikeyxw.livejournal.com]

I couldn't open the first link, but I certainly accept that some folks who were involved with the coup visited Washington DC. I also checked out the "U.S. involvement" of the article you listed, it also supports that the folks involved in the coup visited with US officials. They also visited with Canadian and Brazilian officials at times, so are we saying they were involved as well? A bunch of the section was about the New York Times refuting claims that were made.

The often quoted things about USAID, which Chavez promised to provide proof about, ended up being a few hundred thousand dollars to support an election for a union which came out in support of the coup after it happened. This is hardly sponsorship of the coup.

All in all, the most compelling "proof" I've seen is the US' involvement in the Americas over the past half century, although this is overblown a bit as well. I'd certainly be willing to look at some actual evidence, but I looked a few years ago and there were lots of accusations and few facts.

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

the US' involvement in the Americas over the past half century, although this is overblown a bit as well

What makes you say this?

Of course evidence is scarce, it's not like there's a public library containing all the documentation that has circulated between the Pentagon, CIA and the White House for the last half a century or so.

[mikeyxw.livejournal.com]

Wikileaks released a whole bunch of stuff that was never intended to see the light of day, including a whole lot of material on Venezuela. None of it really pointed to any US involvement. Also, it was an unsuccessful coup, so there should be a lot of lose ends.

The US' involvement in, say the Shah's "coup", while a bit odd, is pretty clear. Same with Guatemala. You can point to people doing stuff on behalf of the US government. In Venezuela, even with an unexpected release of over a thousand document, really there is nothing.

[abomvubuso.livejournal.com]

It would only mattered if it had been a successful one, wouldn't it? ;)

By the way you missed to mention Allende.

[mikeyxw.livejournal.com]

I try to limit myself to one can of worms per day.

[telemann.livejournal.com]

Great thread btw, so thanks for providing some nformation I was curious about.

I've been watching Oliver Stone's Untold History and he mentioned a few other cans of worms. But I'm suspect of a lot of Stone's conclusions (not the "facts" mind you) because I remember his movie JFK made some really bad historical blunders, and then he doubled down on those mistakes when he and Gerald Posner* were in an interview together. I mention all this because the series gets into a lot of these same issues in the OP; and CIA involvement with destabilizing governments we don't like.
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* (an author who demonstrated beyond any doubt there wasn't a conspiracy and Oswald was the lone gun man)

[underlankers.livejournal.com]

I think Fidel Castro might disagree with that, as would the South and Central American countries where we propped up dictators to meet our interests. And as would the victims of the Contras, like all the nuns they raped.