"Whether or not the OP or Plutarch are saying [that the atheist has faith and the superstitious doesn't], it's just not true."
Given that you, evidently by your own admission, don't understand the meanings of the words as they are being used in this context, surely you're not in a position to assess whether or not the claims that use these meanings are true or false. That is: in order to assess whether Plutarch or the OP are correct in their attribution of faith to the atheist and not the superstitious, you would surely first have to understand what they mean by faith, atheism, and superstition. But you don't.
In any case, your personal belief that their thesis is false (regardless of whether that belief is well or poorly founded, and regardless of whether their thesis is in fact false) isn't relevant. The problem here is that you and the_rukh have engaged in a fallacy of equivocation. A critic's fallacy of equivocation is no less fallacious if the thesis they are critiquing happens to be false.
"I don't believe Plutarch is talking about this..."
But you haven't read the piece, right? Why should anyone--including, above all, yourself--be interested in beliefs you've arbitrarily imagined about the contents of something about whose contents you are ignorant? If you're interested in what Plutarch is saying, surely the next step would be to read what he is saying.
"I simply disagree with that claim."
Again, you would have to have understood the claim in order to have a reasonable disagreement with it.
"Your entire argument seems to be twisting my words to say what you want them to say."
My argument is that the comments by you and the_rukh are insubstantial since they are based on a fallacy of equivocation.
"However, suppose the second definition is used."
No, that's exactly what we shouldn't do, since it would be a fallacy of equivocation.
no subject
Given that you, evidently by your own admission, don't understand the meanings of the words as they are being used in this context, surely you're not in a position to assess whether or not the claims that use these meanings are true or false. That is: in order to assess whether Plutarch or the OP are correct in their attribution of faith to the atheist and not the superstitious, you would surely first have to understand what they mean by faith, atheism, and superstition. But you don't.
In any case, your personal belief that their thesis is false (regardless of whether that belief is well or poorly founded, and regardless of whether their thesis is in fact false) isn't relevant. The problem here is that you and the_rukh have engaged in a fallacy of equivocation. A critic's fallacy of equivocation is no less fallacious if the thesis they are critiquing happens to be false.
"I don't believe Plutarch is talking about this..."
But you haven't read the piece, right? Why should anyone--including, above all, yourself--be interested in beliefs you've arbitrarily imagined about the contents of something about whose contents you are ignorant? If you're interested in what Plutarch is saying, surely the next step would be to read what he is saying.
"I simply disagree with that claim."
Again, you would have to have understood the claim in order to have a reasonable disagreement with it.
"Your entire argument seems to be twisting my words to say what you want them to say."
My argument is that the comments by you and the_rukh are insubstantial since they are based on a fallacy of equivocation.
"However, suppose the second definition is used."
No, that's exactly what we shouldn't do, since it would be a fallacy of equivocation.