I think that all these groups are trying to influence the course of the Syrian Civil War, but they're fundamentally being driven by the continued factionalism of the war itself. Most of the rebel factions, especially the FSA, are desperate for any support they can get, and they're giving the various groups around Syria an opportunity to buy some influence, which they're doing in the hopes that they'll have something to show at the end of the affair. And the need of those internal Syrian factions to increase the cohesiveness of their own support base is driving the sectarian nature of the war. Sure, some countries aren't helping the issue, but a lot of the impetus is a natural outgrowth of fighting a prolonged war against members of other ethnic groups.
But I think that mostly the various external factions are being governed by their own political considerations more than economic ones. I can't see the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds doing anything but supporting the Syrian Kurds, whether or not there is a pipeline involved. Similarly I can't see Hezbollah letting a possibly hostile group grow too comfortable in control of the Damascus-Lebanon transit corridors. Al-Qaeda's whole purpose is to leap into situations like this on the side of the most heavily Islamicist faction. Turkey and the Gulf States both have plentiful political reasons for opposing Al-Assad, regardless of the presence of a hypothetical pipeline (which is still a far future event), immediate political reasons that have led them to oppose Syria in the past, and I believe are more likely to be the cause of their interference. In fact in both sides I see more pressing political interests. I believe Edrogan rates getting re-elected over pipeline projects, and that can be influenced by an unstable southern border and the mass chaos it causes there (also on Turkey's internally perceived weakness). I think the House of Saud would likewise rather stay in power than have monopoly control over gas lines, and getting rid of the meddlesome Assad family is one step in that (not to mention replacing the government of a semi-hostile nation with one indebted to the Gulf States). Countries with pre-existing prejudices also seem to be following them, Russia and Iran siding with the government, and Syrian enemies like the US and the UK siding with the rebels who aren't actively at war with the West.
I do believe that a lot of countries are muddying the waters in Syria, and generally behaving irresponsibly. I also believe that you're right that a lot of countries would be very happy if, regardless of the outcome, Syria was removed as a regional player by internal strife. But I don't think economic considerations over pipeline projects are a primary motivator for foreign behavior. It seems to me that most of the external actors are proceeding to act in accordance with their pre-war instincts, and that the primary motivators of their actions seem to be long-standing geopolitical issues whether large-scale (in the case of the US and Russia), or local (in the case of the Kurds and Hezbollah). I agree, it's not about democracy, but I do think it is about geopolitics (or what passes for geopolitics these days).
(Full disclaimer: I tend to give more weight to geopolitical concerns than economic futures in international affairs, mostly because I find that the pressures of domestic politics and domestic perceptions of foreign countries explain a lot more about actions than complicated economics. This may or may not be correct in all, or even most, circumstances).
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But I think that mostly the various external factions are being governed by their own political considerations more than economic ones. I can't see the Iraqi and Turkish Kurds doing anything but supporting the Syrian Kurds, whether or not there is a pipeline involved. Similarly I can't see Hezbollah letting a possibly hostile group grow too comfortable in control of the Damascus-Lebanon transit corridors. Al-Qaeda's whole purpose is to leap into situations like this on the side of the most heavily Islamicist faction. Turkey and the Gulf States both have plentiful political reasons for opposing Al-Assad, regardless of the presence of a hypothetical pipeline (which is still a far future event), immediate political reasons that have led them to oppose Syria in the past, and I believe are more likely to be the cause of their interference. In fact in both sides I see more pressing political interests. I believe Edrogan rates getting re-elected over pipeline projects, and that can be influenced by an unstable southern border and the mass chaos it causes there (also on Turkey's internally perceived weakness). I think the House of Saud would likewise rather stay in power than have monopoly control over gas lines, and getting rid of the meddlesome Assad family is one step in that (not to mention replacing the government of a semi-hostile nation with one indebted to the Gulf States). Countries with pre-existing prejudices also seem to be following them, Russia and Iran siding with the government, and Syrian enemies like the US and the UK siding with the rebels who aren't actively at war with the West.
I do believe that a lot of countries are muddying the waters in Syria, and generally behaving irresponsibly. I also believe that you're right that a lot of countries would be very happy if, regardless of the outcome, Syria was removed as a regional player by internal strife. But I don't think economic considerations over pipeline projects are a primary motivator for foreign behavior. It seems to me that most of the external actors are proceeding to act in accordance with their pre-war instincts, and that the primary motivators of their actions seem to be long-standing geopolitical issues whether large-scale (in the case of the US and Russia), or local (in the case of the Kurds and Hezbollah). I agree, it's not about democracy, but I do think it is about geopolitics (or what passes for geopolitics these days).
(Full disclaimer: I tend to give more weight to geopolitical concerns than economic futures in international affairs, mostly because I find that the pressures of domestic politics and domestic perceptions of foreign countries explain a lot more about actions than complicated economics. This may or may not be correct in all, or even most, circumstances).